



Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Introduction by Thomas Maddux, CSU Northridge

In 1965 the issue of the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs against Japan moved to the front burner of political-diplomatic discussion with the publication of Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*. Although not the first author to challenge the necessity, wisdom, and morality of President Harry S. Truman's decisions, Alperovitz provided the most serious questioning in a tightly written and argued thesis with substantial primary sources. In Alperovitz's view, Truman adopted a strategy of a delayed showdown with Joseph Stalin and waited for the development of the atomic bomb before moving on Stalin over his emerging hegemony in Eastern Europe. Truman used the atomic bombs to pressure Stalin, end the war without a U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands, before the Soviet Union could enter the war. Alperovitz's Truman did this despite evidence that Japan was ready to end the war.

Herbert Feis and other historians questioned Alperovitz's thesis, his reading of Japanese policy and decision-making, and his basic challenge to the acceptance of the use of the a-bombs as necessary to ending WWII in the Pacific with minimum loss of life and the achievement of U.S. objectives. However, if you were teaching in 1969 you encountered students who, believe it or not, were really into reading about U.S. diplomacy or anything that could be linked to the current disaster in Vietnam. When I taught U.S. diplomacy since 1898 for the first time, many students were taking a Political Science course on U.S. foreign policy since 1945. They started the course with Alperovitz and started questioning me about his thesis and the a-bombs when I was just getting to the 1930s. I caught up to the Political Science instructor who spent about eight weeks on 1945-1947, used Herbert Feis and Robert J.C. Butow to challenge Alperovitz's reading of Japanese policy, and dismayed the students who also were not very pleased with other revisionist authors who disagreed with aspects of Alperovitz's interpretation.

Alperovitz's expanded study, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (1995) attracted a different reaction reflecting the twenty years of scholarship since 1965, such as Martin Sherwin's *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race* (1987), and the significant change in scholarly perspectives and changed political context of the 1990s. Yet the issue still could produce significant heat as witnessed in the month long H-Diplo exchanges on Alperovitz's book in September-October, 1995, and continuing on to H-Japan. Interested list members may locate this discussion at: <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=lm&list=H-Diplo>.

Interested readers may also review the historiography on the issue in J. Samuel Walkers' "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground," in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2005), 311-334.

So it is very appropriate that Professor Alperovitz and Barton Bernstein, who has written many challenging and influential articles on the issue (Bernstein's commentary has been delayed but we hope to post it separately), are among the distinguished commentators on Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's study which, all of the commentators agree, takes the issue of the role of the atomic bombs to a new level with the first international perspective on ending of the war in the Pacific. Whereas previous scholars consulted only U.S. records or Japanese and U.S. documents, Hasegawa has included available Soviet records and emphasized the triangular relations among the three powers as the war moved to its final stages in the spring and summer of 1945. At times the study reads like an early Tom Clancy novel with flashing date lines starting with Emperor Hirohito meeting with his advisers in the Imperial Palace; jump to Moscow where Stalin is conferring with Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov about speeding up Soviet Red Army preparations for the attack on Manchuria; or shift to the White House where President Truman is being advised by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to modify unconditional surrender but Secretary of State James Brynes vigorously objects. Only at the end with the scrambling, opportunistic Soviet occupation of the southern Kurils and unsuccessful effort to divide up Hokkaido, the northern-most home island, does the drama lose some of its momentum.

So what are the major issues raised by Hasegawa's book and the commentaries? Hasegawa carefully addresses the historiography on these issues and makes clear where he is in disagreement with recent studies by Richard Frank, Sadao Asada, and Herbert Bix. A first issue which makes this roundtable valuable for student seminars on historiography and decision making in diplomacy is that of intention, what were the intentions of Truman, Stalin, Hirohito, and their advisers. As Michael Gordin and Gar Alperovitz point out this is a major challenge since the documentary evidence is limited with respect to what has emerged from Soviet archives, from Japanese documents that were not deliberately destroyed, and even on the U.S. side where President Truman and Secretary of State James Brynes spent a lot of time together during the critical period in July-August 1945 but left few primary records. How does Hasegawa and other historians evaluate intentions and what weight do they give to a variety of diplomatic, military, political, and personal considerations?

Second, the issue of morality and what role should it play in decisions for war and peace. In his conclusion (pp. 298-303), Hasegawa addresses the myths each nation constructed to explain how the war ended and notes Stalin's "expansionist geopolitical designs ... [which] he pursued with Machiavellian ruthlessness, deviousness, and cunning." (p. 300). Hirohito and his advisers receive the most credit for the destruction produced by the way the war ended with the Emperor depicted as giving priority to saving the imperial house rather than the Japanese people and nation. Truman is challenged by Hasegawa for failure to pursue alternatives to using the atomic bombs, although the author does not emphasize the use of the second bomb on Nagasaki as significantly unnecessary as some revisionists stress.

A third issue is to what extent are Stalin and Truman racing against each other, as Hasegawa suggests in his title, and particularly after the Potsdam conference when the author suggests that

earlier cooperation gives way to competition with the U.S. increasingly trying to end the war to minimize Soviet gains with respect to its Yalta concessions in Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, and the Northern Kurils. How concerned is Stalin about the Pacific war coming to an end before he can secure his Yalta concessions, and how much does this shape his support for unconditional surrender, his effort to delay and keep Tokyo hoping for an agreement that would keep the Soviet Union out of the Pacific war? Does Washington really give a high priority to reducing Soviet gains to the extent of rejecting negotiations with Tokyo on terms of surrender and using the atomic bombs as soon as they were ready?

A fourth issue is the nature of Japanese decision-making and the relative impact of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war on Japan's final decision to surrender. Hasegawa provides the most thorough assessment of Japanese decision-making with significant attention devoted to the major Japanese participants, the peace party, and the Japanese military. The author includes a number of useful maps, such as Map 3 on Central Tokyo around the Imperial Palace that helps the reader follow the hour-by-hour consultations during the last week of the war. The kokutai, which Hasegawa defines as the "symbolic expression of both the political and the spiritual essence of the emperor system," (p. 4) is closely followed through the book since the author considers it central to the final decisions of Tokyo. Hasegawa clearly demonstrates the enduring resistance of Japanese civilian and military officials to face the reality of defeat and surrender to the U.S. and its allies with a revealing discussion of military coup plans and abortive efforts even after the Emperor called for an end to the war. Furthermore, Hasegawa comes down decisively on the side of authors who have suggested that the Soviet entrance into the war rather than the atomic bombs had the most decisive influence, although he recognizes the importance of the shock effect of both on Hirohito and his advisers.

A fifth issue related to the third involves the nature of calculations shaping the decisions of President Truman and his principal civilian advisers. Hasegawa depicts Truman as motivated by a desire for revenge, a political distaste to revise unconditional surrender terms, and an expectation that a successful development of the atomic bombs will significantly enhance his negotiating stance vis-à-vis Stalin. Hasegawa displays considerable disagreement among civilian and military advisers about revising unconditional surrender terms and about the future Soviet role in the Far East. They seemed to agree only on the belief that ending the war without an invasion of the home islands would be most desirable but difficult to accomplish without the Soviet Union and/or a new powerful weapon like the atomic bombs to shock Japan into surrender.

Finally, the question raised by David Holloway, "how are we to think about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the endgame of the war in the Pacific?" As every instructor of U.S. diplomacy knows, students want to get to the origins of the Cold War and are quick to pull the hindsight trigger on the ending of WWII. So it is a most important question coming out of Hasegawa's study to consider "what role the endgame in the Pacific play in ushering in the Cold War?"

Author and Discussion Participants:

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is Professor of History and Co-Director of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Professor Hasegawa earned his Ph.D. at the University of Washington in 1969 where he worked with Donald Treadgold, a leading specialist in Russian and Soviet history and completed a reading seminar with Robert Butow, author of the classic *Japan's Decision to Surrender*. Hasegawa has several major publications on Russia, Japan, and international relations, most notably *The February Revolution of Petrograd, 1917* (1981), *Everyday Life of Petrograd during the Russian Revolution* (1989), co-editor with Jonathan Haslam and Andrew Kutchins, *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma between Distant Neighbors* (1993), and *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations. Vol. 1: Between War and Peace, 1967-1985. Vol. 2: Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998* (1998). *Racing the Enemy* will be revised and translated into Japanese and will be published as *Anto: Sutarin, Toruman to nihonno kohuku* (Tokyo: Chuokoron shinsha). He is currently editing *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War: Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Entry into the War* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

Gar Alperovitz, the Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the University of Maryland, College Park, is both a historian and political economist. He earned a Ph.D. at Cambridge University, UK, 1964. His most widely-known works in connection with the close of World War II include *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (1965) and *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (1995). Alperovitz has also published *Cold War Essays* (1970) and several works dealing with American economic policy, most recently *American Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy* (2004). Alperovitz has numerous articles in academic and popular journals. He has also been a Legislative Director in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, and has been a policy level Special Assistant in the Department of States. Alperovitz has been a Fellow of King's College, Cambridge University, a Fellow of the Institute of Politics at Harvard, and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution.

Barton Bernstein is Professor of History at Stanford University. Professor Bernstein earned his B.A. at Queens College and Ph.D. at Harvard University. In 1968-69 Bernstein launched his early leadership of New Left revisionist historiography with *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays on American History* (1969) and quickly followed-up with a series of collected essays and documents on the Truman administration, specifically *The Truman Administration; A Documentary History* (1968), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (1970) with Allen Matusow, and *Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations* (1969). By the mid-1970s Bernstein shifted increasing to studies related to the decision to use the atomic bombs with a number of influential articles in *Diplomatic History*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Pacific Historical Review*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, and *The Journal of American History*. Bernstein is currently teaching at course at Stanford on the atomic bombs.

Michael Gordin is an Assistant Professor at Princeton University. He earned his A.B. and Ph.D. at Harvard University. He specializes in the history of the modern physical sciences and the history of Imperial Russia. He has published articles on a variety of topics, such as the introduction of science into Russia in the early eighteenth century, the history of biological warfare in the late Soviet period, the relations between Russian literature and science, and a series of studies on the life and chemistry of Dmitrii I. Mendeleev, formulator of the periodic

system of chemical elements. His cultural history of Mendeleev in the context of Imperial St. Petersburg, *A Well-Ordered Thing: Dimitrii Mendeleev and the Shadow of the Periodic Table* was published by Basic Books in April 2004. Princeton University Press will publish his *The Third Shot: Ending the First Nuclear War* in September 2006 which focuses on ending the Pacific War. He is currently working on a study of the rise of nationalism among Russian and German chemists in the late nineteenth century.

Richard B. Frank, a graduate of the University of Missouri, is an independent scholar specializing in World War II in the Pacific. Random House published his first book in 1990. It won the General Wallace Greene Award from the U.S. Marine Corps. His second book, *Downfall: the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*, was published by Random House in 1999. It won the Harry S. Truman Award from the Truman Presidential Library. Both works were main selections of the History Book Club. He contributed essays on the end of the Pacific War to Robert Crowley's *What If?* 2 and to Daniel Marston's *Pacific War Companion: Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*. In the past year Mr. Frank was a consultant on "Victory in the Pacific," a program on the *American Experience* series on PBS, and BBC's "Hiroshima." He is currently working on a biography of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for Palgrave.

David Holloway is Professor of Political Science and Raymond A. Spruance Professor in International History at Stanford University. He is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for International Studies. He served as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation from 1991 to 1997, and director of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies from 1998 to 2003. He earned his B.A., MA, and Ph.D. at Cambridge University, UK. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. Professor Holloway wrote *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (1983) and co-authored *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment* (1984). His book, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (1994) received the Vucinich and Shulman prizes from the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. He also edited with Norman Naimark, *Reexamining the Soviet Experience: Essays in Honor of Alexander Dallin* (1996).

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Commentary by Michael D. Gordin, Princeton University

The publication of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan*, sixty years after the events it chronicles, should be considered a landmark for diplomatic history. One of the most egregious problems in the literatures about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, Soviet entry into World War II, and the unconditional surrender of Japan, as Hasegawa rightly notes, is that these are *literatures*, in the plural. Historians of U.S. diplomatic history tend to focus on the first, historians of the Soviet Union on the second, and historians of Japan on the third, all of which seems at first a reasonable division among sub-disciplines. Yet considering that these issues concern, during the period of the most intense pace of events, roughly three weeks of the Summer of 1945 involving all the same principals, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the militant segregation of quite vibrant historiographical debates. By putting the various documents, archives, and historiographies into conversation with each other, Hasegawa has rendered all three subfields an invaluable service. Even though there is much to engage with critically in *Racing the Enemy*, one hopes that from now on it will be impossible to contemplate the concluding weeks of World War II in the traditional balkanized fashion.

Of course, the segregation of literatures is not as hermetic as I have just implied, and in particular the story of Japan's surrender and of the decision to use atomic bombs in combat are often told in tandem. Hasegawa instead foregrounds the third element in this equation—Soviet entry into the Pacific war—as the missing link, not only because it has been relatively neglected so often before, but because it has the potential to resolve key paradoxes that bedevil any historian who engages seriously with this period. Even history published in Russian that extensively employs recent (albeit limited) archival openings, does not integrate the Soviet-Japanese war into the history of the end of World War II completely, particularly with respect to the role of the Americans.[1] Hasegawa has produced an account that does exactly that, adding to and consolidating the net total of what we now know about these crucial days.

This is not to say that the actors themselves knew everything that Hasegawa informs us about—and here I would like to venture a first point of discussion. Precisely how much does knowing, to the degree we can, what Japanese Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki or Emperor Hirohito or Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov or Joseph Stalin was thinking change, for example, our analysis of the internal dynamics of the Truman Administration with respect to S-1

(Secretary of War Henry Stimson's code name for the atomic device)? There are, in a manner of speaking, two different books coexisting within the binding of Hasegawa's work. The first is an account of what each of the three governments and associated officials were actually doing (so far as we can determine from available evidence—a qualification that cannot be stressed often enough). The second is an account of how those three governments, but particularly the Truman Administration, made decisions while heavily weighing the potential actions, responses, and intentions of the other two powers. In certain cases, such as the central question of the purposes of the American drafting of the Potsdam Declaration (or Proclamation) and the subsequent exclusion of the Soviet Union from signatory status, the disparity between what Truman and Stalin knew about each other's actions and intentions and what Hasegawa can now show us was in fact the case is massive (165). The reader is unclear, however, whether significant knowledge of the behind-the-scenes action would have changed any of the decisions made, and much of the narrative now serves largely as a hook on which to hang retrospective evaluations of the sagacity of various politicians. Without a clearer understanding of how the facts and the perceptions mutually influenced each other, the depth of Hasegawa's revision of our understanding is limited, although by no means erased.

Other writers in this forum will likely venture a discussion of Hasegawa's specific arguments, and the thoroughness and richness of the book ensure that detailed engagement with even a significant number of his thoughtful interpretations would exceed the bounds of a short review. Suffice it to say that Hasegawa has conclusively demonstrated, to my mind at least, that the issue of Soviet entry into the Pacific War was a central preoccupation of both American and Japanese decision-making for months before the event took place on August 8, 1945 (with Soviet forces crossing the border into Manchuria an hour later at midnight, August 9, Transbaikal time). Whether a welcome or unwelcome development—and most of Hasegawa's actors fluctuated on this issue dramatically, not least of all President Harry S. Truman—elaborate calculations for an end-of-war strategy on all sides hinged around one's perceptions of the likelihood and impact of that entry. Hasegawa interprets the Potsdam Declaration, for example, as a dual attempt to get the Japanese to surrender before the Soviets entered the war and complicated the politics of postwar Asia: to soften (slightly, but not dramatically) the demand for “unconditional surrender,” and thereby induce a capitulation by the Japanese regime; and to provide retrospective cover for the initiation of atomic bombing, the Americans' best option to induce a Japanese surrender before the full-scale invasion of Kyushu slated for November 1945 (at which point the Soviets would certainly already be in the war). The atomic bombs, in this rendition, were not an attempt to “intimidate” the Soviets to make them more pliable in Europe or to set up a future Cold War, as suggested as far back as 1948 by Nobel-Prize-winning physicist P. M. S. Blackett and later developed by Gar Alperovitz [2], but instead an attempt to intimidate (or provide an excuse for) *the Japanese* and so obviate a Soviet presence in the Pacific conflict.

There is much to discuss, dispute, and elaborate on in this picture of the end-of-war decisions, but the fundamental assumption behind this posing of the question offers a deep truth: the true focus on how the war ended should emphasize not the Americans and the Soviets primarily, but how those two parties evaluated the future actions of the Japanese government. Only Japan has the power to end World War II. Legally speaking, the war ended when the Japanese government surrendered. Historically speaking, the war ended when it became obvious after the Emperor's radio announcement on August 15th that Japanese forces would not continue fighting, a fact that

only became clear a few weeks afterward. What prompted that surrender is a question on which reasonable and well-informed people can differ. What is beyond dispute is that the war was not over until the *Japanese government* decided that it was; the Allies could engage in various gambits, but only the Japanese possessed the power to make any of those gambits “work.”

Thus a central problem for any historian attempting to grapple with the end of the war is the question not so much of why the Japanese surrendered, but why that surrender happened *when* it did. The issue is not, as some would have it, why Japan surrendered so quickly and presumably so early—was it the Soviet entry into the war or the atomic bombs (on which more soon)—but why it happened so *late*. It was clear from shortly after the fall of the government of Hideki Tojo in late Summer 1944, according to the Hasegawa's analysis of the findings of Rear Admiral Sokichi Takagi on ways to end the war, that “the only way to end the war was for the emperor to impose his decision on the military and the government” (28). And yet nothing happened for the greater part of a year, when the war ended in precisely the manner that Takagi had foretold. Hasegawa's account of these developments updates, supplements, and in some places modifies the classic account by Robert Butow, which has recently been further extended by Sadao Asada.[3] Hasegawa frames his answer squarely around the Soviet Union: the Emperor delayed because he hoped (quite rationally) that the Soviet Union would help mediate better surrender terms with the United States and Great Britain (30), and he changed his mind largely because the Soviet Union became a belligerent, and not because of the atomic bombs (186). Since this is clearly among the most controversial evaluations in the book, I trust that the other reviewers in this forum will treat Hasegawa's often-compelling case in more detail than I shall.

Instead, for the rest of this review, I will discuss some of the methodological questions raised in Hasegawa's work, both where those connect and where those diverge from those employed in most other histories of the use of the atomic bomb on Japan and the end of World War II. Given that we as historians have a very restricted amount of evidence for the three major sides—due to official secrecy surrounding the atomic bomb before the destruction of Hiroshima, the very limited releases from Soviet archives, and the incineration of many reams of absolutely crucial documents by Japanese officials before the American occupation—any history of these events has to make assumptions and generalizations. The question is not whether speculation should be avoided; it is simply inevitable. The question instead ought to revolve around the validity of particular choices and arguments. In most instances, Hasegawa's determinations are laudable and eminently reasonable. I wish to flag them here not so much to initiate a critique, but in hopes of generating a broader discussion of how these assumptions are deployed in historical analysis of this period.

My comments concern three major areas:

1. The issue of intention in diplomatic history, and in history in general. There is no question that Truman, Stalin, Hirohito, and their advisers had intentions in pursuing the actions they did, and that quite possibly those intentions shifted. The important difficulty is how we as historians are supposed to have access to those intentions. This is important because so many of the actions described in *Racing the Enemy*—the breaking of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the writing and issuing of the Potsdam Declaration, the decision to employ nuclear weapons in combat—acquire vastly different significance depending on the intention motivating the actors. It is

difficult because even if we had access to all the documents we could hope for (such as diaries, transcripts of meetings, marginalia on memoranda), a large amount of which we just do not have, these would in all likelihood not help us with the intention problem. Especially in the world of diplomacy, where one often says one thing and means another, even written documentation is unreliable. The problem is exacerbated for all three of the nations Hasegawa discusses: Stalin's innermost thoughts were rarely committed to paper, and the Soviet archives have not been especially forthcoming on such crucial matters; the Japanese documents have been mostly destroyed, and in any event would not have registered the silent Hirohito's views, the most relevant factor in Japan's surrender; and the fiercely opinionated Truman vacillated so dramatically in even his stated views on crucial questions—Soviet entry, the proposed efficacy of nuclear weapons, the retention of the Emperor, and so on—that even in this rather well documented case the historian is somewhat left to his or her own devices.

The problem of gauging intention crops up again and again in this volume. To list just a few examples, in no particular order: Stalin's motives in renouncing the Neutrality Pact and then persuading the Japanese that he would not abrogate the one-year grace period (46-48). “If Soviet action had any impact on American decisions, it reinforced the resolve of the U.S. government to continue the course it had thus far followed: to achieve Japan's surrender unilaterally” (195). “Indeed, Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima bomb, convinced political leaders to end the war by accepting the Potsdam Proclamation” (198-199). Each of these claims by Hasegawa requires a careful weighing of individuals' intentions in proposing certain actions, yet Hasegawa does not offer us a clear calculus of how he comes to evaluate evidence in favor of these views. What should be the importance/validity of memoir literature? How are conflicting accounts reconciled in general, as opposed to in each specific case? Certain factors that must be considered in any evaluation of intention are given short shrift in Hasegawa's account. Of course, he already covers so much so well that it would be churlish to point to nitpicking omissions, but some of these omissions bear on crucial decisions. For example, domestic matters in both the Soviet Union and (more importantly) in the United States are often neglected. If Truman's main goal was to convince the Japanese to surrender before the Soviet Union entered the war, then why did he take no actions on the domestic front—preparing for demobilization fever and postwar inflation—that would signal some confidence in achieving that result? By including largely diplomatic and military considerations in his assessment of intentionality and not these more mundane domestic political factors (with the important exception of popular opinion on the retention of the Emperor), the reader leaves the book a bit confused about how to reconcile competing accounts and critiques.

2. How do historians construct the boundaries of a historical “event”? The simplest way to highlight this as a conceptual problem, carefully articulated in Hasegawa, is by focusing on the question of when we as historians decide the Second World War actually ended. For U.S. diplomatic historians, the answer is almost trivial: the war was over when Emperor Hirohito decided to accept (August 14th) and then announced over the radio (August 15th), that the Japanese government had accepted the Potsdam Declaration and the armed forces were surrendering unconditionally. From the perspective of the Japanese and the Soviets, however, the issue of when the war ended is complicated in two ways.

First, the war between Japan and the Soviet Union was quite frankly not over on August 15, 1945; fighting continued throughout August, and the Kurile Islands were not seized until after the beginning of the American occupation of Japan with the signing of the instruments of surrender on board the *U.S.S. Missouri* on September 2nd. The nature, scope, and implications of the continued fighting is one of the most surprising and important features of Hasegawa's book, and his willingness to look beyond the formality of Japanese surrender to the combat forces on the ground offers many compelling insights (252, 255).

Second, albeit not an issue addressed by Hasegawa, is a question for us as historians as to whether even the American-Japanese war ended on August 15. The reason we say now that the war ended on that date is because there was no right-wing or militarist coup against the Japanese government, kamikaze attacks did not strike the incoming Americans, and the Occupation began and concluded relatively peacefully, shaping Japan into the nation it is today. But until it was evident to the historical actors that the war was in fact over—because no other events contradicted this picture—and especially in the second half of August, a time of great uncertainty in Japan and in mainland Asian occupation zones, the war was in a half-alive, half-dead state. Hasegawa is very sensitive to this uncertainty in the case of the Soviet-Japanese fronts, but somewhat less so for the American-Japanese case. He treats that aspect of the war as more or less continuous up until August 14th, at which point it truncates. This occasions one of his rare missteps with the historical record. Hasegawa believes that after Nagasaki's bombing on August 9th more than 1,000 bombers continued to be sent from August 10th to August 14th on firebombing raids from U.S. bases in the Marianas (234). This is true, but it is not true that Truman overruled Stimson and refused to allow an aerial cease-fire for those days; in fact, there were *no* bombing raids on the 10th through 13th, and all those planes flew on a single day to comprise the largest bombing raid of the war. The reason this error matters is that it further demonstrates how uncertain Truman and his advisers were that surrender would “take,” even on the verge of Hirohito's announcement. Recognition of this uncertainty only strengthens most of Hasegawa's arguments in the final sections of his narrative about how the war ended on the ground.

3. Finally, to take up an issue Hasegawa confronts directly in his conclusion, there is the potential methodological validity of counterfactual reasoning. Instead of explicitly defending the utility of such reasoning, Hasegawa structures his final chapter around various questions posed counterfactually and then evaluated. [4] His final analysis? “On the basis of the available evidence, however, it is clear that the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone were not decisive in inducing Japan to surrender. The Soviet invasion was” (298). The conclusion is one matter, and can certainly be disputed; but what about the reasoning? In a limited philosophical sense, every causal claim (which is what historians are in the business of making) implies a counterfactual: if A caused B, then that implies that if A had not occurred (*ceteris paribus*), then B would not have occurred. But how does Hasegawa - and how do we - evaluate the history of matters that never took place, indeed by definition *could not have* taken place, since events were otherwise? The atomic-bomb literature is filled with counterfactuals, and I do not believe that they are going away in the near future, but some discussion of their limits and potentials is in order.

Hasegawa's *Racing the Enemy* is a tremendous book, destined to assume an influential place in our understanding of this vital moment in twentieth-century history, and not just in diplomatic history. It is, in a very real way, a model of how international history should be written: sensitive to cultural and linguistic differences, deep in archives, astute in argumentation. However one evaluates Hasegawa's conclusions, it has raised the standards of evidence and argumentation in this area. For a historian, there is scarcely higher praise.

Notes:

[1] See, in particular, Boris Slavinsky, *The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941-1945*, tr. Geoffrey Jukes (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Boris Slavinskii, *SSSR i Iaponiia—na puti k voine: diplomaticheskaia istoriia, 1937-1945 gg.* (Moscow: Iaponiia segodnia, 1999); and V. P. Safronov, *SSSR, SShA i iaponskaia agressiia na dal'nem vostoke i tikhom okeane, 1931-1945 gg.* (Moscow: IRI RAN, 2001).

[2] P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949 [1948]); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); and Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Vintage, 1995).

[3] Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954); and Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration," *Pacific Historical Review* 67 (1998): 4 77-512.

[4] This is similar to the organizational approach in Robert P. Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995).

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Commentary by Gar Alperovitz, University of Maryland, College Park

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's new book *Racing the Enemy* is subtitled "Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan," and the author clearly believes a central contribution to be the emphasis he gives to the concept of a "race" between Truman and Stalin as World War II in the Pacific drew to a close. Hasegawa does offer important new insights in connection with this issue, much of which will be of particular interest to specialists (especially information drawn from Soviet materials). However, by far the most important contribution of the book has to do with our understanding of a related but different matter—namely, how, precisely, Japan came to surrender, and what the critical factors were which led to the final decision.

Non-specialists are not always aware of the difficulties which have faced historians concerned with this question. For almost half a century after World War II American scholars have been seriously handicapped by their lack of Japanese language skills and by the paucity of Japanese documents. Robert Butow's 1954 book *Japan's Decision to Surrender* was the primary and often only source of basic information on Japanese decision-making. In recent years this has begun to change. Herbert Bix, a researcher with language sophistication and knowledge of modern Japanese scholarship, offered his analysis in his 2000 Pulitzer Prize-winning *Hirohito*. An inherent limitation of this work, however, was that its biographical focus left little room for a full analysis of American decision-making. Richard Frank's 1999 *Downfall* attempted to dissect decision-making on both sides of the Pacific, but among other things Frank was forced to rely in part on a Japanese language interpreter. Hasegawa is the first modern American scholar with command of the language to focus detailed attention on all aspects of the problem and to draw fully upon the Japanese scholarly and primary sources now available.

Racing the Enemy provides an in-depth, day by day—often hour by hour—account not only of how key Japanese actors at the top of the decision-making pyramid maneuvered in the final days of the war, but of how subordinate players strategized behind the scenes to help orchestrate the final decision. Hasegawa also clarifies important distinctions concerning the concept of *kokutai* which are often confused in non-expert accounts—especially the degree to which at different points in time different factions and Hirohito himself upheld (or would settle for) a mystical version of the Emperor's role, a political version of his authority, or of a limited, figurehead form of Constitutional monarchy.

Hasegawa's conclusions are straightforward: First, contrary to conventional American belief, he argues that the atomic bomb did not provide the knock-out punch which caused Japan to surrender: the traditional "myth cannot be supported by historical facts;" Second, he holds that by far the most important factor forcing the decision was the August 8th Soviet declaration of war.

Although these judgments run contrary to conventional American understanding, they are in line with a wide range of other Japanese studies. Many—if not most-Japanese historians who have assessed the causes of Japanese surrender have accorded the Russian declaration of war either a central or equal role in bringing about surrender.[1] Hasegawa challenges the interpretation of an important recent exception, Sadao Asada. He also challenges key points of fact and interpretation in connection with this and other matters in related work by American writer Richard Frank.

Racing the Enemy is distinguished by the subtlety and depth of Hasegawa's scholarship, and by his comprehensive grasp of the underlying sources. He offers a nuanced account of how well known changes occurred—including: how the peace faction maneuvered to gain support for a mission to seek Soviet help in ending the war; how the Emperor came to support such an approach; how in July he came to propose that a Personal Envoy be sent to Moscow; how he thereafter made his desires known—and, finally, how Japan's military leaders (particularly the Army) were ultimately brought to accept surrender.

In all of this the central question, of course, was what it would take to bring the Army around. Hasegawa's emphasizes that the Army's contention that the war could be continued depended critically on the idea that Soviet neutrality could be maintained. The Army leadership's credibility with the Emperor, he suggests, also significantly hinged on this hope and expectation. So long as it was possible to believe the Red Army might not join the fighting, it was possible to sustain belief that there might be a way to achieve a mediated end to the war. Hasegawa notes that when the Potsdam Proclamation demanding surrender was issued without Stalin's signature from the site of (and in the midst of) the Big Three meeting the underlying theory was given important, although very brief, support. It prompted Japanese leaders "to continue their efforts to terminate the war through Soviet mediation rather than immediately accepting the conditions stipulated by the Potsdam Proclamation."

The entire house of cards (Hasegawa calls it a "pipedream") collapsed when the Red Army attacked on August 9th. He argues that the decision to move forcefully for surrender was powerfully impacted by Stalin's decision to enter the war (and by the fact that the Red Army advanced so rapidly through the once vaunted but now depleted Japanese forces in Manchuria). He also holds that the Army's military strategy of "Ketsu-go"—one major battle to force American concessions—was dependent upon keeping Moscow neutral; hence also lost credibility when the Russians entered the war. The military leaders yielded to the inevitable—even "allowed themselves to be tricked" by the peace advocates, he suggests—in large part because their own argument for continuation of the war now "lacked conviction."

Other important points Hasegawa offers in support of his central argument include: (1) "There is no convincing evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb had a direct and immediate impact on

Japan's decision to surrender;" (2) The day after the first bomb was dropped "neither the cabinet nor any member of the peace party believed that any change of policy was needed;" (3) The Nagasaki bombing was reported after the key decision-makers had assembled, and had little if anything to do with top level decisions; (4) Although in a public rescript announcing the war's end the Emperor alluded to "a new and most cruel bomb," in his rescript addressed to the military he emphasized the Russian attack and made no mention at all of the atomic bomb; (5) The argument that the atomic bomb was central to the Emperor's personal decision is based in significant part on unreliable "hearsay" evidence; (6) Finally, the overall record makes it very difficult to believe that the decision to surrender would not have occurred shortly in any event (with or without the atomic bomb) as the Red Army continued to move in the direction of an assault on Hokkaido.

Ernest R. May concluded that the Emperor's decision probably resulted from the Russian attack fifty years ago—and also that "it could not in any event been long in coming." Herbert Bix offers a similar judgment in a recent article.[2] Analysts with Japanese source expertise who disagree will, of course, inevitably suggest contending interpretations of underlying documents and of the subtle maneuvering which brought about surrender.[3] What makes Hasegawa's overall account of particular significance is that it ties in with the evidence we now have suggesting that by the time of Potsdam (and indeed well before that time) top American and British policy makers believed that a declaration of war by the Soviet Union combined with assurances for the Emperor would likely end the war before an invasion. As early as April 29 the Joint Intelligence Committee advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that given the ongoing strategic bombing, air-sea blockade, and collapse of Germany, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would "convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat"—and further, that if they were persuaded that unconditional surrender "did not imply annihilation, surrender might follow fairly quickly." On June 7 General Marshall approved a memorandum prepared by the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operation Division advising that a Russian declaration of war, either alone or in combination with a landing "or imminent threat of landing," might be enough to convince the Japanese of the hopelessness of their condition. Meeting with Truman on June 18, Marshall specifically added what he termed an "important point" to a discussion of intelligence findings: "[T]he impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan." [4] Three weeks later the U.S.-U.K. Combined Intelligence Committee completed a pre-Potsdam Conference "Estimate of the Enemy Situation" which judged that an "entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat." The Estimate was discussed by the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff, and a summary which British military leaders presented to Churchill was blunt: "[I]f and when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor."

For such reasons before the atomic test a major U.S. objective was to get the Russians into the war sooner rather than later; the fear was Stalin might wait until the U.S. had done all the dirty work and then join in for the spoils. Truman was pleased after his first Potsdam meeting with Stalin to note: "He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about." In a letter to his wife the next day he wrote: "I've gotten what I came for-Stalin goes to war on

August 15 with no strings on it....” “I’ll say that we’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won’t be killed!”

The precise meaning of Truman’s diary on this point has been a matter of dispute among historians. Some hold that he meant only that a Russian attack plus the atomic bomb would end the war before an invasion. In his memoirs Truman writes that he sought Russian participation because if the test were to have failed then it would have been “even more important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a physical conquest of Japan.”

Hasegawa is not primarily interested in this issue, however. Instead he argues that on the basis of the Magic intercepts before and after the Potsdam Proclamation (and leaving aside the likely impact of a Russian declaration of war) American leaders “must have known ... that the emperor’s involvement in the peace process marked a new departure in Japan’s policy, and, further, that the major stumbling block in persuading Japan to capitulate would be the demand for unconditional surrender.” Nor does he leave any room for doubt as to his position: “An alternative was available but they [American leaders] chose not to take it.” “[T]here were alternatives to the use of the bomb, alternatives that the Truman Administration for reasons of its own declined to pursue.” That by late July and early August Truman must have been aware the bomb was not the only way to end the war without an invasion which could not begin for another three months is also strongly suggested by an often overlooked entry in the diary of Byrnes’ assistant Walter Brown. This records the following August 3 discussion on the way back from Potsdam:

Aboard Augusta/ President, Leahy, JFB agreed [sic] Japas [sic] looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden.

Hasegawa concludes that without the atomic bombs the war would likely have ended shortly after Soviet entry in any event—and, again, clearly well before the planned November 1 landing. What he focuses most attention on is not the Soviet option, however, but the fact that once the bomb had been successfully tested American leaders were moving very fast and not at all interested in exploring other ways to end the war. Especially not the Soviet option: A central emphasis of the book is that once word of the successful test reached Potsdam Truman and Byrnes desperately wanted to end the war before the Russians got in. “Truman was in a hurry. He was aware that the race was on between the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war.” “Contrary to historians’ claim that Truman had no intention to use the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union, it is hard to ignore the fact that the Soviets figured in Truman’s calculations...”

Hasegawa’s main contention is that the bomb gave Truman a solution to three problems: It was a way to end the war and save lives, to maintain a tough domestic position on unconditional surrender, and (possibly) to avoid Soviet entry into the war. In different parts of the book, however, he offers more than one explanation for Truman’s decision—or, more precisely, he emphasizes different sources of his views. At one point he argues that as early as June 6 for Truman to not have used the atomic bomb would have required “overwhelming justification and incredible courage.” At other points he stresses revenge: “Punishing the Japanese, soldiers and

civilians alike, with atomic devastation represented in Truman's mind a just retribution against the 'savage and cruel people' who had dared to make a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and mistreat American POWs." In fact, Hasegawa uses the terms "revenge" or "vengeance" or "thirst for revenge" repeatedly throughout the book as he tries to explain Truman's underlying attitude. (Although he acknowledges the importance of recent work demonstrating a build up of Japanese forces on Kyushu, Hasegawa stresses that there is no evidence this information reached the President or that it had anything to do with Truman's decision).

A critical issue is why the famous paragraph twelve offering assurances for the Emperor was eliminated from the Potsdam Proclamation. US and British military leaders urged that some form of assurances be clearly stated. Without this a surrender would be impossible, and without this many more American and British lives would be lost. At Potsdam U.S. military leaders felt so strongly about the matter they asked British military leaders to convince Churchill to ask Truman to offer such assurances! (Moreover, Churchill did just that.)

Why, Hasegawa asks, did Truman and Byrnes actively choose to remove assurances from the Proclamation? One possible answer is American politics. Hasegawa allows that this may have been one motive, but he finds it difficult to believe it was of overriding importance. For one thing, he makes it clear that Byrnes was by no means a "hard liner" on the matter. Moreover, as he observes, numerous columnists and editorial writers (including, for instance, the editors of *The Washington Post*) had long been calling for a change in the unconditional surrender formula, as had many Members of Congress. He mentions Senator Wallace H. White, but neglects to note that as the Republican Minority Leader of the Senate White was far from unimportant. In political terms, this was not a situation where changing the surrender terms would involve opening Truman to attack by the opposition party. Quite the contrary, not only was the Senate Republican leadership actively calling for a change, but other leading Republicans had long urged a revision of the surrender formula-including, most obviously, former President Herbert Hoover (who had met with Truman in the late spring to urge change) and Henry L. Stimson, Truman's Secretary of War, an eminent Republican figure in his own right.

"It was not public opinion that dictated their course of action;" Hasegawa concludes, "rather they selectively chose public opinion to justify their decision." But, he asks, if the traditional answer that politics required it cannot explain why Truman and Byrnes eliminated paragraph twelve from the Proclamation, were there any other reasons? Clearly troubled by the question, Hasegawa comes to rest on a two part answer which many will find the most controversial aspect of this work. First, as noted, were a mix of reasons which involved the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and vengeance, on the other. (But, note carefully, not saving lives—since eliminating the assurances clearly made it harder, not easier, for Japan to end the fighting).

Second, he argues that Truman and Byrnes eliminated paragraph twelve because they knew this would make the surrender demand unacceptable to Japan-and that making it unacceptable was in fact what they sought to accomplish. Hasegawa's argument is much more explicit and goes much further than that offered by most critics of the Hiroshima decision: American leaders wanted to have Japan reject the Potsdam Proclamation in order to justify using the atomic bomb. "In order to drop the bomb, the United States had to issue the ultimatum to Japan, warning that the rejection of the terms specified in the proclamation would result in 'prompt and utter

destruction.’ And this proclamation had to be rejected by the Japanese in order to justify the use of the atomic bomb. The best way to accomplish all this was to insist upon unconditional surrender.”

We may also note, contrary to Hasegawa, that the idea that Truman was personally profoundly committed to the unconditional surrender formula (or overwhelmingly thirsty for revenge) is challenged by many documents. Among other things, in May he told Acting Secretary of State Grew that “his own thoughts had been following the same line” in response to Grew’s proposal for a statement modifying the surrender formula. In June he told Assistant Secretary of War McCloy “that’s just what I’ve been thinking about.” In July at Potsdam Churchill reported after talking with Truman his impression that “there is no question of a rigid insistence upon the phrase ‘unconditional surrender’...” At this time, too, Truman told Stimson that “he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it” if the Japanese were “hanging fire” on the issue. (Stimson noted that he was hardly “obdurate” about the matter.) Moreover, after Potsdam Truman was more than willing to accept Japan’s proposal not only that the Emperor be maintained, but that his prerogatives not be limited. (The President had to be carefully and explicitly reminded of the “unconditional” language which he himself had endorsed less than two weeks earlier at Potsdam—hardly a sign of his over-riding concern with the formula). There is also the well documented fact that all along key decision makers knew that in the end the only way to obtain the surrender of Japanese soldiers in the field was for the Emperor to order it. Perhaps the most obvious point is the simplest: political objections notwithstanding, in the end Truman did allow Japan to keep its Emperor; a descendant of Hirohito still sits on the Imperial throne.

Leaving aside whether or not one accepts Hasegawa’s explanation for why paragraph twelve was removed, he has clearly put his finger on one of the most troubling of all the many questions involved in the Hiroshima decision. Why—especially in view of the of very strong military arguments to the contrary—did American leaders make it harder for Japan to surrender?

The truly puzzling question, furthermore, is that obviously if “racing” to end the war before the Soviet Union could get involved (or, minimally, before the Red Army got very far into Manchuria) was a primary objective—and clearly in the minds of Byrnes and Truman it was an important goal—then why, specifically, act in a way which was almost certain to prolong the fighting? Making the terms harder makes little sense—especially in the face of U.S. and U.K. military objections.

Scholars who accept the argument that domestic political concerns were central, of course, have no problem answering this question. But if, like Hasegawa, one discounts political concerns, then one is forced to probe for other possible reasons why American leaders issued the Potsdam Proclamation in a manner that both made use of the atomic bomb inevitable and also—by making it more difficult for Japan to surrender—increased the likelihood that the Red Army would move ever deeper into Manchuria and North China.

The question is whether there were other reasons why U.S. leaders may have wished to use the atomic bomb.

There are, of course, many suggestions in the documents of other possible explanations. Atomic scientist Leo Szilard reported that as early as May 1945 “Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. .. At that time Mr. Byrnes was much concerned about the spreading of Russian influence in Europe; ... [his view was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russian more manageable in Europe.”

May also found Stimson advising that we should ...”let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way....They can’t get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not to get into unnecessary quarrels...; let our actions speak for themselves.”

And, of course, Truman postponed discussion of the entire complex of European and Asian issues so that he would know if the atomic bomb actually worked before sitting down to negotiate with Stalin. Once the full report of the successful test came in Truman “stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner... He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting...” (This is Churchill’s report of a meeting at which Eastern European matters were discussed. Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, reports that Churchill had also “painted a wonderful picture of himself as the sole possessor of these bombs and capable of dumping them where he wished, thus all-powerful and capable of dictating to Stalin...”)

The general attitude which Byrnes expressed to Szilard was also evident in numerous specific reports. After a discussion with Byrnes at Potsdam, for instance, Ambassador Joseph Davies noted that the bomb was directly involved in Byrnes’ calculations regarding reparations negotiations: “The details as to the success of the Atomic Bomb, which he had just received, gave him confidence that the Soviets would agree...” (Davies also noted: “I told him the threat wouldn’t work, and might do irreparable harm.”) In September McCloy met with Byrnes before he left to negotiate Eastern European issues and noted: ““ He was on the point of departing for the foreign ministers’ meeting and wished to have the implied threat of the bomb in his pocket during the conference...” At this time, too, Stimson found Byrnes wanted to have “the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon...”

In addition to what we know about the apparent consistency of Byrnes’ views before, during, and after the Potsdam Conference, there are also many indications that Truman’s chief adviser was fully capable of extremely complex, subtle and devious maneuvers. He was “a very Machiavellian character”-as Truman’s appointments secretary Mathew Connelly put it. To Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. he was “an operator;” Forest Pogue understood how it was that “he was called a fixer.” Byrnes was also Averell Harriman’s candidate for “worst Secretary of State during an important period of the life of our Republic...” Truman himself described Byrnes as his “conniving Secretary of State.”

Even to raise the possibility that diplomatic considerations connected with the Soviet Union not only in Asia but in Europe may have played a major role in the decision to use the atomic bomb has occasioned extreme anger over the years. Hasegawa, by suggesting that issues in the Far

East connected with Russia were important, touches on the hot button issue. He also notes that at Potsdam Stalin appears to have sensed that there was an intimate relationship between American diplomacy related to Europe and the atomic bomb. Hasegawa, however, has very little to say directly about European matters-or any of the other major issues in dispute at the long Potsdam Conference. In this respect his book reflects one of two continuing limitations of a number of studies concerned with the use of the atomic bomb: Few historians whose primary expertise has centered on the war in the Pacific or the Hiroshima decision have themselves actually done much detailed research on the relationship between the bomb and the emerging European confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Few know much about the details of the Polish issue which was hotly debated throughout the spring and summer. Few have explored the intensity and importance of the German reparations negotiations in dispute from the time of Yalta on. Most know little about Byrnes' concerns over conditions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary—or the importance of the fact that he personally had been the chief spokesman for (and was personally politically identified with) Roosevelt's Yalta agreement on these matters. Some have accepted without themselves having spent any serious time with the documentary sources the judgment of other historians that the impact of the atomic bomb on these matters was a mere "bonus." [5]

If lack of real knowledge of the European issues at the center of American-Soviet struggles throughout 1945 is one limitation, a second is that many scholars working in this area appear to have had a very difficult time accepting just how devious some of the key players were. One reason undoubtedly is that it is simply not easy to come to terms with the idea that some of the most important American leaders were men whose behavior was (to say the least) less than straightforward. Another reason may be that few scholars have much direct experience with the often distasteful realities of hand-to-hand combat at high levels of political decision-making.

We are slowly beginning to lose our innocence about such matters. Even a cursory review of the Oval Office tapes from both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations reminds us of just how complex (and, yes, devious) the conventional world of real world political feints, maneuvering, and posturing often is. We have also been forced to greater clarity by what we have learned about the manner in which the United States was maneuvered into war by the Johnson Administration on the basis of mis-information at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution-and, increasingly, of what we are learning about the ways in which the current Bush Administration led the nation to war in Iraq on the basis of faulty information (and strident rhetoric stressing the imminent danger of a "mushroom cloud.") Jimmy Byrnes no longer seems so unusual a figure, or his standard operating procedure so hard to confront.

My own view continues to be that although there are very strong suggestions in the available documents both of the deviousness of Byrnes and of the importance of both European and Asian issues related to the Soviet Union in the decision to use the atomic bomb, the truth is we still do not have sufficient information to definitively answer some of the most important questions concerning why the bomb was used.

This, however, leads to two final observations. Some writing in this field not only seems innocent of real world political experience (and not well informed about broader issues of Cold War maneuvering in Europe). In some cases the tone of pronouncements is certain and assertive;

sometimes even Olympian and magisterial—allowing, as it were, no possibility of error. Such a posture reaches well beyond what can be documented with certainty. Hence, the final issue we need to confront is the inadequacy of the record.

Non-specialists may not fully understand that most discussions concerning the decision to use the atomic bomb at the very highest level were simply not recorded. Not only were such matters handled in an extremely secretive manner at the time, they were largely handled outside the normal chain of command. There is also evidence of the manipulation of some documents, or simply of missing documents in certain cases-and in some cases, explicit evidence that specific documents were destroyed.

Most important is that although we know that Byrnes was Truman's closest adviser, we have almost no information on critical discussions related to the key issues between the two men. The point needs to be stressed. Byrnes and Truman were old friends; their relationship dated to the days when the Byrnes mentored Truman when he first came to the Senate. They often ended the day with a "libation" (often Byrnes' bourbon)-and what they called a "bullbat session." It is also clear that Byrnes dominated the relationship in the early days of Truman Presidency-especially with regard to atomic bomb issues (he was Truman's representative on the Interim Committee) and on foreign policy (both before and after he was formally sworn in as Secretary of State.)

Byrnes briefed Truman on the Yalta understandings at the very outset of his Presidency, and the two men met privately to discuss the key issues on many, many occasions throughout the spring and summer of 1945. They were at sea together for eight days on the way to Potsdam, meeting at least once a day to plan for the Conference and for the use of the bomb. (Truman's "conniving" characterization of Byrnes was made in connection with one such discussion.) They also shared a villa at Babelsberg near Potsdam. (And commonly drove back and forth together, in all probability discussing the day's events.) Virtually none of the discussions between the two men most responsible for the critical decisions related to the atomic bomb at Potsdam were recorded in any direct way. [6]

Perhaps one day we will know more and will be able to define with greater certainty the way decisions were really made. We are unlikely, I think, to discover new official sources. However, a new generation of scholars may well be able to ferret out diaries, letters, or additional personal papers in the attics or basements of descendants of some of the men involved. An even more interesting possibility is that the President's daughter Margaret will one day donate additional papers to the Truman Library. (In her own writing Margaret reports details from the Potsdam Conference which seem clearly to be based on documentary sources. However, she has so far refused to respond to inquiries from historians asking for access to these.) A third possibility is that if the Soviets did, in fact, bug the Truman villa near Potsdam (or the villas of other American or British officials), there may be tapes or transcriptions of some key conversations in NKVD or other files in the Russian archives. [7]

Notes:

[1] Information from a comprehensive assessment nearing completion by Ayako Doi and Kimi Yoshida.

[2] “Japan’s Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,” *Japan Focus*, July 5, 2005.

[3] Papers taking up some of the issues by Frank, Asada and other writers will be published this coming year in a collection to be edited by Hasegawa.

[4] Some historians think the words “at that time” can be read to mean at the time of a possible invasion rather than at the time of Russian entry, which seems the more obvious meaning and grammar of the additional point Marshall is here adding to the intelligence discussion.

[5] The “bonus” theory is that of Barton Bernstein-a historian with whom I disagree on this matter, but, who, unlike many, has personally undertaken the research required to make a serious judgment of the issue.

[6] A list prepared by David J. Williams of numerous known meetings at which Byrnes was present in the spring and summer of 1945 (as well as additional evidence of his return from South Carolina and presence in Washington) is published as an Appendix to my *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb*, Knopf (1995).

[7] Documentary evidence cited in this essay is well known in the literature ; references to most of the sources may also be readily found via the index to my *The Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb*, Knopf (1995).

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

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Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Commentary by Richard Frank, Independent Scholar

OVERVIEW

The end of the Pacific War looms as one of the leading controversies in American history. For more than fifty years—an astonishing achievement--Robert Butow's exemplary *Japan's Decision to Surrender* reigned as the essential work on political decision making in Japan and the United States.[1] Other works supplemented Butow, but never entirely displaced him. *Racing the Enemy* now stands as an absolutely critical work on political dimensions of this passage and I believe it is the first work with a legitimate claim to have eclipsed Butow. Not only does Dr. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa profit from an enormous body of evidence shielded from Butow's view, Hasegawa stretches the political canvas to include a Soviet Union in vivid hues. All of this is a sterling achievement that amply justifies this roundtable.

At the core of Hasegawa's presentation of Japanese decision making is his illumination of the attitudes of the key figures about the *kokutai*. This elusive concept represented the symbolic expression of both the political and the cultural essence of the emperor system. An attempt in the 1930's to find a modern constitutional monarchy in the Meiji constitution was savagely rebuffed by the prevailing mythical vision that made the emperor a god reigning above the political system. Despite his exalted theoretical status of supreme political, religious and cultural authority, much controversy surrounds the emperor's actual role in policy making. One pole of argument vigorously advanced by Dr. Herbert Bix in his prize winning work is that Hirohito was a sort of "fighting generalissimo," and the real master puppeteer forging Japan's destiny.[2] At the other pole is the image cultivated particularly during the occupation of Hirohito as a figurehead. Hasegawa leans to the later, but argues that the crisis of surrender propelled Hirohito to redefine the *kokutai* such that he could actively participate in the decision to capitulate, and that in doing this he separated himself from the mythic notion of a national community.[3]

One measure of Hirohito's deftness—and the opaqueness of imperial Japan--is that he crafted a record that left historians grappling to understand his exact role. Bix is convincing that Hirohito was much more than a figurehead. But the "fighting generalissimo" image reaches too far because there are simply too many gapping chasms between Hirohito's concepts and actual Japanese policy, not to mention instances of flat disregard for his ostensible "orders." [4] Hirohito used his intelligence and his willingness and skill at exploiting the power of his

symbolic role to shape and not simply ratify policy. His effectiveness, however, arose not from his veiled but unchecked power, but from his canny tactical maneuvering.[5]

Hasegawa as I read him does not dispute Butow's assessment that the key actors in Japan numbered only eight men: the inner cabinet dubbed The Big Six, the emperor and the emperor's alter ego, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis Kido Koichi. What Hasegawa illuminates in a new and subtle way is that among these eight men, only Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori was prepared to abandon any vestige of the old order in Japan dominated by a militarist and super nationalist elite and accept the Potsdam Proclamation terms save only for a promise of retention of a constitutional monarchy. Everyone else, most particularly including Hirohito, looked to maintain the old order in Japan. They were divided, however, over the means to achieve that aim. Most of these key actors looked to favorable terms for ending the war, prominently including the prohibition of an occupation. As a last resort sought, Hirohito and others sought to retain substantive powers in his hands to thwart the American occupation reforms aimed precisely at eradicating the old order. During the critical debates on August 9, Hasegawa shows that contrary to the conventional views, Hirohito sought more than what Togo was prepared to accept to end the war. All of this leads to two of Hasegawa's most important conclusions: that Japan was not on the cusp of peace before Hiroshima and that even an American guarantee of a constitutional monarchy under the existing dynasty would not have secured Japan's surrender without further military action.

Another major contribution is the first really comprehensive incorporation in the story of the end of the Pacific War of Soviet decision making and particularly the diplomatic and military initiatives that continued long after the emperor announced that Japan would surrender. *Racing the Enemy* depicts "geostrategic" considerations rather than ideology as the faithful guide to Joseph Stalin's maneuvers. Hasegawa presents a convincing case that the notion that the war might have been ended diplomatically by Soviet signature on the Potsdam Proclamation (with or without a promise regarding the imperial institution) is a chimera. Stalin would never have done anything that threatened to end the war before the Soviets could launch the attacks that would secure for them the spoils promised at Yalta. Hasegawa confirms Soviet designs on Hokkaido were real and came very near to realization. He further details the series of seizures of the southern Kuril Islands for which the Soviets lacked any historic claim whatsoever.

With respect to the U.S., Hasegawa portrays President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes as facing a dilemma of avoiding massive American casualties and ending the war before the Soviets could enter. *Racing the Enemy* maintains that Truman and Byrnes therefore deliberately excised from the Potsdam Proclamation any promise that Japan could retain a constitutional monarchy. They did this with deliberate intent to assure that Japan rejected the Potsdam Proclamation to justify the use of the atomic bombs that would deliver them from their dilemma. Hasegawa further argues that it is a myth that Japan rejected the Potsdam Proclamation and that this rejection led to the use of atomic bombs. My dissents from these arguments are set forth below.

Hasegawa also provides the most comprehensive examination in English of the role of a number of secondary actors, like Admiral Takagi Sokichi, an aide to Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, Matsudaira Yasumasa in the Imperial Household and Matsumoto Shun'ichi in the Foreign

Ministry, who steered and even deceived the key actors along the path to peace. On the American side, he provides a parallel story of secondary actors that is new and very significant. The exhortations concerning the mythic version of the kokutai of Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro at the Imperial Conference on August 9-10 prompted the insertion of a malignant cell in Japan's note purportedly accepting the Potsdam Proclamation. That cell constituted a demand as a condition precedent to surrender that the U.S. must concede the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign Ruler." Joseph Grew, Joseph Ballantine and Eugene Dooman—ironically under suspicion as the "appeasers" in the State Department—recognized this provision was not innocuous but was a demand to place substantive power in the hands of the emperor and thus defeat the overall American war aim of a demilitarized, democratic Japan. While critics castigated James Byrnes for years for persuading Truman not to accept this note, Hasegawa demonstrates that Byrnes himself was initially complacent about accepting it, and that Grew and company labored hard to convince him that the Japanese note could not be accepted without dire consequences.

Racing the Enemy will mark a turning point in the U.S. historiography of the end of the Pacific War. It is the coup de grace to the fundamental premises of the first wave of what has been called "revisionism." Following a number of prior works and based on such thorough and sound research from Japanese sources, it demolishes the narrative that Japan was near surrender before Hiroshima or that her surrender could have been easily procured with a guarantee about the imperial institution untenable. At the same time, this work will open new fronts for critical challenges to Japanese and American decision making. As this roundtable is designed to bring out disagreements and perhaps areas where further scholarship is warranted, I will now turn to those areas.

COMMENTARY

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The dominant narrative in Hasegawa's fine work is that Japan's decision to surrender was "political" rather than "military." Having labored so hard and so well to capture more accurately than anyone else the nuances of Japanese political debates, he has skipped with ease to the conclusion that the "political" element is overwhelmingly dominant. He is by no means alone for this is a persistent theme in the cannon of "revisionist" work. In my view, the "political" and "military" elements are too thoroughly intertwined to be cleanly separated, much less to permit relegating "military" factors to a markedly inferior status. For example, the surrender decision of Japan's most senior military leaders in Tokyo is critical to ending the war. Even Hasegawa attributes this to a "military," not a "political" factor. He maintains that these militarists agreed to surrender because Soviet entry into the war negated their Ketsu Go strategy of a last great battle against the expected initial American invasion. Unfortunately, this assertion is belied by their actual reaction and their response can not be comprehended without placing the "military" elements in the foreground. I find that the lack of balance in presentation and assessment of the "political" and "military" aspects of Japan's surrender induces fundamental distortions. Hasegawa's portrait of why Japan surrendered and American decision making. [6]

Japan's surrender is best understood as two steps. The chronological first step and thus the most important one was overtly "political:" someone with legitimate authority had to decide that Japan would surrender. But this would not alone end the war. There was a second essential step: Japan's armed forces both in the Home Islands and overseas had to comply with that order. These steps involved different actors and not surprisingly the factors that motivated these different actors varied. Both political and military considerations shaped both steps. Although *Racing the Enemy* does not explicitly follow this "two step" analysis, Hasegawa is too perceptive to ignore or minimize the question of the compliance of Japan's armed forces with the surrender. This sets him apart from much of the critical literature that in my view ignores or minimizes this very real issue. There is important new evidence and interpretation bearing on this second step in *Racing the Enemy*.

One of the mainstays of *Racing the Enemy* is the repeated assertion that Soviet mediation was Japan's "last hope." But was it? The answer even within the text of *Racing the Enemy* is no. For many of the loose federation Hasegawa tags as the "peace party" (including Togo and his Foreign Ministry, some outsiders like Prince Konoe, a former prime minister) it is correct to say that "Soviet mediation" was "the last hope." If ultimate power rested with this "peace party" then it would be reasonable to argue that Soviet mediation and thus political factors were the key to Japan's surrender.

But *Racing the Enemy* concedes that the nemesis of the "peace party" was another faction, the "war party." The "war party" vested its "last hope" in Ketsu Go, the strategic plan that aimed to either defeat or inflict such heavy loss on the initial invasion that the American leaders would be prepared to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the "war party." Ketso Go tucked the critical moment for hard diplomacy chronologically after the initial invasion battle, although the effort to open a mediation channel before the first invasion battle did not unduly disturb the "war party"— provided that Japan made no great concessions that would imperil the old order.

This brings us to the central conceptual flaw in *Racing the Enemy*. The most powerful decision makers in Japan in 1945 were the "war party," the militarists. Thus, even the most insightful analysis of the "peace party" will not explain fully Japan's surrender. Hirohito by his own admission was effectively a member of the "war party" until defeat on Okinawa loomed as a certainty in the second half of June. At that point he augmented his vision to include a simultaneous effort to expedite the Soviet mediation effort. [7] But as *Racing the Enemy* shows, Hirohito's only ambiguous concepts of the terms for ending the war (assuming Hirohito ever had much in mind for terms beyond the preservation of the maximum power in his hands) did not match those of Togo and the "peace party."

The whole desultory tale of the checkered course of diplomatic approaches to the Soviets stands as a formidable obstacle to a generalized "last hope" interpretation. The incredibly dilatory contacts (first without an intention to reveal a desire to secure their mediation!) and the complete inability of the Big Six to conduct any meaningful discussion of what terms Japan would accept to end the war until the morning of August 9, belie the notion that Soviet mediation represented the "last hope" for all the major actors who actually held the power to make the decision to capitulate.

TRUMAN, BYRNES AND THE POTSDAM PROCLAMATION

The Potsdam Proclamation is pivotal to Hasegawa's depiction of American political decision making for ending the war. He maintains that Truman and Byrnes believed they were on the horns of dilemma between avoiding massive U.S. casualties and ending the war before Soviet intervention. They decided that by dropping draft language in the proclamation providing for a guarantee of the imperial institution, they could assure that Japan would reject the proclamation and thus justify the use of atomic weapons. The atomic bombs would then end the war without massive U.S. casualties and before Soviet entry. For the reasons set forth below, I do not find merit in this argument. [8]

The Chronology of the Decision to Drop the Promise of the Constitutional Monarchy from the Draft Potsdam Proclamation and the News of the Successful Test of the Atomic Bomb

One of the touchstones in *Racing the Enemy* is the chronology of the decision to drop the promise of a constitutional Monarchy from the draft of the Potsdam Proclamation and the news of the successful atomic bomb test on July 16. Initially, Hasegawa stresses the fact that when Truman's Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 17, his language strongly suggested that Truman and Byrnes had already discussed the issue and that they had already decided to remove the promise of a constitutional monarchy from the draft of the Potsdam Proclamation. Leahy's actual comment is recorded as: "consideration had been given to removing the sentence in question [promising a constitutional monarchy]" at a political level (p. 148). I do not find this phrase an affirmation that a definitive decision had been made.

Racing the Enemy then goes on to argue that although there were initial reports about the atomic bomb test on July 16 and 17, it was not until a detailed report arrived on July 21 that the "atomic bomb began to influence American decisions" (pp. 148-49). But if Leahy's statement accurately mirrored what he understood Truman and Byrnes were thinking by July 17, then it would appear that the definitive or the tentative decision was made before the test, or at latest at the time of the first flash reports of the test without any details. The chronology alone would rule out the prospect that the decision was rendered with the knowledge the July 21 report that first confirmed the power of the weapon.

This analysis suggests *Racing the Enemy* might have been better arguing Leahy's comment to the JCS on July 17 was tentative (which appears more consistent with the evidence). This would still permit an argument that the July 21 report cinched the linkage in the minds of Truman and Byrnes that by dropping any promise with regard to a constitutional monarchy, they could assure Japanese rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation and thus justify the use of the atomic bombs. It still leaves a problem with the record because it shows in any way of reading Leahy's comments that Truman and Byrnes were already at least thinking of dropping the promise even before they had any basis to repose great confidence in the practical reality of really powerful bombs. At a minimum, this indicates there must have been some other factor or factors that moved them in this direction we must consider.

On the other hand, if the stance in *Racing the Enemy* that the decision had been made by July 17 to delete the promise of a constitutional monarchy from the Potsdam Proclamation is correct,

then it would establish that this critical decision was made before July 21 when Hasegawa first sees the atomic bombs as definitely beginning to influence American decisions. This would undermine the linkage in the minds of Truman and Byrnes between dropping the promise and the success of the bomb test.

Were Truman and Byrnes Alone in Contemplating Dropping the Promise of the Constitutional Monarchy from the Potsdam Proclamation?

One of the other mainstays of much critical argument by no means confined to this work is that it was Truman at Byrnes' urging who removed the promise of a constitutional monarchy from the draft of the Potsdam Proclamation despite what is often portrayed as massive if not universal support by other advisers. The obvious problem with this argument is that it ignored or glossed over the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves recommended that the original draft language be dropped in a July 18 memorandum to the president—an action Secretary of War Henry Stimson would also endorse. The Joint Chiefs, in turn, were clearly influenced by the arguments of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC). This little noted component of the Joint Chiefs bureaucracy acted as a sort of “think tank” to which the Joint Chiefs referred complex and thorny issues.

Hasegawa goes after the JSSC with a vengeance.

As I read the comments of the JSSC, I thought that they had simply done useful work. They sat back and tried to put themselves in the shoes of the Japanese and asked how the draft language might be interpreted, without benefit of any preconceived notions of what the drafters actually intended. They astutely noted that the draft contained ambiguity. Then they set out what seemed to me to be two reasonable interpretations that the Japanese might extract from the ambiguity.

First they thought that some Japanese might take the provision allowing for “a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty” as indicating as Hasegawa puts it “a commitment by the United Nations to depose or execute the present emperor and install some other member of the Imperial family” (p. 146). I thought that was reasonable and a useful warning that the silence about the incumbent emperor could be interpreted as having sinister implications for Hirohito. It was not as *Racing the Enemy* has it that the JSSC saw the “promise to keep a constitutional monarchy” as raising a threat to “depose or execute the present Emperor.” It was the silence on the explicit fate of the incumbent emperor in the draft language that the JSSC highlighted.

On the other hand, the JSSC feared that this same highlighted language could be taken by “radical elements” as a promise to “continue the institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship.” Here I think *Racing the Enemy* misinterprets what the JSSC meant by “radical elements.” Hasegawa takes the JSSC to mean by “radical elements” groups opposed to the emperor (like the communists). But I think what the JSSC feared was right wing or militarist “radical elements” that would revive after a time and then they would insist that the Allies allowed for the reinstitution of the emperor system and emperor worship. Many Americans in general, and specifically the liberals within the administration like Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish, deemed the emperor system and the practice of emperor worship as the very origin of

Japan's militarism. I think one has to bear in mind that everyone's frame of reference at this point was the revival of Nazi Germany by Hitler after the defeat in World War I.

The JCSS recommended changing Stimson's draft as follows and in keeping with what it believed were the principles of the Atlantic Charter with the omissions in []:

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. [This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.] Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government."

As Hasegawa usefully adds to the record, the Operations Division of the War Department (OPD) countered this memorandum on July 13 in a memorandum to General Thomas T. Handy. OPD thought the first point made by JSSC could be handled by further clarifying the term "constitutional monarchy." Their essential recommendation was that the last sentence of the JSSC draft be modified to read: "The Japanese people will be free to choose whether they shall retain their emperor as a constitutional monarchy." As for the second point, OPD thought the "radical elements" were so small and unlikely to have any power to influence the present government in its decision to surrender that the argument was totally irrelevant. OPD said:

"The primary intention in issuing the proclamation is to induce Japan's surrender and thus avoid the heavy casualties implied in a fight to the finish. It is almost universally accepted that the basic point on which acceptance of surrender terms will hinge lies in the question of the disposition of the emperor and his dynasty. Therefore, from the military point of view it seems necessary to state unequivocally what we intend to do with regard to the Emperor."

OPD proposed language as follows, again omissions in []: "[Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression,] The Japanese people will be free to choose [their own form of government] whether they shall retain their emperor as a constitutional monarchy."

OPD said this was totally in line with the thinking of Stimson and McCloy. Handy sent this memorandum to Marshall. (Pp. 146-47)

With regard to this second point by the JSSC and the revision proposed by OPD, we get into the troublesome issue of the proper sphere of military competence and advice. OPD's position would be defensible if its proposal only touched the immediate surrender of both the Japanese government and armed forces. This is an area that falls within the realm of military competence and advice. The obvious problem is that OPD's proposed language can be read as a firm pledge about the fate of Hirohito ("whether they shall retain their emperor"). This inevitably reaches to the questions of the political arrangements the Allies intended to impose upon Japan and the fate of Hirohito. These questions extend well beyond the proper sphere of military competence and advice. No wonder it was rejected by the JCS.

Marshall proposed support of the JSSC and with an amendment by General Henry Arnold, the JCS then sent a memo to Truman explaining “in the exact words of the [JSSC] the reason for the amendment.” (p. 147-48) Hasegawa points out that Leahy and Marshall had previously been strong supporters of the efforts of Stimson, Grew and Forrestal to amend unconditional surrender, but by this action they prompted a draft that was “harsher on the Japanese.” (p. 148)

Racing the Enemy finds a number of mysteries about this, but detects a hint of an answer in Stimson’s record that the president and Byrnes had worked out a timetable for the end of the Pacific War. “Stimson must have felt how strongly Truman and Byrnes were committed to unconditional surrender. Likewise, informed by Leahy that Truman and Byrnes had already made up their minds to remove the promise to retain a constitutional monarchy, the JCS had to accept that decision.” But does the record of Leahy’s remarks really lend itself plainly to the interpretation that Truman and Byrnes were already committed to remove the promise of the constitutional monarchy? The reported remarks only say they had given consideration to this action (p. 148). More significantly, is there a scintilla of evidence that Truman and Byrnes manipulated the JSSC? *Racing the Enemy* cites none. (I seriously doubt if Truman even knew what the JSSC was.) The Joint Chiefs plainly based their recommendations on the report of the JSSC. To suggest otherwise is pure conjecture contrary to the contemporary written record.

Likewise, *Racing the Enemy* argues that Truman and Byrnes deliberately excised the promise of the constitutional monarchy from the Potsdam Proclamation because they had decided that by doing this, they could guarantee that they could justify the use of atomic bombs and thus avoid huge American casualties while ending the war before the Soviets could enter. Where is there any documentation that either Truman or Byrnes ever directly stated this reasoning? Did the JCS/JSSC propose the removal of the draft language for the same reasons? If the JCS/JSSC proposed removal of the original draft language for other reasons, how are we to conclude that Truman and Byrnes did not share the same thinking? In my view this whole argument is at best, a weak inference and one that prompts a particularly lamentable leap. Hasegawa writes:

“In his [Byrnes’] memoirs he noted that ‘had the Japanese government surrendered unconditionally, it would not have been necessary to drop the atomic bomb.’ But perhaps this statement can be read in reverse: ‘if we insisted on unconditional surrender, we could justify the dropping of the atomic bomb’” (p. 135).

Reading a statement in a public figure’s memoirs as signaling the reverse of what he actually penned may be an interesting exercise in textual analysis, but it is not history.

The labored hunt to detect a Machiavellian motive for American officials does not confront the fact as I will discuss that there was solid evidence to support the revision of the Potsdam Proclamation and that other key participants recognized correctly as Hasegawa ultimately concludes, that a promise of a constitutional monarchy would not secure Japan’s surrender.

Truman and Byrnes Revise the Potsdam Proclamation

Hasegawa points out that Stimson's diary entry for July 23 says, "He [Truman] told me that he had the warning message which we prepared on his desk, and had accepted our most recent change in it, and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation" (p. 151). This can be viewed as contemporary evidence that Truman is clearly linking the dropping of the promise of the constitutional monarchy to the recommendations made by the JCS and Stimson. Truman's comments as recorded by Stimson do not reflect that he and Byrnes had already made the same decision, or even that the recommended change was consistent with what he and Byrnes already had decided or had been contemplating. In my view, this diary entry alone is enough to illustrate how tenuous the charge is that Truman and Byrnes were plotting to maneuver Japan into providing a pretext for using atomic weapons.

On July 24, Truman and Byrnes approved the final draft of the Potsdam Proclamation. They removed the JCS proposed draft language: "Subject to suitable guarantee against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government." Hasegawa's view of the amendment is: "The omission made the provision more stringent and less clear about the status of the emperor" (p. 156).

I do not see that the revision actually is "less clear about the status of the emperor." The final version of the Potsdam Proclamation reads:

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as their objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."

Both phrases tie the new government to the free "choice" or the "freely expressed will" of the Japanese people. I do not see that the final version was more stringent and less clear about the status of the emperor. The original version says the Japanese people get to choose "their own form of government," but this is made subject to the proviso that there will be a "suitable guarantee against further acts of aggression." The revised version says the government chosen must be "peacefully inclined and responsible." I do not see any difference between the original proviso about a "guarantee against further acts of aggression" and the revised language about the new government being "peacefully inclined." (If anything, by dropping the demand for "a suitable guarantee"--whatever that could mean-- one could argue the revision is somewhat less stringent).

This leaves us then with the only other material difference of the addition of the demand that the new government be "responsible." Is this coded language threatening the imperial system? I do not see it that way.

Hasegawa adds that Truman and Byrnes accepted British amendments to direct the Proclamation at the Japanese government and not the Japanese people, but the UK did not insist on the preservation of the monarchical system. "In view of strong opposition from Truman and Byrnes, Churchill and Eden decided to drop the demand that unconditional surrender be modified" (p. 156). Where is the authority for this? The footnote cites the Stimson diary for July 24 and FRUS. Which of these sets out the views of Churchill and Eden?

“Magic” and Ultra

I believe the most reasonable explanation of the actions of Truman and Byrnes (and probably the Joint Chiefs among others) rests in radio intelligence. Certainly, Joseph Grew clearly linked that source to his documented view that Japan was nowhere close to peace on July 13 and again as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima. The decisions of Truman and Byrnes are also consistent with the opinion reached by the expert navy analysts closely following the radio intelligence information flowing from decoded Japanese diplomatic and military communications. In other words, the express or implied argument that only nefarious reasons could undergird the actions of Truman and Byrnes because no other officials shared their view is without merit.

Likewise, the intercepts demolished the belief that a guarantee of the imperial institution would secure Japan’s surrender and provide an explanation of why prior advocates of such a promise like Marshall, Leahy and Stimson backed away from such a promise.

It has been a fixture in much critical literature that Truman, Byrnes and other officials were reading the daily “Magic” Diplomatic Summary. Employing some excerpts from this summary, critics raised arguments either that Truman and Byrnes must have realized Japan was on the cusp of surrender from the intercepts alone, or that the intercepts coupled to the counsel of advisers like Stimson and Grew, clearly armed them with certain knowledge that they had to provide a guarantee of the emperor system and that such a guarantee would have ended the war.

But the reality is that the decrypts flowed to policy makers in not just one, but two streams. A comparative trickle of diplomatic exchanges comprised the contents of the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary. But there was a second stream culled from a torrent of military intercepts. This stream was the “Magic” Far East Summary.

Racing the Enemy takes the stance that there is evidence that Truman and Byrnes saw at least some of the diplomatic intercepts, but disputes whether they saw any of the military intercepts or that such intercepts influenced their decisions.[9] In important part, Dr. Hasegawa’s position was based on my work in *Downfall*. At the time I wrote *Downfall*, I was very cautious about what intercept summaries officials saw because I had not located what I regarded as definitive evidence on this point.

Because the draft chapters of *Racing the Enemy* really forced this question to the forefront, I returned to the national archives to seek further information on the distribution of Ultra and “Magic.” What was not clear when *Downfall* was written or when *Racing the Enemy* was in draft, but is now clear is that the exact same officials receiving the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary also received the “Magic” Far East Summary. Indeed, both summaries usually were delivered jointly. [10] Moreover, as the message files of the White House Map Room detachment with Truman at Potsdam make clear, the Magic/Ultra summaries were being forwarded by locked pouch courier to Potsdam with a three day delay from publication in Washington to receipt in Potsdam. When the intercepts showed the emperor’s intervention to participate in the Soviet mediation effort, arrangements were altered so that each day radio

intelligence information was passed from General Marshall and Admiral King, who did have the special secure “Ultra” radio links, through Marshall’s aide Col. Frank McCarthy to Truman’s chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy. There is no indication, however, that the locked pouch delivery halted. [11]

Understanding the distribution of the summaries by no means completely resolves the question of the influence of radio intelligence. The extraordinary security requirements imposed upon the very tiny number of officials cleared to see radio intelligence material required that they not keep copies, that they make no written records at the time of what they saw or what action they took based upon what they saw, that they never discuss the material with those not in on the “ultra secret,” and that they not refer to the matter later in memoirs or other writings. To an amazing extent, American officials honored these restrictions. Even those who violated these rules usually left only terse comments.

What has emerged in the historiography of use of Allied radio intelligence in World War II is a general pattern. We now have evidence of the radio intelligence material that flowed to various officials. We have evidence of the chronology and content of the decisions they made. In a distinct minority of cases overall an obvious direct link can be seen between the information and the decision. But far more often we are left to infer that the radio intelligence information shaped the decision making. I am not aware of any serious historian dealing with this problem who has taken the track that since we can not prove definitively whether the information shaped policy, we must therefore presume that it did not. I believe overwhelmingly historians dealing with this problem in the many other contexts it appears for events in World War II draw the inference when it is reasonably evident. I do not see that different rules should apply to this period.

We face a further conundrum when we are dealing with sets of officials, some of whom violated security restrictions and made contemporary or later references to radio intelligence while others kept their silence. If we are to try to judge the impact of radio intelligence from such indiscretions, then we need to at least assemble all the indiscretions (or the few positive indicators of how the intelligence was interpreted) when we draw inferences.

Interpreting the impact of the Japanese diplomatic and military intercepts in 1945 illustrates all of these issues.

The key diplomatic exchanges were between Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori in Tokyo and Ambassador Sato Naotake in Moscow. Sato was the conduit through which the Japanese were attempting to secure Soviet mediation. From the outset, however, Sato was convinced that the effort must fail. Further, he infuriated Togo with his dismissive hectoring about the soundness of the whole approach.

A critical exchange transpired between July 15 and 21. Sato declared that “abstract arguments” and “pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality” would not impress the Soviets. He further directed pointed questions at the bona fides of the whole enterprise. Did the government and the military actually support initiative? How could the initiative represent government policy in light of the fight to the finish stance adopted in the June Imperial

Conference? Because the initiative was a closely held secret by the Big Six, Togo's reply was evasive. He could not claim board support by the government and the military because it did not exist. Nor could he explain how it displaced the decision in the Imperial Conference. Instead, Togo was forced to say it was supported by the "directing powers" as he called them. Further, because the Big Six remained divided about terms to end the war Togo could not provide terms, apart from his oft cited comment that "If [the Anglo-Americans] insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese are unanimous in their resolve to wage a thorough-going war." But what are not commonly cited are Togo's very next words:

"The emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russian's mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

A reasonable interpretation of this message is not that Japan is simply adamant about the phrase "unconditional surrender," but that Japan would only accept a negotiated end to the war far, far different from "unconditional surrender." When Sato received that dispatch, he fired back two messages advising Togo that the best conditions Japan could hope for were unconditional surrender modified to the extent that imperial institution was preserved. [12] Togo replied to Sato on July 21, and *Racing the Enemy* particularly highlights this message from Togo finding that this telegram "played a decisive role in Byrnes and Truman's decision." (p. 157)

Byrnes' biographer stressed that Byrnes saw this message as indicating Japan's intention to fight on to the end rather than accept unconditional surrender. *Racing the Enemy*, acknowledges this, however, it goes on to argue that Stimson and Forrestal saw the dispatch very differently as indicating Japan "might be close to surrender." (p. 158.)

I agree the July 21 message was critical, and perhaps the most critical of the individual diplomatic messages that appear in the summaries. But what *Racing the Enemy* does not address about that July 21 intercepts is that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made it crystal clear to policy makers that Sato expressly "advocated unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House was preserved." Togo flatly rejected this. His comments do not even include language indicating a guarantee of the imperial institution would be vital or even helpful. Nor I would add is *Racing the Enemy* alone. As far as I am aware, the entire body of literature critical of Truman has failed to acknowledge and address the fact that the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, made it perfectly clear that Togo was rejecting Sato's proposal which parallels the package of terms that supposedly would have produced Japan's capitulation before Hiroshima. I would add that this fact was of record as early as the 1978 release of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary.

Moreover, two contemporary informed opinions of particular weight supported Truman and Byrnes. The first is Joseph Grew, the man most sympathetic to the Japanese and arguably the most knowledgeable about Japan's leadership within the U.S. government. As *Racing the Enemy* notes, an assessment prepared by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General John Weckerling on July 13 assessed the evidence that the emperor had intervened to support the effort at Soviet mediation. He listed three possible interpretations:

- (1) The emperor personally intervened for peace against the military opposition;
- (2) The conservative groups close to the emperor triumphed over militaristic elements who favored continuation of the war; and
- (3) That the Japanese government was making a well coordinated effort to stave off defeat, believed that Soviet mediation could be brought for the right price, and that an attractive peace offer from Japan would cause war weariness in the United States.

Weckerling labeled the first as remote, the second as possible and the third as the most likely scenario. He noted that Grew concurred with this assessment. The memorandum shows that it was forwarded to General Marshall at Potsdam. [13] Hasegawa concurs with my view in *Downfall* that based on what we know now, the assessment was probably too pessimistic about the significance of the emperor's intervention. But would any American official with knowledge of the Weckerling-Grew memorandum find that emperor's intervention was a clear signpost that Japan was near surrender?

Hasegawa argues that we have only Weckerling's claim that Grew agreed with the assessment. But there is no evidence that Weckerling misrepresented Grew's views. Moreover, in a memorandum to Byrnes on August 7, Grew wrote:

"We know, for instance, from secret but unimpeachable information that Sato, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow [and former Foreign Minister] has been earnestly recommending this course [i.e. acceptance of the Potsdam terms] and we believe it possible although by no means certain that this movement may gain headway to the point where the advocates of peace will be able to overcome the opposition of the military extremists and their present control of the Emperor." [14]

Based on his obvious reading the radio intelligence (the "secret but unimpeachable source"), Grew even at this late point still sees Japan not close to peace on terms acceptable to the U.S. [15]

The second contemporary informed opinion is an analysis piece from naval intelligence published in the "Magic" Far East Summary on July 27. What is notable about this analysis is that it originates from specialists whose basic job was to closely monitor and interpret radio intelligence. Their assessment states that when both the military and the diplomatic intercepts are evaluated, it was clear that so long as the Imperial Army believes it can defeat the initial invasion, there was very little prospect that Japan would surrender on terms acceptable to the U.S.

This second opinion reflected the extraordinarily grim picture presented by the military intercepts which showed Japan's militarists without exception girding for a final Armageddon battle in the Homeland. Given the dominant role of the militarists, this radio intelligence material carried political significance as well. Further, while the opinion did not appear in the "Magic" Far East Summary until July 27, it represented a cumulative assessment of the pattern that had emerged literally over months. There simply was no indication at all that the militarists

would quit before a final “decisive battle” in the Homeland. Thus, it was not a conclusion one could only have reached by July 27. It is one that anyone looking at both the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary and the “Magic” Far East Summary could have extracted days or weeks before.

In my view, both of these opinions carry more weight than those of Forrestal, Stimson or McCloy about the nearness of Japan to surrender. At a minimum the actual contents of the summaries, coupled with the opinions of Grew and the expert analysts, indicate that a policy maker reasonably could have concluded by July 13 if not well before that there simply was no diplomatic silver bullet that could bring Japan to surrender before the atomic bombs were used. Further, the intercepts made clear an absolutely crucial point prior to the date the Potsdam Proclamation was finalized and contemporaneous to the period when Truman and the Joint Chiefs believed dropping the promise of the imperial institution was appropriate: modifying the Potsdam terms to include a guarantee of the imperial institution would not secure Japan’s surrender. You do not have to imagine ever more nefarious motives to understand why dropping language making some guarantee about the imperial institution stood on its own merits aside from a Machiavellian desire to justify use of atomic bombs.

I find another irony here. Literature about this passage customarily addresses the radio intelligence in terms of the perceptions of American officials. But I would submit that this material is a particularly invaluable source of insight into Japanese thinking and decision making. The body of documentary evidence from Japan for this period is beset by a number of hazards. I suspect that much of importance within the top echelons was not written down in the first place because of the secrecy and fear of the consequences if evidence that an official was contemplating terminating the war. The Japanese make no bones about the fact that much documentary evidence was destroyed in the interval between the surrender and the arrival of occupation forces. All the post-war statements are, of course, suspect for reasons ranging from frayed memory to the deliberate distortions of hidden agendas. What makes the intercepts so invaluable is that they are unquestionably contemporary, authentic and unmarred by efforts to conceal matters after the fact. Indeed, one of the most important conclusions by Dr. Hasegawa is that an offer to preserve the Imperial institution in the Potsdam Proclamation would not have secured Japan’s surrender. Any American official could have reached that exact conclusion reading the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary on July 22, 1945. And this followed weeks of mounting evidence that the men who really controlled Japan were absolutely bent upon one final decisive battle and would not surrender on terms acceptable to the U.S.

PEARL HARBOR

This discussion of radio intelligence also brings up another issue. *Racing the Enemy* contains a persistent theme emphasizing that references to Pearl Harbor demonstrated that revenge figured prominently in the motives of American leaders, particularly Truman. For example, Hasegawa notes that on morning of June 18, Truman met Grew who pressed to modify unconditional surrender and Truman told him he was postponing it to the joint conference. Hasegawa comments that:

“[Truman’s] consistent avoidance of the problem pointed to the inevitable conclusion that Truman did not want to modify unconditional surrender demand. He was bent on avenging the humiliation of Pearl Harbor by imposing on the enemy unconditional surrender. But he would still have to find ways to minimize the cost of American lives while satisfying his thirst for revenge. He was not yet holding all the cards.” (p. 99, see also 142-43, 180-81, 201-02)

That Americans hated the Japanese with a passion during World War II is clear. *Racing the Enemy*, however, does not explore the vast catalogue of horrors Japan perpetrated that earned it the hatred of not just the Americans but other peoples. There is no acknowledgement that every day the war continued massive numbers of Asian noncombatants died as a consequence of Japan’s march of conquest.

But what is more significant in connection with Pearl Harbor that is not addressed is the fact that it inflicted horrendous damage on the credibility of Japanese diplomacy. The bungled attempt to provide a declaration of war before the Japanese launched the attack on Pearl Harbor indelibly impressed Americans that the Japanese were particularly duplicitous and that the words of their diplomats could not be assumed to be sincere. (For example, in the announcement of the Nagasaki bomb, Truman referred to the Japanese “who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor.”) As Edward Drea aptly notes, “Thus in early August 1945 as the Japanese signal peace (MAGIC) they are preparing another military surprise on Kyushu (ULTRA). I’m sure many U.S. intelligence analysts felt a sense of *déjà vu*.” [16] If you assumed, as for example Joseph Grew did, that the militarists held the upper hand in Japan, you were likely to discount the diplomatic intercepts as true indicators of Japan’s intentions. This is exactly how not only Grew saw the situation as late as August 7, but also the message the “Magic” Far East Summary conveyed on July 27.

The “Myth” of Rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation

Racing the Enemy maintains that it is a popular “myth” that Japan’s rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation led to the decision to use the bombs. More specifically, this argument goes to so far as to maintain that Japan never rejected the Potsdam Proclamation. While I admire the creativity of this argument, I do not agree with it.

1) The Proclamation was not issued as a formal diplomatic note, but was released through “propaganda” channels. Whatever the niceties of how the proclamation was transmitted, the fact is that Japanese leaders recognized it as a very significant diplomatic note. The discussions reported in *Racing the Enemy* do not reflect that any Japanese leader seriously argued that it should be ignored because proper diplomatic etiquette had been violated. Both the Proclamation and the Japanese “response” appeared via “propaganda” channels. The “mokusatsu” comment from Suzuki appeared in the Japanese print media, and other comments were still more strident.

2) In any event, the Japanese never rejected the Proclamation because they made no formal response whatever. The problem with this argument is that by its very terms, the Potsdam Proclamation demanded an immediate response: “The following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the proclamation demanded that it be entirely accepted without delay. Failing to respond at all when the demand was for a prompt response was a rejection.

3) Since the order authorizing the use of the atomic bombs was issued before the Potsdam Proclamation was issued, it is a popular myth that Japan's rejection of the Proclamation led to decision to use the bombs (p. 152). This misses the context. It is true that the July 25 order authorizing use of atomic bombs was issued before the Potsdam Proclamation. But the order did not authorize actual use until "after about 3 August 1945." As the prior description of the status of the Japanese diplomatic stumbling indicates, the Japanese had not decided on terms to end the war and were not close to surrender. If this was clear reading the diplomatic and military intercepts, why would anyone believe they would accept the Potsdam Proclamation? If it was obvious that the Proclamation would be rejected, why pretend there was some mystery waiting to be solved before it was appropriate to issue a preparatory order authorizing use of the bombs at a date well after it was expected that Japan's stance on the Proclamation would be revealed. If the Japanese quite unexpectedly accept, there was plenty of time to cancel authorization for use of the bombs.

Backfire: The Real Reaction of Japanese Policy Makers to the Potsdam Proclamation

There are two very important pieces of evidence about the reaction of Japanese policy makers to the Potsdam Proclamation *Racing the Enemy* omits. The first is the reaction of Navy Minister Admiral Yonai, one of the Big Six, as recorded by Admiral Takagi. "If one is first to issue a statement, he is always at a disadvantage. Churchill had fallen. America is beginning to be isolated. The government therefore will ignore it. There is no need to rush." [17]

The second is Prime Minister Suzuki's comments to the Cabinet Advisory Council:

"For the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force them also to end the war. That is why they are talking about unconditional surrender. Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, they will yield before we do. Just because they have broadcast their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop fighting. You advisers may ask me to reconsider, but I don't think there is any need to stop [the war]." [18]

This is contemporary and authentic evidence on the stance of two men usually cast as among the three "moderates" on the Big Six (I agree with Hasegawa that Suzuki's entitlement to the status of "moderate" is suspect before August 9). If this is how the "moderates" or at least one "moderate" reacted, obviously it must have powerfully reinforced the die-hards in the belief that American will was cracking even before the first casualty in the invasion.

Thus, these statements constitute potent evidence that the Potsdam Proclamation in one important sense backfired. Its many promises housed a host of weighty concessions never offered to Germany. It promised dire consequences for those who lead Japan into war and war criminals, but guaranteed no extinction of Japan or its people and a generous future for ordinary Japanese. Precisely because it comprised a laundry list of unilateral concessions, we now know that critical Japanese decision makers interpreted it as a sign that there was no need to rush to

terminate the war as American will was crumbling and if they just held out, the Americans would yield. In view of this documented reaction, had the proclamation contained some guarantee about the imperial institution, instead of fortifying the so called “peace party” to try to terminate the war immediately, it might very well have steeled Hirohito to believe that if Japan just held on a little longer, the next round of concessions would leave him (or a government formed from the old order) with real substantive power that would preserve the old order and a kokutai to Hirohito’s taste.

I think many of those who strenuously argue that a modification of the Potsdam Proclamation could have secured Japan’s surrender labor in the wishful belief that unilateral concessions are a one way ratchet to peace. The reaction of the very hard headed men who decided Japan’s destiny illustrate that this is just not so.

THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND HER ARMED FORCES

A Turning Point in the Controversy

The relative role of the political and military threads in Japan’s decision to surrender brings us to another major argument in *Racing the Enemy* that is apt to provoke the most debate and perhaps wrongly detract from the book’s other major contributions. This is the argument that Soviet intervention not only was the most important factor in securing Japan’s surrender, but that Soviet intervention might have produced the surrender without the atomic bombs whereas the converse was not true. (pp. 295-98) More implicit than stated is the further proposition that ending the war in this fashion would have been morally superior.

The first thing about this issue is that regardless of whether it stands or falls in the subsequent debates, I believe *Racing the Enemy* will mark a major turning point in the historiography. The initial wave of what has been called “revisionism” attacked American motives in using atomic weapons. Central to all of the assaults was the premise that American leaders knew Japan was on the cusp of surrender when they deliberately chose to unleash needless nuclear devastation for suspect reasons, such as intimidation of the Soviets. A further central “revisionist” argument is the assertion that a U.S. guarantee of the imperial institution would have secured Japan’s surrender. Hasegawa finds no merit in the central premise of this line of argument that Japan was about to surrender prior to Hiroshima. Coming on top of similar conclusions or implications in Dower, Bix, Drea and Frank, and based as it is on deep research in Japanese evidence, I think *Racing the Enemy* will be the coup de grace to the cornerstone of the first wave of “revisionism.” [19] Hasegawa further finds no validity in the idea that a mere guarantee of the imperial institution would have secured Japan’s surrender.

Hasegawa thus reorients the basic structure of the controversy. He insists that historians take as the departure point for debate that Japan was not close to surrender before the morning of August 6, 1945. Instead, he argues that various diplomatic and military options should be addressed and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in ending a war that was not at an end. He still leaves plenty of scope for scrutiny of American motives that will not please “traditionalists,” but he shows that the fractured Japanese leadership sought much more than a mere guarantee of the

imperial institution and was even more resistant to surrender than the earlier versions of “revisionism” recognized.

Was Manchuria “Written Off” by Japanese Leaders Prior to Soviet Intervention?

Hasegawa and I respectfully disagree as to whether or not the Japanese had “written off” Manchuria prior to Soviet intervention. He believes they had not whereas I believe they had. *Racing the Enemy* notes that Chief of Staff Umezu briefed the emperor on June 9 following an inspection trip to the continent. Hasegawa accurately terms the briefing as “shocking.” Umezu reported that the Kwantung Army “had shrunk to a mere skeleton, and that the ammunition reserve would be exhausted after the first major encounter” (p. 101). This sounds to me like he is telling the emperor that he could write off Manchuria if the Soviets attacked. Also, I would continue to emphasize the Kwantung Army revised and secret strategic plan (it was not disclosed to units defending the frontiers) called for abandonment of all but a small triangular redoubt in southeastern Manchuria along the Korean border. This would be analogous to a “defense plan” for the United States that provided for withdrawal of all forces to an enclave comprising Florida, Georgia and parts of South Carolina and Alabama. This again appears to me like a “write off” of Manchuria.

Amending the Framework, The New Strategic Bombing Directive and Surrender Compliance of Japan’s Armed Forces

With respect to the overall analytical framework set out in Hasegawa’s Conclusion, pp. 290-98, the featured variables involve the Potsdam Proclamation, the atomic bombs, the Soviet intervention, the Japanese offer of August 10 and U.S. response denominated as the Byrnes Note. The other issue directly addressed is the conclusion in the 1946 Summary Report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) that Japan would have surrendered without the atomic bombs or Soviet intervention before November 1, 1945 (actually the Summary Report stated that that Japan would have surrendered by December 31 and probably by November 1 without the atomic bombs or Soviet entry.)

While these variables certainly deserve attention, I believe they are incomplete. Moreover, I believe two omitted variables must figure critically in any analysis of why the war ended and the alternatives to the path history followed.

The November 1 Deadline

Before addressing the omitted variables, one other matter must be addressed. I find the long held belief on all sides of the controversy that Operation Olympic, the planned first phase of the invasion of Japan with a target date of November 1, 1945, loomed as a “deadline” in assessing how the war might have ended should be discarded. The revelations from radio intelligence and the reactions of key policy makers, particularly those of the U.S. Navy, make clear that Olympic was not going to take place as planned and ordered. This was not because it was unnecessary, but because it was unthinkable in the face of the massive build-up of Japanese forces on Kyushu.

Had Japan not surrendered when it did, senior American policy makers would have clashed violently in a great debate over whether to discard any invasion strategy at all of the Home Islands (the navy position) or whether Olympic or some alternative landing should be mounted (the army position). [20] Moreover, I believe that anyone who could conceivably have been president in 1945 would have authorized the use of the atomic bombs in the face of the radio intelligence information about Japan's preparations to meet Operation Olympic.

The Strategic Bombing Survey, Rail Bombing, and the "Domestic Situation"

With respect to the USSBS conclusion, I fully concur with Hasegawa that the work of Barton Bernstein (as well as Robert Newman and others) has demonstrated that the Survey's conclusion was not supported by its own evidence. The USSBS opinion rested on two pillars. One was that the testimony of Japanese officials had endorsed this statement. The scholarship by Bart Bernstein, Robert Newman and others has illustrated that this is just not so. But the other pillar purportedly buttressing the opinion was that it was based on a "detailed investigation of all the facts." That is an extraordinarily broad and diffuse claim. On its face it appears dubious to anyone who gazes beyond the prodigious output of USSBS and gains some grasp of the limited time invested and depth of research by the USSBS.

I agree that the amorphous claim that USSBS looked at "all the facts" is unsustainable. I do not believe that the work the USSBS did on "the facts" would unequivocally support the 1946 opinion. I do think, however, that buried in the mass of USSBS work was evidence not cited in the summary report that there was yet another scenario that might have produced surrender without the atomic bombs or Soviet entry. And I believe there is a reason why, if the author or authors of that opinion had this evidence in mind, they chose not to refer to it explicitly.

The additional evidence submerged within the USSBS reports concerns the new August 11 strategic bombing directive. This reoriented the B-29 campaign away from urban incendiary attacks in favor of a massive attack on Japan's railroad system. This new bombing campaign coupled with Japan's extremely dire food situation does raise a legitimate question as to whether Japan might have surrendered without the atomic bombs or Soviet entry.[21]

The rail bombing would have had an immediate impact on the urban populations in the densely peopled areas in western Honshu from Tokyo to the south and west (which contained 48% of Japan's population in the 1944 census). This would have triggered a massive breakdown in civil order in two waves. The first marked by the almost immediate flight of millions from the cities to the countryside. The second wave would involve nearly half the population of Japan trekking out from western Honshu to escape a massive famine. [22]

This collapse of civil order and the internal threat to the continuation of the imperial system is exactly what I think formed the most terrifying nightmare for Kido and Hirohito. (A breakdown of civil order was explicitly cited in Kido's June proposal as an important reason for action by the emperor and he again raises it in the context of his severe dressing down of Prime Minister Suzuki on August 12, described on page 232. Hirohito would mention this factor at the Imperial

Conferences on August 10 and 14 and in the Imperial Rescripts of August 15 and 17.) Admiral Yonai would comment that the atomic bombs and Soviet intervention were “gifts from the gods” precisely because they permitted Japanese leaders to avoid admitting that their real nightmare was “the domestic situation.” [23]

The rail bombing scenario alone raises a legitimate question as to whether Kido and Hirohito would have attempted to contrive an imperial conference and to render a decision like the emperor did on August 10. I do not think the evidence is absolutely clear as to what the outcome of such a showdown might have been, or as to when necessarily it would have taken place. (A protracted surrender debate in Tokyo might have provided the ultra radicals with more time to halt the march to peace with violence. Without atomic bombs, Ketsu Go may still have appeared viable to the militarists.) Overshadowing all other aspects of this scenario is one other that I believe may explain why it was not expressly cited in the 1946 USSBS opinion. The cumulative effect of the rail bombing in the context of the food shortage would be to kill Japanese, mostly noncombatants, by the millions through starvation. As it was, Japan experienced an extremely severe food deficit in the first years of the occupation with an intact civil order and a functioning rail system to haul foodstuffs from surplus to deficit areas. Since part of the hidden agenda of the USSBS was to burnish the reputation of the air force, its authors were not about to triumph explicitly how it could have defeated Japan by killing millions of civilians.

Even if the rail bombing alone did not produce surrender by itself, it is a factor that must be considered in any counterfactual scenarios on how the war might have ended. So too is the issue of the fear of Hirohito, Kido and other leaders of the “domestic situation.”

Compliance of Japan’s Armed Forces with the Surrender

The other important variable that should figure in any assessment of how the Pacific War ended and what were the alternatives is the issue of the compliance of Japan’s armed forces with the surrender order. Overall, the literature in this country on Japan’s surrender has either ignored this issue, or treated the compliance of Japan’s armed forces with the surrender as a foregone conclusion. It was a very real consideration as demonstrated both by evidence not highlighted and evidence cited in *Racing the Enemy*.

The evidence absent from *Racing the Enemy* demonstrating that the compliance of all the armed forces with the surrender was not automatic is extensive and persuasive. At the imperial conference on the night of August 9-10, War Minister Anami expressly warned that the overseas commanders might not comply with a surrender order. On August 11, the Vice Chief of the General Staff, General Kawabe confided to his diary that another senior officer at Imperial Headquarters commented to him that he did not think the overseas commanders would comply with the surrender order and Kawabe noted he agreed. A dispatch from Foreign Minister Togo to Japan’s diplomats overseas on August 11 cautioned that the government had decided to surrender, but cautioned that the Imperial Army and Navy had not concurred. When word of the surrender decision was radioed to overseas commanders, the senior officers of the China Expeditionary Army and the Southern Army both replied that they would not comply. These

two commands had between a quarter and a third of all Japanese soldiers. I regard the actual coup attempt on the night of August 14-15 as a lesser piece of evidence on this issue. [24]

Racing the Enemy does diligently itemize a series of actions by War Minister Anami demonstrating that he by no means accepted the emperor's decision on August 10 as final and continued to contemplate seriously reversing it by argument or force. On page 217, for example, Hasegawa notes all the unofficial meeting of junior officers after they receive the shocking news of the emperor's decision and the episode of Major Inaba's public statement for Anami that sounded as though the army would ignore the emperor's decision and press on with the war. Hasegawa points out that Anami refused to halt the publication because he said this represented his attitude which showed:

"...that Japan's surrender was still precarious. One false move could tip the balance, reverse the decision, and send Japan down the costly path of continuing the war. Anami's position was crucial in the balance, and he had not decided which side to take."

Racing the Enemy points out that the Soviets had an excuse for their adventures on Sakhalin and the Kurils through August and into September because: "For inexplicable reasons, the cease fire order was not issued to the armed forces until August 17" (p. 252). I do not find the "delay" in issuing this order "inexplicable." It is in fact entirely consistent with the underlying problem that the compliance of the armed forces with the emperor's order was not simply a foregone conclusion. The "delay" in issuing this cease fire order is in my view one of the clearest pieces of evidence on this point.

Hasegawa provides further important evidence on this point in the context of the ill-considered Soviet attempt to land on Shimushu, the obvious target for an initial Soviet penetration of the Kurils. The Imperial Army's 91st Division not only checked the attack, but was poised to crush it. At that point, as *Racing the Enemy* explains, the Fifth Area Army Headquarters in charge of the Kurils "panicked." As Hasegawa observes, "At a time when the Imperial General Headquarters was trying to secure the smooth surrender of all Japanese forces, a victory of the 91st Division against the Soviet forces would derail the entire process. Thus, around noon on August 18, the Fifth Area Army ordered Tsutsumi [commander of the 91st Division in the Kurils] to stop fighting except in self-defense." (p. 262) Then on August 19, Imperial Headquarters "alarmed at the prospect of continue resistance from the Japanese forces, admonished the Fifth Area Army to stop any military action, even in self-defense, 'on order of the emperor'" (p. 262). But 5th Area Army did not order forces on Sakhalin to surrender until August 26. (p. 258)

The reaction of Imperial General Headquarters as late as August 18 and 19 to the prospect of a "victory" by the 91st Division on Shimushu is further important evidence of how senior Japanese officers viewed the fragile status of the surrender of Imperial forces. If they thought this relatively small scale action could unravel general compliance with the surrender, then they clearly were extremely concerned that even a relatively modest blow could collapse the whole process. Further, the fact that this would involve a "defeat" of Soviet forces is evidence that the

Imperial Army was not totally intimidated by Soviet entry. Moreover, here yet again, we find evidence that even declaring a directive an “order of the emperor” is not enough to secure automatic compliance from a command as high as an area army.

Racing the Enemy wisely acknowledges this issue in the text, but does not return to it in the analysis. I believe it must be considered.

ASSESSMENT

At the center of this debate over the effects of the atomic bombs, Soviet intervention and other factors is a close examination of the really critical period between August 6 and 14, 1945. Hasegawa argues that chronology is the key guide to what factors induced Japan’s surrender. I agree that chronology is certainly a key analytical tool, but I do not agree that it supports all the conclusions propounded in *Racing the Enemy*. I do find, however, that *Racing the Enemy* prompted revision of my own views.

The departure point for analyzing the workings of Japanese decision making is that at the time the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, the government of Japan still had not agreed on what terms it was seeking to end the war. Drafts of negotiating guidelines had been prepared for Prince Konoe who was to head the mission to Moscow seeking Soviet mediation, but the government had not endorsed them.

Hiroshima was a tremendous shock. Indeed, incredulity marked the response of many Japanese officials. Even those who knew about the possibility of atomic weapons were not all instantly inclined to believe the U.S. possessed even one. Moreover, as Hasegawa concludes: “There is no question that the Hiroshima bomb had a great impact on the emperor, convincing him of the urgency with which Japan had to terminate the war.” He adds that likewise the determination of Kido and Togo to terminate the war as quickly as possible was likewise strengthened by the Hiroshima bomb. “Nonetheless, it did not lead to their decision to accept the Potsdam terms. If anything, the atomic bomb on Hiroshima further contributed to their desperate effort to terminate the war through Moscow’s mediation.” (pp. 185-86) I agree with this picture of how the Hiroshima bomb affected the core “peace party.” Hasegawa presents no evidence that Kido and Hirohito shared this same view.

But how did Hiroshima affect the “war party”? Hasegawa quotes Admiral Toyoda’s postwar testimony as “the situation had not progressed to the point where one atomic bomb would force us to discuss the possibility of terminating the war.” There was more to the stance of the war party than this that *Racing the Enemy* does not fully engage. Their first response was that an investigation must be conducted before the American claim that it had an atomic weapon would be accepted. But the second line of defense erected by the “war party” was that even if it was an atomic bomb, the U.S. could not have that many of them, they would not be that powerful, or world opinion would deter the U.S. from using more of them.

When *Racing the Enemy* turns to Soviet entry, Hasegawa finds that “[t]he evidence is compelling that Soviet entry into the war had a strong impact on the peace party. Indeed, the Soviet attack,

not the Hiroshima bomb, convinced political leaders to end the war by accepting the Potsdam Proclamation.” (pp. 198-99) For the “peace party” Soviet entry extinguished their plans for Japan to mediate her way out of the war. In this sense, Soviet entry carried more weight than the atomic bombs for this faction.

He then confronts the question of what Soviet entry meant for the military (the “war party”). His assessment is that the military’s Ketsu Go plan was anchored in the premise of Soviet neutrality. A staff study as late as August 8 urged that Soviet intervention should be met by acquiescing in any Soviet ultimatum, or keeping the Soviets neutral, if not joining the war on Japan’s side (!).

The fundamental problem with attempting to elevate Soviet intervention to primacy in the dictating the actions of “war party” is that their policy decisions, as acknowledged in *Racing the Enemy*, as well as the behavior of the powerful figure of the War Minister, simply can not be hammered into conformity with this view. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Kawabe Torashiro, had been one of the most if not the most vocal exponent of the necessity for keeping the Soviets neutral. He was unquestionably shocked at news of their entry into the war. Hasegawa finds that Kawabe’s diary entry reaction to Soviet entry demonstrates more shock than news of the atomic bomb. Even assuming Kawabe sustained a greater jolt from Soviet entry than Hiroshima, the differential in his emotional reaction to these two events did not lead him to argue that the only solution for Japan was to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Kawabe’s policy prescription was just the opposite: continue the war, declare martial law and, if necessary, terminate the last vestige of any government and run the government from Imperial General Headquarters. War Minister Anami found this plan congenial. Perhaps the most level headed of the three key army figures at Imperial General Headquarters, General Umezu Yoshijiro, the Chief of the General Staff, told the emperor to his face at the Imperial Conference on August 10 that Soviet entry was unfavorable, but it did not negate Ketsu Go. Umezu’s telling comments to the emperor are absent from *Racing the Enemy*. [25]

At this point a digression is in order to comprehend why the reaction of these key Japanese officers was rational. Decades of images of mighty Soviet forces have made it easy for many to assume that the mere prospect of Soviet intervention would intimidate Japan’s military masters into submission. But the facts are different. The Soviets massed about 1.6 million men and over 5,000 combat aircraft and over 5,000 armored vehicles in the Far East for their onslaught against Japan. They readily crushed the Kwantung Army which by this time was numerically strong, but composed of woefully untrained and underequipped units that Japanese staff officers estimated possess the combat power of only six and two-thirds divisions. [26]

The Achilles heel of Soviet capabilities, however, was sea lift. Like the German Army facing Great Britain in 1940, once the Soviets reached the ocean shores, all this mass of men, planes and armored vehicles could not avail them unless they could be transported over the water to the places the Soviets needed to go. Soviet sea lift permitted only extraordinarily modest excursions by regiments or small divisions of light infantry with a few man portable weapons (supported by the larger caliber weapons on the Soviet warships). There was no capability of landing on a beach armored vehicles or artillery in numbers. Soviet aircraft were optimized for immediate battlefield missions, not long range escort or strike as required to support an invasion of Japan. [27] As *Racing the Enemy* describes, what passed for a major Soviet landing in the Kurils came

within an ace of being crushed by the modest Japanese garrison on Shimushu. (*Racing the Enemy*, pp. 261-62.) In light of these realities, there was nothing absurd about the reaction of the key leaders of the Imperial Army that Soviet intervention did not negate their “last hope,” Ketsu Go.

Nor was Soviet intervention unexpected. The Imperial Army anticipated that the Soviets would join the war. Despite clear intelligence that the Soviets were conducting a huge build-up of forces in the Far East, senior officers convinced themselves that the Soviets would not intervene until 1946, after Ketsu Go. This was an obvious case of believing that what you wished would be so. [28]

When the news of the Soviet attack arrived, it did clearly prompt the emperor to order the government to confront the situation and seriously address settling the war. This is an important step in the right direction, because the government of Japan amazingly still had no clear concept of what would be acceptable terms to end the war. But belatedly confronting the issue of terms is not surrender itself.

When forced to settle at long last on terms to end the war, the best the Japanese leadership in the inner cabinet, the Big Six, could do was to adopt the set of terms most favorable to Japan that had been devised for the Konoe mission prior to the use of atomic bombs or Soviet intervention. That folio of terms included not simply a guarantee of the imperial institution, but also three others: Japanese self-disarmament, Japanese trial of alleged “war criminals,” and above all no occupation. As Hasegawa concedes, this was not a set of terms that could or should have been acceptable to the U.S.

The News of Nagasaki

The news of Nagasaki arrived before the Big Six at 11:30 PM and Hasegawa finds that it had “little impact on the substance of the discussion.” He points out the official Japanese war history says there was no evidence it had serious effect and Togo and Toyoda later did not mention it. (p. 204)

I agree, of course, that Hasegawa correctly cites what the official history says and that Togo and Toyoda did not mention it later. Asada Sadao points out, however, that in Toyoda’s post war statement, he maintained that the attitude of the Big Six initially was “bullish” on continuing the war. This is with knowledge of Soviet intervention and the Hiroshima bomb. It’s only later that the Big Six agree for the first time on a set of terms. If chronology is our guide, then it points to the significance of the Nagasaki bomb. [29]

Further evidence that Nagasaki was not without effect appears within hours. At the afternoon cabinet meeting, Anami states that the U.S. might have more than a hundred bombs and the next target would be Tokyo. (p. 208). This was contrary to what he said just that morning in the Big Six meeting that “they could not base further action on the assumption that Japan would be attacked by additional bombs.” Does it really appear valid to argue that Nagasaki was unconnected to Anami’s stance later that the U.S. had a huge supply of bombs? If Anami is

telling other policy makers that this is the case, he was undercutting his main argument about carrying on the war, not to mention what the emperor would have thought when he learned that the army is crediting the U.S. with a huge supply of atomic bombs. Looked at this way, the evidence has been there in plain sight but not identified that Nagasaki did indeed have an important role.

When I wrote *Downfall*, I saw the Nagasaki bomb as being an indirect factor in that it simultaneously undermined the argument that the U.S. did not have a supply of atomic weapons and thus undermining the arguments of some in the die hard camp. But if Anami himself makes such a flip flop on the U.S. supply of bombs after news of Nagasaki arrives, then I think its effect was not so indirect.

Suzuki Meets Kido at 1330, August 9

As *Racing the Enemy* reports, Suzuki reported to Kido at 1330, and said the Big Six had decided to accept the Potsdam terms with four additional terms. Kido “at first approved acceptance” of this proposal that satisfied the dictates of the “war party.” So if chronology is the key, the fact is that by the early afternoon of August 9, neither the atomic bombs nor Soviet intervention has brought the government of Japan or the emperor to terms that would end the war. What is further illuminated here is that even as late as this point, the emperor and Kido clearly were not encamped with the “peace party.”

Hasegawa explains that when Konoe learned of Kido’s stance, he was “aghast.” Konoe recruited Prince Takamatsu to call Kido. Kido “told the prince with obvious annoyance, that they had little choice but to accept the four conditions.” Then at 1500, as Kido talked with Hirohito, Konoe enlisted Shigemitsu who went to the imperial palace and met Kido at 1600. Shigemitsu insisted: “In order to break through the impregnable wall of the army, they had no alternative but to rely on the emperor’s intervention.” Shigemitsu’s “desperate plea” finally convinced Kido and at 1635 Kido had a long audience with the emperor. At 1720 Kido reported back to Shigemitsu that the emperor now supported the single condition. (p. 206)

I concur with Hasegawa on the key importance of the meeting of Kido and Hirohito between 1635 and 1720 August 9 (or maybe I should say he concurs with me since he generously acknowledges this was a point made in *Downfall*). As Hasegawa affirms, it “was perhaps one of the most crucial events that moved Japan decisively in the direction of surrender. We still do not know what they discussed or what changed their minds.” Hasegawa speculates that Hirohito initially resisted relinquishing the three additional conditions, and finds it even more likely that he was reluctant directly to involve himself in the decision to terminate the war. What is clear is that they were convinced that the Konoe-Togo path was the only way to preserve the kokutai and preservation of the imperial house was “foremost in their minds.” (pp. 206-07) I respectfully disagree in part with this assessment. I submit that the available record can also be read for the proposition that Hirohito had not abandoned his plans not only to remain on the throne, but to assure he retained the powers to secure that objective.

Racing the Enemy then adds that they may have changed the definition of the kokutai from simply preservation of the imperial house to “the preservation of the emperor’s status within the national laws.” This later definition is what would emerge from the imperial conference that night. “The question is who changed this definition and where the change took place,” Hasegawa points out. “Although there is no direct evidence, a process of elimination points to the crucial Kido-Hirohito meeting in late afternoon. Perhaps this was a concession Kido had to make to obtain the emperor’s approval for the one-condition acceptance of the Potsdam terms.” (p. 207)

Based on the current record, we are all reduced to speculation about exactly what Hirohito was contemplating during these hours in the afternoon of August 9. It seems to me that one reasonable way to interpret the behavior of Kido when he first gets the news from Suzuki about the “four conditions” offer is that this was presented as something Anami and the other militarists were prepared to accept. If, as I believe, one of the factors to which Kido and Hirohito were keenly attuned was the compliance of the armed forces with surrender, Kido and Hirohito may well have found the “four conditions” offer acceptable precisely because it seemed to come with a guarantee of likely compliance by the armed forces. Hasegawa may be correct that somehow Kido and Hirohito may have thought they could distance themselves from the surrender decision, but such thinking seems to me to border on the delusional.

The Imperial Conference, August 9-10

I found Hasegawa’s discussion of the veiled meaning of the language in the printed “one-condition offer” at the Imperial Conference and Hiranuma’s amendment masterful and extremely important.

At the beginning of the Imperial Conference that opened at 2350, Sakomizu read the Potsdam Proclamation and then Suzuki presented the rival “one condition” and “four conditions” responses. The “one condition” offer had been printed and a copy placed on each desk. It included the language that Japan would “accept the Potsdam Proclamation on the understanding that it did not include any demand for a change in the status of the emperor under the national laws.” Hasegawa emphasizes that this was a change from the (minimalist) position of Togo earlier in the day that the exception was just to the preservation of the imperial house. He goes on to explain:

“[t]his much broader definition of the emperor’s status came close to the position advocated by Tatsukichi Minobe in his theory of the emperor as an organ of national laws. The writer of this proposal, however, was most likely referring to the Meiji constitution when he spoke of ‘national laws.’ Given that the Meiji constitution stipulated that the emperor had exclusive authority over the military command, the very cause of Japan’s unbridled militarism, one can argue that his condition was contrary to the Americans’ fundamental objective of eradicating sources of militarism. Nevertheless, this condition contained a narrow strip of common ground, though tenuous, with Stimson’s notion of a ‘constitutional monarchy.’” (p. 211)

My view is that this amended language signifies Hirohito's aim to retain the throne and to assure he has the power to do so by his own authority. He clearly was distancing himself from Togo's narrow vision that was probably compatible with Stimson's ideas.

During this meeting, Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro proposed an important amendment to the "one condition" offer. He argued that the imperial prerogatives of the emperor originated not from any laws, but from the national essence. Hence, the condition should be changed to read "on the understanding that the Allied proclamation would not comprise and demand which would prejudice the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." (pp. 211-12)

As Hasegawa points out, Togo's original proposal had been watered down, most likely at the Kido-Hirohito meeting. But now Hiranuma proposed an affirmation "of the emperor's theocratic power, unencumbered by any law, based on Shinto gods in antiquity, and totally incompatible with a constitutional monarch." Hasegawa believes that the original printed draft might have had a narrow and tenuous common ground with Stimson's proposal, but "Hiranuma's amendment removed any possibility that the United States would accept this condition." (p. 212)

Hasegawa further explains that Hiranuma's understanding of the kokutai had been the prevailing orthodoxy since Minobe's emperor organ theory was denounced in 1935. No one dared to challenge it, and says Hasegawa "perhaps Suzuki and Yonai even agreed with this interpretation." He believes that it was hard enough for Togo to fight for the one condition, and he did not see any point in arguing against Hiranuma's amendment. (p. 212)

Hirohito and the Hiranuma Amendment

Hasegawa and Bix are divided about how Hirohito regarded the Hiranuma amendment. Bix believes the other participants at the imperial conference, including Hirohito, shared Hiranuma's right wing Shinto notion of the kokutai. But in the post-war statement, Hasegawa points out that Hirohito identified the kokutai with highly personalized matters of the imperial house, like the imperial regalia. Rather than clinging to absolute theocratic power, he was preoccupied with the household, which might be swept away unless he ended the war. I believe Hasegawa is shrewd to connect this passage to what Kido and Hirohito discussed between 1635 and 1710 on August 9. "They were determined to save the institution of the emperor. But the price Kido had to pay for Hirohito's acceptance of the one-condition proposal was the dilution of the definition of the kokutai from the narrow preservation of the imperial house to the preservation of the emperor's status with the national laws, Hirohito and Kido knew that to save the institution of the emperor, they had to cut off the military as the sacrificial lamb." (pp. 213-14)

Hasegawa then goes on to make what I regard as a key point: "It is difficult to speculate how Hirohito and Kido reacted to Hiranuma's amendment. One possibility, as Bix argues, is that they may have welcomed it. But it is also possible to argue that Hirohito was annoyed by Hiranuma's amendment, thought he was not averse, at least at this point, to present this maximum demand to the allies to see how they would react. What is clear is that Hirohito and Kido did not raise any objections to Hiranuma's amendment." (p. 214)

My view on this matter is that while it is possible to read the record for the proposition that Hirohito was driven by an overall controlling Shinto theocratic theory, his actions are also consistent with a pragmatic concern about preserving the imperial house and particularly his seat on the throne. His later actions suggest to me that Hasegawa is probably correct that he regarded the amendment as a potential maximum demand to see how the allies would react. I suspect he did not comprehend how this stance might be potentially disastrous for Japan and himself.

Collapse of the “War Party” Opposition to Surrender

This now brings us to the emperor’s “sacred decision”—and yet another mystery. The sources we have quote Hirohito as supposedly beginning his “decision” by endorsing Togo’s “one condition” offer. Hasegawa points out that Hirohito did not object to the amendment, but this still leaves the question of through what mechanism was Hiranuma’s amendment adopted as part of Togo’s proposal and made Japan’s official position? We are left to wonder whether the emperor actually expressed his support for the Hiranuma amendment then or before it was dispatched.

If that mystery is unresolved, another matter is not mysterious to me. When does opposition to ending the war on terms acceptable to the U.S. collapse or at least begin to collapse among the key “war party” leaders? The answer based on chronology is after the emperor announces he thinks Japan must terminate the war at the Imperial Conference in the early hours of August 10. It is when Umezumi brings this news that Kawabe’s diary reflects his resignation to surrender, not before. The diary entry reads like a splash of cold water hit Kawabe and as Hasegawa acknowledges the emperor’s loss of confidence in the army is a great shock to Kawabe (p. 214). The Japanese war history volume declares that news of the emperor’s “decision” likewise came as a great shock to officers at Imperial General Headquarters. [30] Chronologically, the collapse of will of the “war party” to settle for an end to the war that will not involve a continuation of the old order in which they dominate follows the emperor’s announcement.

In emphasizing this point, I respectfully disagree with the view advocated by Dr. Bix that Hirohito was always in control as sort of generalissimo. When Hirohito speaks in the early hours of August 10, it is not as if he simply issued an “order” in the ordinary sense of that word. Even after his opinion is known, plenty of Imperial Army officers— notably including the War Minister--continue to act as though whether Japan will surrender remains an open question. Hirohito’s words pack a powerful wallop not because they are an “order” but because they have a shattering morale effect when Japan’s supreme symbolic figure announces that he no longer thinks Japan can go on with the war.

Racing the Enemy describes Hirohito’s comments in the Imperial conference and concludes that “the game plan for Hirohito and the peace party was clear: they wanted to save the emperor and the imperial house by putting the blame on the military.” (p. 213)

I do not disagree in the least with this conclusion that Hirohito and the “peace party” aimed to shift the blame to the military. But I believe there were further important purposes in Hirohito’s remarks. He well knew that the whole rationale advanced by Anami and the “war party” for

continuing the war was their confidence in Ketsu Go. This is what sustained their morale through all the tribulations of 1945 and now even Soviet entry. I think Hirohito and Kido remained very much concerned about the compliance of the armed forces with any surrender “order.” This was not simply the high command in Tokyo, but also the field forces— as Anami had warned in this very meeting.

I believe the emperor dwelled at some length upon why he no longer had confidence in Ketsu Go precisely because he knew that it was necessary to not only issue an “order,” but also to strike directly at the underlying rationale of the militarists for continuing the war. By striking directly at their rationale, he was trying to destroy their morale and thus greatly increase the likelihood of compliance with his decision. I see the evidence Hasegawa notes of Kawabe’s reaction and what Hasegawa sees as his resignation, as more powerfully influenced by the shock of learning the emperor had turned against them and the reasons he offered than Soviet entry or atomic bombs.

Hirohito’s remarks may also have been connected to Umezu’s opinion that Soviet entry made no difference as to Ketsu Go. It is very telling that Hirohito chose not to challenge that argument, but to strike directly at Ketsu Go itself. One other extremely significant point is that there is no recorded evidence that Hirohito made any reference to Soviet intervention. Moreover, by emphasizing the weakness of defenses in front of Tokyo, he clearly was indicating his doubts stemmed from a lack of capability to resist American actions, as a Soviet landing before Tokyo was impossible.

Hasegawa sets down further evidence about the perilous situation even after the emperor’s “sacred decision.” Postwar, Admiral Takagi would report that there remained strong currents with the army and navy to continue the war. He charged that Suzuki showed no leadership and kept going back to the emperor. Many stood on the sidelines to see how it would come out and only Togo and Yonai “risked their lives to achieve peace” (p. 215).

This brings us to the next piece of evidence I would highlight. As *Racing the Enemy* portrays him, Anami is a “loose cannon.” I believe Hasegawa pictures him as verging even closer to defying the emperor and supporting the coup than anyone else ever has. But what finally brings Anami around? He mentions neither the atomic bombs nor Soviet entry. He says that his decision was based on just the emperor’s personal plea.

Thus, Hirohito took the first indispensable step on the path to Japan’s surrender: he became the legitimate authority to make the political decision that the war must end. *Racing the Enemy* convinces me that Hirohito’s sacred decision, not the atomic bombs or Soviet intervention, was the single most shattering blow to the leaders of the “war party.” One popular Japanese historian, Hando Kazutoshi, maintains that Soviet entry killed any hopes of the politicians for a negotiated end to the war while the atomic bombs finished the military’s vision of a fight to the finish. [31] I believe Hasegawa concurs with the first part of this formulation. In *Downfall*, I concurred with the second part of Hando’s formulation insofar as the senior officers in Tokyo were concerned. I believed those senior officers recognized that with atomic bombs, the U.S. would not need to attempt to invade and if there was no invasion, they really had no strategy other than national suicide. [32] *Racing the Enemy*, however, convinces me that the emperor’s

intervention takes primacy even above the atomic bombs in collapsing the will of the militarists in Tokyo.

Hirohito's Motives

What then finally motivated Hirohito? The short and most candid answer is that the record so far contains no definitive answer. *Racing the Enemy* illustrates that there were further dimensions to his decision making that add yet more complexity to this puzzle.

In my view the most probative evidence about Hirohito's thinking, as with any historical figure, consists of his contemporaneous recorded statements. Here is where Hasegawa and I disagree and I believe he misinterpreted my analysis. In *Downfall*, I examined Hirohito's statements. The first point I would highlight is that his statements do not neatly break down into those that emphasize the atomic bombs and those that emphasize Soviet entry. One constant thread that runs through this period is repeated references to "the situation at home" or "the domestic situation." This appears at the Imperial Conference on August 9-10, the Imperial Conference on August 14 and in both the Imperial Rescripts of August 15 and 17. This was his deepest nightmare that the imperial institution and his place on the throne would be destroyed by an internal revolt. It was the effects of the American campaign of blockade and bombardment (of which the atomic bombs were a part) that sparked this fear. Indeed, one reason the atomic bombs may have prompted Hirohito's alarm was precisely because they threatened to bring the simmering civil unrest to a boil faster than the rest of the campaign of blockade and bombardment. As Kido would lecture Suzuki on August 13, if Japan rejected the Byrnes Note; "tens of millions of innocent people would suffer as a result of air raids and starvation. More important, there might be unrest" (p.232). (I think the actual level of civil unrest to this point in Japan was minimal and that the fears of Hirohito and others were greatly exaggerated. But the U.S. was poised to deliver hammer blows that would have made the nightmares come true very quickly.)

The second and third reasons he identified were military: his loss of confidence in Ketsu Go and the vast destructiveness of atomic and conventional attacks. He referred to both the Soviet entry and the enemy's "scientific power" (the fast rising euphemism among Japanese leaders for the atomic bombs) when he conferred with the most senior officers of the armed services on August 14. In the Imperial Rescript on August 15 announcing that Japan will surrender, he expressly makes reference to what could only be the atomic bombs, but makes no mention of Soviet intervention. On August 17, an Imperial Rescript is issued to the Soldiers and Sailors. As Hasegawa reveals, this was actually drafted at the same time as the August 15 Rescript but not issued until later. This later Rescript mentions Soviet intervention but not the atomic bombs. But what is lacking in the accounts emphasizing the August 17 Rescript as the "real reason" for Hirohito's decision is that it was issued in the context of the refusal of overseas commanders to comply with the surrender order.[33] This is exactly as Anami predicted at the August 9-10 Imperial conference and Kawabe (and Togo) anticipated. No wonder the emperor offered to issue a separate Rescript to his soldiers and sailors to deal precisely with this challenge and that such a Rescript was drafted in anticipation that it would be needed. Soviet intervention, not atomic bombs, was a vastly more persuasive argument to present to commanders on the Asian

continent for compliance. As I noted earlier, I do believe Soviet intervention was important in exactly this arena: securing compliance of the overseas armed forces with the surrender.

What Hasegawa omits from the enumeration is one other piece of evidence. Shortly after the formal surrender, Hirohito wrote a letter to the Crown Prince. As John Dower describes it, “this most private of communications at this extraordinary moment,” reflects Hirohito ascribing Japan’s loss of the war to the fact that her armed forces underestimated the British and Americans and exulted spirit over “science.” He made no reference to the Soviets. [34] Unless you believe this letter was manufactured to give a false impression and then hidden for decades, it is very telling.

On the basis of this evidence, I concluded that the atomic bombs were more significant than Soviet entry in Hirohito’s decision. I further pointed out that because I believe Japan’s surrender was in two steps, Soviet intervention was critical with regard to securing the surrender of the overseas commanders who initially balked. But since the surrender process did not reach this question until after the initial political decision was made, I found that primacy had to be accorded to the atomic bombs as the motivator of the emperor.

In challenging this line of argument, Hasegawa takes two tacks. The first is that he disputes my enumeration of Hirohito’s references to the atomic bombs. He argues that Hirohito made no reference to the atomic bombs at the imperial conference on August 10. Hasegawa points out that the only source for attributing a reference to the atomic bomb at this session is the Lt. Col. Takeshita Masahiko diary. This he finds is obviously hearsay since Takeshita was not present. But Takeshita was Anami’s brother-in-law and in constant contact through these days. Takeshita’s diary records many other events of this period that are accepted as correct. The Japanese official military history which is sober and careful accepted the Takeshita diary entry as valid.

The second tack in my view stems from perhaps a misreading of my argument. I was not examining Hirohito’s contemporary statements for an assessment of why other actors made the decision they did. My argument was that the best evidence of Hirohito’s decisions was his own contemporary statements. Hasegawa totals up the statements of Hirohito and a host of other parties on how they perceived the relative importance of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry. (Interestingly, he comes up with a total of twelve opinions: two giving primacy to the atomic bombs, three to Soviet intervention as the dominant factor and seven instances where contemporaries cited both factors.) This is comparing apples and oranges: what others said overall does not carry high probative weight about Hirohito’s thinking as does his own statements. Moreover, I would respectfully add that if Hasegawa’s math undermines my argument for the primacy of the atomic bombs, it does the same for according primacy to Soviet intervention!

The Role of Grew, Dooman and Ballentine in the American Response to Japan’s Note of August 10

The arrival of the Japanese note of August 10 in Washington prompted an episode that Hasegawa illuminates for the first time. I found his whole discussion of the role of the three “Old Japan Hands,” Byrnes and the others one of the high points of the book. It is new and connects up with some other evidence I find pertinent.

I certainly concur that there is great irony in the fact that the supposed “appeasers” within the State Department are the very men who recognize and halt the attempt to get the U.S. to agree to a condition that would negate the overall American war aim.

I also find it odd that the recorded evidence about what transpired at the policy meeting with Truman does not reflect that Byrnes set out clearly what was at stake if the U.S. bowed to the Japanese proposal. I would speculate that perhaps the explanation is that the other parties who made diary entries like Forrestal and Stimson either did not grasp the full significance of what Byrnes may have argued on this point or perhaps because they opposed him they failed to faithfully record his whole argument.

When Hasegawa presented this story, it made me think back to earlier notes in the Stimson diary in July and August where he recorded the expectation voiced by Byrnes that Byrnes and Truman believed the war would end with an armistice followed by negotiations. During the negotiations, Byrnes and Truman anticipated providing a guarantee about the imperial institution. [35] This contemporary evidence indicates that Truman and Byrnes believed no serious peace exchange could take place until Japan’s militarists clearly believed the end had come. Seen in this light, Byrnes’ initial disposition to accept the Japanese offer is consistent with this entry in the Stimson diary. When he believed the Japanese were actually serious about ending the war, then he was prepared to make the concession about the imperial institution.

Noncombatant Deaths

With respect to the Soviets, *Racing the Enemy* has left everyone else in the dust in coverage. Hasegawa’s argument that Soviet intervention was more significant than the atomic bombs in securing Japan’s surrender is important, but I find it contains one very significant omission that has to be considered in judging whether it was “better.” That is the issue of the numbers of Japanese dying in Soviet captivity. Hasegawa does address the fate of prisoners-of-war, however, he does not address the fate of Japanese noncombatants. John Dower and Takemae Eiji give a ranges of between 300,000 to half million total deaths of Japanese nationals in Soviet captivity. Dower cites a report that 179,000 Japanese civilians and 66,000 military personnel died just in the first winter after the war in Soviet hands in Manchuria. [36] Since there is an excellent chance that the Soviets might have seized half or all of Hokkaido, the implications for Japanese civilians of falling into Soviet hands loom large with regard to that possibility also. I believe this issue is significant because any argument that waiting to see if Soviet intervention alone would end the war should forthrightly confront the costs of Soviet occupation.

Coupled to the issue of Japanese noncombatants dying in Soviet hands is the larger issue of noncombatant deaths in general. It is the death of noncombatants that forms the core of the moral issue surrounding the atomic bombs. But I believe that if noncombatant deaths are

properly an issue, and they are, then as historians we must deal with all the noncombatant deaths. This includes not only those dying in Soviet hands, but also the toll of noncombatant Asians dying each day in Japanese hands and the prospective toll of noncombatants who would have perished in alternative ends to the war like invasion or the strategy of blockade and bombardment. One example of this is that the Japanese had seized about twenty to twenty-five percent of the Korean rice crop and were preparing to ship it to Japan to stave off the food crisis in the Homeland. It is very likely that had the war gone on, most of this rice would have ended up on the bottom of sea rather than in Korea or Japan. The implications for the Korean people in this scenario are dire. [37]

THE ALTERNATIVES

Modifying the Potsdam Proclamation

This brings us to an assessment of the various alternative methods of ending the Pacific War. I concur with Hasegawa that adding a guarantee to preserve the imperial institution to the Potsdam Proclamation would not have secured Japan's surrender prior to Hiroshima—just as the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary of July 22 foretold. He raises what is certainly a realistic possibility that this might have somewhat advanced the path to peace, notably that after Hiroshima it might have strengthened the negotiating power of the “peace party.” I believe there was an at least equal prospect that such a promise would have fortified not just the government but also the emperor to believe that if they held out they could procure concessions that would preserve the old order. Thus, there is a very real danger it perversely might have impeded surrender.

Surrender Without Either Atomic Bombs or Soviet Intervention

A combination of the cumulative effects of the blockade and the new August 11 strategic bombing directive on top of Japan's dire food shortage would have produced a massive upheaval. The urbanized and densely populated area of southern and western Honshu would spew out millions of civilians seeking food and the government would face a crisis of civil disorder in the face of famine. The upheaval would have started in Japan's major cities on Honshu within about two weeks after the rail bombing began, however, its potential effects would have been recognized by senior Japanese leaders almost immediately. Moreover, it would have been impossible to conceal from the U.S. as intercepted messages and perhaps even public broadcasts would have indicated the crisis. Fearful that the unraveling “domestic situation” would topple the throne, I believe Hirohito would have attempted to intervene to end the war regardless of whether atomic bombs or Soviet intervention occurred. Abandonment of Ketsu Go by the emperor and the collapse of civilian morale would have undermined the will of the leaders of the armed forces in Tokyo to continue. The surrender of the government probably would have occurred between the end of August and the end of October. Overseas commanders, however, would not have obeyed promptly and hostilities in those regions would have dragged on for weeks or possibly months. They would only end after Soviet intervention.

There are very significant ramifications of a delayed and possibly piecemeal surrender. This scenario would result in the deaths of all or some significant fraction of the ten million Japanese

on the edge of starvation when the war ended. The Soviets would have overrun all the areas they actually seized, plus probably all of Korea. The entire Korean population would have then experienced decades of rule by the Kim Il Sung dynasty. This presumably avoids the Korea War, but the cost to the Korea people would have been fearful. In a more protracted surrender scenario, the Soviets likely would also have seized half or all of Hokkaido. Given the Soviet record with Japanese noncombatants elsewhere, the death toll of Japanese noncombatants would have increased by hundreds of thousands. Stalin would have demanded and probably received an occupation zone in Japan. Total noncombatant deaths from this scenario would have vastly exceeded those who actually died in 1945.

Although not probable, there also exists the possibility that a more protracted surrender process would permit radical die-hards to mount a more effective last ditch effort to thwart peace. Additional time may have allowed enhanced opportunity to subvert more officers and more important officers to a coup attempt. Recalcitrant officers may have been assassinated. If overseas commanders weighed in against surrender, the impetus of the die-hards may have increased. This scenario lurks as a great unknown when we contemplate the path history did not take, but the portrait of War Minister Anami in *Racing the Enemy* suggests it cannot be entirely dismissed.

The Atomic Bombs

Two atomic bombs, coupled to the blockade, the new targeting directive and the dire food situation would have prompted surrender by the end of August or very early September. The emperor would have intervened as in the prior scenario. The atomic bombs would have eased the process compared to their absence because they would signal that the U.S. would not need to invade Japan, thus invalidating the Ketsu Go strategy. Absent the prospect of inflicting huge casualties in an invasion, the senior military leaders in Tokyo had no strategy to offer save national suicide. Thus, their concurrence with the emperor's decision would have been expedited.

This scenario also probably has the same additional effects described in the first scenario. Once again, surrender of overseas commanders would have been later and probably only after Soviet intervention. And once again, there would have been a much higher death toll among noncombatants. The prospects for the ultra die-hards would diminish, but not wholly disappear.

Soviet Intervention Without the Atomic Bombs

Absent the atomic bombs, Soviet intervention would have been delayed by ten days to two weeks. During this interval, the new strategic bombing directive would have commenced to produce the massive upheaval. Soviet intervention at that point would have helped Hirohito to secure compliance of all the armed forces with the surrender. Because Soviet intervention would have been later than the atomic bombs, the most likely result would be that the surrender would be similarly delayed to a date between the first part of September and the first part of October. On the other hand, the overseas commands would have complied with the surrender more

promptly than they would have under either the scenario without atomic bombs and Soviet entry or just with Soviet entry.

This scenario would also result in the same collateral effects described in the first scenario. Once again, deaths from this scenario would have been substantially greater than those that occurred in 1945. The prospects for the ultra die-hards would diminish, but not wholly disappear.

Summary

Racing the Enemy is vitally important because it will move the debate over the end of the Pacific War to a much sounder footing as to the realities of 1945. It provides a quantum leap in our understanding of many political elements of ending the Pacific War, particularly in Japan and the Soviet Union. This work, however, distorts the whole picture by minimizing the military elements in both coverage and analysis, although it does properly acknowledge the issue of compliance of Japan's armed forces with the surrender decision. The most provocative argument that President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes deliberately dropped a guarantee of the imperial institution from the Potsdam Proclamation to assure Japan's rejection and thereby justify the use of atomic weapons does not rise above a weak inference. It further ignores powerful evidence to the contrary.

Notes:

[1] Robert J.C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954).

[2] Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000).

[3] *Racing the Enemy*, 4.

[4] Bix points out that after the Japanese lost Saipan in the Marianas, Hirohito flatly ordered that the island be retaken. Bix characterizes this as an example of "paramount importance in assessing the role [Hirohito] played in the war." After feverish work at Imperial Headquarters to prepare a plan for such an expedition, Prime Minister Tojo and a senior naval officer told Hirohito the plan "must be cancelled." One can scarcely imagine that a direct "Fuhrer Order" in Germany on such a major issue would ever have been so handled. In my view what is significant about this episode is not the fact that Hirohito issued such an "order" but the fact that it was not followed. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 475-76. Another example is provided in the emperor's postwar monologue where he states that when he Hirohito finally realized Okinawa would fall and then advocated that Japan launch a new offensive in China. Once again, Imperial Headquarters failed to follow his "order." Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Random House, 1999), 99-100.

[5] *Downfall*, 87-88. My thanks to Edward Drea who I think correctly points out that Hirohito understood his role and influence and used both to shape policy decisions. He was neither a figurehead nor a fighting generalissimo, but a shrewd bureaucratic tactician. Email to author, 16, Nov 05.

[6] I started to total up coverage of “military” elements, but quit after a time when it became clear that only a tiny fraction of *Racing the Enemy* sketched out such matters as the American campaigns of blockade and bombardment, the invasion plans, and Japanese plans and efforts to meet the expected U.S. invasion or a Soviet attack. By far the most detailed coverage of “military” elements comes in the section on Soviet operations in the Kurils, where actions down to company level (p. 281) are discussed.

[7] *Downfall*, 99-100.

[8] *Racing the Enemy*, 2, 158-60.

[9] “There is no information to show that Truman, Stimson, and Byrnes were aware of [military intercepts] or that this factor played an important part in their decision to drop the bomb.” *Racing the Enemy*, fn 44, p. 335. In keeping with the conclusion, the text does not discuss the military intercepts on the premise that these policy makers did not see them or that they had no influence.

[10] “History of the Special Distribution Branch Military Intelligence Service, WDGS Part 3, Section 7,” SHR 132, Record Group 457, National Archives and Records Administration. I am working on an article to address a number of matters concerning the handling and distribution of radio intelligence in 1945.

[11] *Downfall*, 240-44.

[12] “Magic” Diplomatic Summary, 16 to 22 July 1945, RG 457, NARA.

[13] Deputy Chief of Staff from Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 12 and 13 Jul 45, reel 109. item 2581, George C. Marshall Library.

[14] Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era; a Diplomatic Record of Forty Years*, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1438-39.

[15] Also absent from Hasegawa’s analysis is the fact that on 7 July 1945, Grew advised Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal not to publish an article prepared by a Japanese journalist predicting that Japan would surrender if she only were promised that there would be only token occupation forces on the basis that it was “precisely the type of overture which [Grew] had predicted would come from Japan,” and which would be simply propaganda designed to weaken U.S. determination to carry out the complete defeat of Japan. *Downfall*, p. 224, quoting from the Forrestal diaries.

[16] E-mail to author, 16 Nov 2005.

[17] *Downfall*, p. 234 (quoting from Herbert Bix, “Japan’s Delayed Surrender,” *Diplomatic History* 19.2 (Spring 1995), p. 208).

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] I am referring to the works of John Dower, *War Without Mercy* (New York: Pantheon, 1986) and *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton/New Press, 1999), Edward Drea, *MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-45* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), as well as the previously cited works of Bix and Frank.

[20] One other variable is the Soviet plan to attack Hokkaido. This might have been a wild card on U.S. attitudes to an invasion of the Home Islands. Even the navy might have agreed to a plan under consideration in August 1945 for a landing on northern Honshu as an alternative to Olympic. The new purpose of this alternative, however, would be to block Soviet penetration to the south.

[21] USSBS, *Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s Economy*, 64. Also along the same line is *War Against Japanese Transportation*, 1, 17-18, 27-28.

[22] *Downfall*, 349-54.

[23] *Ibid.*, 310.

[24] *Ibid.*, 297, 308-09, 311-13, 328-29.

[25] My authority for Anami’s warning that the overseas commanders would not surrender and Umezu’s statement to the emperor that Soviet intervention was unfavorable, but did not invalidate Ketsu Go is the “Hoshina Memorandum” which Hasegawa identifies as the best record of the conference. This document was translated in *Statements of Japanese Officials*, Doc. No. 53437, Center for Military History. It shows on page 2 that Umezu stated: “Though the participation of the USSR was disadvantageous to JAPAN, it did not create a situation calling for unconditional surrender.” (the companion Ikeda Memorandum reports Umezu said at this point: “Preparations for the decisive battle of the homeland are already completed, and we are confident of victory. Although the participation of RUSSIA made the situation unfavorable, I do not think we need abandon the opportunity to deliver one last blow to both America and ENGLAND.” Doc No. 54483) The Hoshina memorandum reflects that War Minister Anami flatly stated that the troops overseas would never accept unconditional surrender. Later in the same memorandum, the emperor’s reported reasoning for deciding to terminate the war included his reference to the lack of arms to outfit the numerous new divisions the army was raising, and that “if this is true, there is no possibility of winning the war against the US and Britain who pride themselves on their mechanization.” Nowhere in the evidence recorded in this memorandum does the emperor allude explicitly to the Soviet intervention as a reason to end the war.

[26] *Downfall*, 277-83

[27] The best description of Soviet capabilities is provided by David Glantz, *Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945 "August Storm"* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 242-310.

[28] Edward Drea, "Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, 1945," *Military Affairs* (April 1984).

[29] Asada, Sadao, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration," *Pacific Historical Review* 64.4 (November 1998), 490-91.

[30] *Downfall*, 297.

[31] Sakamoto Takao et. al. *Showashi no ronten (Points of Controversy in Showa History)* (Bungeishunju, 2000) 201. I am indebted to Edward Drea for bringing this to my attention.

[32] *Downfall*, 348.

[33] I see now that what appeared to me clear at the time I wrote *Downfall* was by no means so obvious to others. I failed to mention expressly the August 17 Rescript on the assumption that it was clearly in response to the refusal of senior overseas commanders to comply with the surrender order from Tokyo and the emperor's Rescript of August 15. It became painfully clear afterwards that I should have made the direct connection explicitly in *Downfall*.

[34] *Embracing Defeat*, 290.

[35] *Downfall*, 247; Stimson Diary, 16-25 July 9-10 August.

[36] *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 51-53; Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ* (New York: Continuum, 2002) 111.

[37] *Downfall*, 350.

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Commentary by David Holloway, Stanford University

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's book *Racing the Enemy* is a significant contribution to our understanding of the end of World War II in the Pacific. For the first time a historian who can read the American, Japanese, and Russian sources has written an account that integrates Soviet as well as American policy into an examination of the timing and terms of the Japanese surrender. Hasegawa has been helped in this not only by his command of the relevant literatures in three languages, but also by the recent appearance of new sources, especially from the Russian archives. His book will provide the benchmark for further work on the end of the war in the Pacific. Henceforth everyone writing on this topic will have to take Hasegawa's book as the point of departure.

After an initial chapter on US-Soviet-Japanese relations before and during World War II, Hasegawa focuses on the period from April to September 1945. He examines the interactions among the three powers, and in these interactions he identifies three subplots: the complex relationship of cooperation and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union; the equally complex relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan; and the struggle between the war party and the peace party in Japan over the terms of surrender. This analysis of the endgame of the war in the Pacific is an example of international history in the classic style, focusing on government leaders, their decisions, their goals, and their understanding of one another's policies.

As he writes in the Introduction (p. 5), Hasegawa's most important conclusion is that "the Soviet entry into the war played a greater role than the atomic bombs in inducing Japan to surrender." He makes this point more emphatically in the Conclusion (p. 298):

it is clear that the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone were not decisive in inducing Japan to surrender. Despite their destructive power, the atomic bombs were not sufficient to change the direction of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion was. Without the Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would have continued to fight until numerous atomic bombs, a successful invasion of the home islands, or continued aerial bombardments, combined with a naval blockade, rendered them incapable of doing so.

The Soviet role in the war against Japan is sometimes dismissed as unimportant - after all, the Soviet Union entered the war on August 8, less than one week before the Japanese surrender. It is a mistake, however, to confuse the Soviet role in defeating Japan with the part it played in bringing the war to an end. Although Japan was already defeated when the Soviet Union attacked, it was not at all clear when, and on what terms, it would surrender. Hasegawa is right to underline the importance of assessing the role of the Soviet factor in the Japanese decision to surrender.

In the Spring of 1945 the Japanese government placed considerable hopes in the Soviet Union, as Hasegawa shows. The peace party looked to Moscow to mediate an agreement with the Allies, so that Japan could retain the Emperor and end the war on terms other than unconditional surrender. For the war party it was important that the Soviet Union stay out of the war so that Japan could wage a final battle with the American forces before securing what it considered an honorable peace. Moscow was thus a key factor in the calculations and hopes of both these groups, which had different conceptions of the way in which the war should be brought to an end and the terms on which Japan should conclude peace. Because these groups had divided purposes, the Japanese were unable to formulate a clear set of proposals to put to Moscow, which not without reason regarded the Japanese overtures as signs of desperation. When the Soviet Union entered the war on August 8, it destroyed the plans and hopes of both groups in the Japanese government: it punctured the peace party's strategy of enlisting Moscow as a mediator, and it put an end to the war party's hopes of keeping the Soviet Union neutral. By depriving Japan of a viable strategy—by checkmating it, in other words—the Soviet Union precipitated the Japanese surrender.

Hasegawa adds another factor: the fear on the part of at least the Prime Minister, Baron Suzuki, that the Red Army would not only take Manchuria, Korea, and southern Sakhalin, but would land troops on Hokkaido too. The headlong Soviet advance into China made the decision to surrender a matter of urgency. “Even without the atomic bombs,” Hasegawa writes, “the war most likely would have ended shortly after Soviet entry into the war—before November 1” (p. 296). In this interpretation it was the prospect of Soviet domination, rather than the fear of more death and destruction inflicted by American bombing, that persuaded Japan to surrender (see p. 237).

Hasegawa is not always so emphatic that Soviet entry was more important than the atomic bomb. He writes on p. 295: “without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would never have accepted surrender in August.” In discussing a counterfactual scenario in which Stalin signs the Potsdam Proclamation and the Proclamation promises that Japan can have a constitutional monarchy, he concludes: “a shock was needed. It is difficult to say if the Hiroshima bomb alone was sufficient, or whether the combination of the Hiroshima bomb and Soviet entry into the war was needed to convince the emperor to accept surrender” (p. 293). In other words, even if the Japanese had been informed that the Emperor could remain and that the Soviet Union would enter the war, the shock of the atomic bomb might still have been needed to persuade the Emperor to surrender. This assigns a greater shock value to the atomic bomb than his other statements allow. He seems at times to take a position not very different from that of Robert Butow who, in his classic *Japan's Decision to Surrender*,

treated both Soviet entry and the atomic bomb as decisive factors, without making a categorical judgment about the relative weight to be assigned to each.

In this context it may be of interest to report the assessments of Japanese generals captured by the Soviet Union in Manchuria and interrogated in the weeks after the end of the war.¹ Among the questions put to the generals was what they thought had caused Japan to surrender. On August 23 Lieutenant General Uemura Mikio gave three reasons for the Japanese surrender. The first was that after the surrender of Germany Japan was on its own, with the result that the fighting spirit of the army and the people fell. The second was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. "Of course," he said, "Japan would not have surrendered because of the use of atomic bombs alone, but this had an effect on the fighting spirit of the people." The third reason was that Japan could not fight against the Red Army and against the armies of the whole world. That, he said, was "the main reason that determined so quickly the surrender of Japan." General Uemura told his Soviet interrogators that he had said to a colleague the year before that if Japan did not improve its relations with the Soviet Union it would not be able to continue the war. General Uemura told his Soviet captors that he would not judge whether it had been right to surrender, adding: "Everything the Emperor does is right."²

General Kita Seiti, interrogated on September 16, gave two reasons for Japan's surrender. The first was the use of the atomic bomb, which caused many casualties among the population: "the Emperor, evidently, considered that it would be hard for Japan to fight on." The second reason was Soviet entry into the war; the Emperor had decided that Japan could not conduct a war against all the great powers.³ Germany's surrender, according to General Kita, was a great blow for Japan too. Lieutenant General Hata Hikosaburo, chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, told his Soviet captors in September that he did not know in detail the reasons for Japan's surrender: "the reasons for surrender are given in the Imperial Rescript, with which I fully agree."⁴

Major General Matsumura Tomokatsu, deputy chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, told his interrogators in September that the Japanese knew they did not have enough forces to resist the Soviet Union in Manchuria, because they needed to concentrate large forces on the territory of the metropole in order to repel an Anglo-American invasion; they did, however, have enough forces to hold Korea for at least two or three years. After victory over Britain and the United States, in which they believed, General Matsumura continued, they assumed that it would be possible to use the Korean bridgehead to attack the Red Army and regain the whole of Manchuria. "I and all the generals and officers known to me thought that we would not be defeated in that war against the allied nations and that the war would just last several more years. Surrender is acknowledgment of defeat. I think we would not have been defeated if the emperor had not given the order to lay down arms and surrender."⁵

¹ These are taken from V.A. Zolotarev, ed., *Sovetsko-iaponskaia voina 1945 goda: istoriia voenno-politicheskogo protivoborstva dvukh derzhav v 30-40e gody*, published in the series *Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia* as volume 7(2), Moscow: Terra, 2000, pp. 299-337.

² For Uemura's comments see *ibid.* p. 302.

³ *Ibid.* p. 311.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 321.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 315.

In October Lieutenant General Simidzu Noritsune told his interrogators that Soviet entry into the war had come at a time when Japan was facing more and more difficulties in its war against America, Britain, and China and had put Japan in an even worse position. One of the main reasons for surrender, he said, was the use of the atomic bomb. He had heard that 350,000 people had died in Hiroshima and 150,000 in Nagasaki. “These facts indicate that America was aiming for the total destruction of the Japanese people. These barbarous methods of conducting war, these devilish deeds by America will remain for a long time in the memory of the Japanese people.”⁶

These assessments—and the reports from which they are taken—merit detailed commentary. I will not attempt that here, but several brief points can be made. First, one has to bear in mind of course the circumstances in which the generals were interrogated: they were talking to Soviet officers on whom their fate depended; they were in Manchuria and presumably not privy to what had actually transpired when the emperor decided to surrender. Second, they gave weight to the bomb as well as to Soviet entry in explaining the Japanese surrender. (And it is perhaps interesting in itself that the Soviet interrogators asked that question.) Third, Soviet entry is related in their comments to the overall strategic position that Japan found itself in after the German surrender; the Soviet attack is seen as putting Japan in an extremely difficult position, at war with all the other great powers. Fourth, the way the generals speak about the Emperor’s decision to surrender indicates how painful it was for them; Matsamura is open in his disagreement, while Uemura barely hides his own doubts.

Whichever version of Hasegawa’s interpretation one takes, the Soviet factor is of crucial importance, and Hasegawa provides a fuller treatment of it than is available in any other English-language work. He was able to draw on newly declassified sources from the Russian archives, and also on the recent work of Russian historians, notably the late Boris Slavinskii, who published several books in the 1990s about Soviet-Japanese relations and provided Hasegawa with important materials. (It should be noted that the Russian sources, though very much better than we had twenty years ago, are still far from satisfactory. There is very restricted access to some key archives, and the documents that have been published, while very valuable, make one wish for access to the files from which they come.) Soviet policy is of interest for several reasons, apart from its role in bringing about the Japanese surrender. Hasegawa explores, for example, how the atomic bomb influenced Stalin’s policy on entry into the war, but there are other questions he devotes less attention to, such as the relationship between the end of the war in the Pacific and the origins of the Cold War.

Hasegawa’s analysis seems to me to be wrong on one aspect of Soviet policy.⁷ He argues that during the Potsdam Conference Stalin realized that the United States now had the bomb, that it would use it against Japan, and that the use of the bomb would lead Japan to surrender. (This latter point contrasts with Hasegawa’s view of the bomb’s actual impact). Late in the conference, according to Hasegawa, Stalin advanced the date of entry into the war from August 20-25, which is what the General Staff was planning for. Stalin now had to make a desperate dash to get into

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 322-323.

⁷ I discuss this issue in detail in “Jockeying for Position in the Postwar World: Soviet Entry into the War with Japan in August 1945,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed. *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War: Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War*, Stanford University Press, forthcoming.

the war as quickly as possible, in order to secure the strategic gains that had been promised to him at Yalta.

This is not implausible, but it contradicts the evidence. According to Marshal A.M. Vasilevskii, Commander-in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East, and to General S.M. Shtemenko, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, both of whom were deeply involved in planning the war against Japan, the planned date of entry was advanced, at some point in late June or the first half of July, from August 20-25 to August 11. On July 16, the day he arrived in Potsdam, Stalin telephoned Vasilevskii in the Far East to ask him to be ready to attack on August 1, but Vasilevskii replied that Soviet forces would not be ready by then and asked that August 11 date remain in effect. According to Shtemenko, Stalin gave no new orders for the war during the Potsdam Conference and evidently did not understand the significance of the atomic bomb.

On August 3 Vasilevskii recommended to Stalin that the offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria begin on August 9-10. Stalin accepted this advice and sent an order that the attack be launched on August 10 at 18.00 hours (Moscow time) or 24.00 hours (Trans-Baikal time). On August 7, however, Stalin sent Vasilevskii a new order advancing the attack by 48 hours. Soviet forces were now to begin their offensive on August 8, not August 10, at 18.00 hours (Moscow time) or 24.00 hours (Trans-Baikal time). Stalin's order to Vasilevskii on August 7 contained no explanation of the change of date, but it seems obvious that it was the bombing of Hiroshima the day before that impelled him to speed up Soviet entry into the war.

It is clear that Stalin was eager in July and August to enter the war before Japan surrendered and to secure the concessions promised to him under the Yalta Agreement. There were two things to cause him anxiety. The first was the increasingly active Japanese approaches to Moscow, which suggested growing desperation on the part of the Japanese government to find a way out of the war. The second was Stalin's chronic suspicion that the Western allies would conclude a compromise peace with Japan, thereby thwarting Soviet aims in the Far East and allowing Japan to remain a powerful military-political force in Asia. These factors are sufficient to explain Stalin's anxiety. There is no evidence that Stalin's policy was driven by the fear that the United States would use the atomic bomb to end the war at a stroke; indeed, Shtemenko's testimony suggests otherwise.

It is of course puzzling that Stalin did not appreciate the importance of the bomb before it was used. The Soviet Union had received detailed information about the atomic project, and it is very likely that Stalin was informed just before Potsdam that the Trinity test was about to take place or had already taken place. It is not clear when he learned that the test had been successful, though he might have deduced it from Truman's remark to him on July 24 that the United States had "a weapon of unusual destructive force." There is no evidence that Stalin expected the bomb to be used against Japan. None of the memoirs or reminiscences by those present in the Soviet delegation—V.M. Molotov, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, and A. A. Gromyko—recalls any apprehension on that score. Stalin might well have assumed that the period between the first test and actual use in war would be much longer than three weeks. Even if Stalin did anticipate early use of the bomb against Japan—for which there is no evidence—there is no indication that he believed before Hiroshima that the bomb would greatly hasten Japan's surrender.

This disagreement does not affect Hasegawa's argument about the impact of Soviet entry on the Japanese decision to surrender, but it does have implications for our understanding of US-Soviet relations at the end of the war. Hiroshima came as a great shock to Stalin, and on August 20—two weeks to day after Hiroshima—he signed a decree putting the Soviet atomic project on a crash footing. In September he adopted a new policy of “tenacity and steadfastness” in order to demonstrate to the United States and Britain that the Soviet Union would not give in to intimidation. This policy was apparently designed to counter American diplomatic pressure backed by the atomic bomb.

Hasegawa's achievement in this book is not that he has settled every issue, but that he has shown how fruitful international history can be in taking a broad approach to the end of the war in the Pacific. For all that Hasegawa has done, there are many issues that deserve further investigation. For example, what was the relationship between Stalin's policies in Europe and his policies in Asia? How can US-China-Soviet relations be integrated into the US-Japan-Soviet story that Hasegawa tells? How did the US-Soviet rivalry play out in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender? There is another, more general, issue that Hasegawa's book raises but does not address: how are we to think about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the endgame of the war in the Pacific? The United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the war against Japan, and each side kept broadly to the Yalta Agreement, in spite of the suspicions that each harbored about the other. This was not the Cold War, but what role did the endgame in the Pacific play in ushering in the Cold War? Hasegawa's book not only contributes to our understanding of the end of the war in the Pacific; it also provides a basis from which to explore more thoroughly and in greater detail the origins of the Cold War.

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Author's Response: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, University of California, Santa Barbara

Introduction:

I am grateful to H-Diplo for providing its space for the roundtable discussion on my book *Racing the Enemy*. I would like to thank Tom Maddux for organizing this roundtable. It is, indeed, gratifying to learn that all four contributors, who represent a wide spectrum of schools on the atomic bomb issue and the Soviet role in the Pacific War are unanimous in their assessment that *Racing the Enemy* represents an important contribution to the scholarship on the ending of the Pacific War. Especially I appreciate Michael Gordin's view that my book incorporates three "balkanized" literatures on the ending the war—the use of the atomic bomb on Japan, Soviet entry into the war, and the unconditional surrender of Japan—into a comprehensive whole, and David Holloway's words that "for the first time a historian who can read the American, Japanese, and Russian sources has written an account that integrates Soviet as well as American policy into an examination of the timing and terms of Japanese surrender," since to write a truly "international history" on this topic, especially by bringing the hitherto neglected Soviet factor to center stage, was my primary goal above anything else.

My book represents a work in progress that will be revised and refined as new evidence appears and critical evaluations help me to revise my views on many issues. In fact, the criticisms that are raised by the commentators in this forum and elsewhere, especially in Gordin's forthcoming manuscript, *The Third Shock* (Princeton University), David Holloway's criticisms of my treatment of Stalin in the forthcoming volume I edited, *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War* (Stanford University Press), and Richard Frank's comments on the Togo-Sato exchange of telegrams in his contribution to this roundtable have already led me to revise some of the assumptions I presented in *Racing the Enemy*. In the Japanese edition, which is scheduled to appear in February this year, I offer revised versions. Scholarship progresses through such exchanges. Thus, I welcome and appreciate the critical comments made by the contributors and especially appreciate the civility with which they engage in this discourse, a manner that has often been lacking in the atomic bomb debate in the past. Especially, I would like to emphasize that Richard Frank has been a generous supporter of my research, making critical comments while I was in the process of writing, and he was willing to share his sources with me despite his disagreements with my view. Since I will devote a considerable amount of space in rebutting his criticisms below, I want to state at the outset that his criticisms and my rebuttal are genuine

disagreements on how to read sources and engage in historical reasoning, and that I applaud the comradely spirit in which he engages in his criticisms.

Since the contributors succinctly summarize my argument and my contributions to scholarship, I will not comment on their positive assessments of my book except to say that I appreciate all of them. Below I would like to respond to important criticisms, if not all, raised by the contributors.

I. General Comments

The comments made by the contributors are divided into two kinds: the issues that I did not write about but that they think I should have explored; and the issues that I wrote about and with which they disagree. Let me begin from the first category of comments.

1. The Atomic Bomb and Eastern Europe:

Alperovitz and Holloway raise the question about Truman's use of the atomic bomb and his policy toward Eastern Europe as an issue that I did not explore. I admit that this is an important topic that should be further researched. After Truman received Groves' report on the Trinity test, Stimson wrote that he was "immediately pepped up," and Churchill noticed that from then on Truman "stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner." (p. 149, all page references are from *Racing the Enemy*). After Truman told Stalin about "a new weapon of unusual destructive force," Stalin immediately understood that Truman was talking about the atomic bomb. According to Andrei Gromyko, then Soviet ambassador to Washington, Stalin commented on Truman's remarks, when he returned to his villa, and said that United States would try to force the Soviet Union to accept its plans regarding Europe with atomic monopoly, and that he was determined to resist this attempt. The connection between the atomic bomb and Eastern Europe was understood by both sides. It would be interesting for some future researcher to see how Groves' report changed the dynamics of the Potsdam conference on Eastern Europe and the German question. My guess is that, as David Holloway demonstrated in U.S.-Soviet negotiations in foreign ministerial conferences in late 1945, the atomic bomb made both sides more intransigent. Also, this issue should be examined in a longer time span than I dealt with in my book. In the essay he contributes to *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War*, Holloway examines this issue more fully.

2. Implementation of Surrender after August 15:

The second issue that both Gordin and Frank criticize me for not exploring sufficiently is the process in which the Japanese government attempted to implement unconditional surrender to the armed forces overseas after the emperor's acceptance of unconditional surrender on August 14 and his radio broadcast of the imperial rescript on August 15. Both Gordin and Frank acknowledge the importance of my treatment of the Soviet-Japanese War after August 15, as Gordin praises this part of this book as "one of the most important and surprising features" of my book. But Gordin states that in military theaters beyond the Soviet Japanese theater as well "the war was in a half-alive, half-dead state," until Japan signed the surrender documents on September 2, and he wishes that I examined this more fully. Likewise Frank argues that the

uncertainties involving Soviet-Japanese situations represent an overall situation that extended everywhere.

I agree that I should have more fully examined the efforts by the Japanese imperial headquarters to implement unconditional surrender for the armed forces overseas other than in Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurils. As I mentioned in my book, on August 15, the imperial general headquarters issued the Continental Order No. 1381, to obey the imperial rescript, while continuing the current task until further notice. It was not until 4 PM on August 16, that the imperial general headquarters issued Continental Order No. 1382, ordering all troops to cease any military action except self-defense. These orders did not mean much when most of the Japanese forces were engaged in self-defense in Manchuria, Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the Kurils. Thus the imperial general headquarters issued the order to the Kwantung Army on August 16 and the Fifth Area Army on August 19 to stop all actions, including self defense, and surrender arms. In addition, the Emperor sent his own relatives overseas to implement surrender: Prince Kan'in to Saigon and Singapore, Prince Asaka to China, and Prince Takeda to Manchuria. Furthermore, on August 17, the emperor issued an imperial rescript to the soldiers and officers, ordering the Japanese troops to accept surrender.

I must stress that each region had its own unique problems. For instance, in China there arose a serious question of maintenance of order. In addition, in some places in Manchuria the Communist forces demanded the surrender of Japanese forces before the arrival of the Nationalist forces. By August 18 the imperial general headquarters ordered all Japanese forces to cease any military action.¹

The question is why the imperial headquarters delayed the issuance of the imperial rescript until August 17, when it had been written already on August 15, and why it delayed the order to stop all military actions (including self-defense) until August 16 (to the Kwantung Army) and until August 19 (to the Fifth Area Army). Frank asserts that this delay was "in fact entirely consistent with the underlying problem that the compliance of the armed forces with the emperor's order was not simply a foregone conclusion." Needless to say the emperor's statement of surrender itself did not ensure the surrender of Japanese armed forces unless the imperial general headquarters specifically ordered them to surrender. Frank's statement dwells on the obvious but it does not explain the reasons behind this delay.

In my opinion, it is important to make a distinction between the Soviet-Japanese military theater and other areas. In the areas where the Japanese were not fighting against the Soviets, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces MacArthur's cease-fire order on August 15 became immediately in force. But MacArthur's order did not extend to the Soviet military theater. In fact, Marshal Vasilevskii, the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Far Eastern Theater, ordered the Soviet forces to keep fighting despite the emperor's acceptance of unconditional surrender. Another important point is that the Japanese army, including Army Minister Anami Korechika, clung to the incredulously unrealistic hope that even after the Soviet invasion it would be possible and expedient to negotiate with Moscow to restore its neutrality and attempt to decouple the Soviets from the Americans and the British. This was the reason why the Japanese government never declared war against the Soviet Union. Gordin is right in pointing out that,

¹ Hattori Takushiro, *Daitoa senso zenshi* (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1965), pp. 944-955.

had I delved more into this general situation, my argument for the special situation in the Soviet-Japanese military theater might have become more forceful. But I do not support Frank's assertion that what happened in the Soviet occupied territories represented the universal problem elsewhere.

3. Political History vs. Military History

Frank criticizes *Racing the Enemy* for focusing merely on the political dimension and ignoring the military dimension. Frank is a judicious and careful military historian and examined various military dimensions of the endgame, including the Ketsu-go, the impact of the firebombs, importance of military intelligence, etc., from which I learned a great deal. But I did not intend to write a military history, and I do believe that the most important aspect on the ending the war was not in the vicissitudes of military actions or in the military strategy, but rather in the political decisions. The fact that the Japanese military had decisive influence in Japan's decision-making process does not necessarily make the military dimension more important than the political dimension, since what mattered was the political dimension of the military's influence. Frank is convinced that the Ketsu-go provided the most decisive key to understand the Japanese government's position and that the military always held the upper hand throughout the endgame. Therefore, in his view the attempt by Stimson and others to modify unconditional surrender in the hope that it would help the peace party within the Japanese government to gain more influence was a pipe dream, and Truman and Byrnes justifiably rejected Stimson's recommendation because their judgment was based on the intelligence source that assessed the Japanese political situation accurately. I argued that the Japanese situation was more complex, showing the gradual shift of power balance in favor of the peace party. But in all this, what mattered was not the military dimension, but the political dimension of the endgame.

4. Methodological Questions about Speculations and Lack of Documents:

Gordin makes an important point about "intentions" in diplomatic history. Documents are not always available; if they are available, they are often unreliable; and even if all documents become suddenly open, it is impossible to get into the minds of Stalin, Truman, and Hirohito. Often historians have no choice but to rely on speculations. One can test the validity of speculations on the basis of plausibility and historical reasoning. Gordin finds most of my speculations plausible, but others weak. That's fair enough, but it is often not a fair question to ask the author to provide direct evidence, the smoking gun, to support speculations. Herein lies a difference between history and a court of law.

II. Response to Frank's criticisms

Now I come to respond to the criticisms on what I wrote. Frank's single-spaced 38 page critique (originally, it was 52 pages) is the most detailed review of my book that has appeared to date and it is unlikely to be surpassed in length. He graciously accepts the book's original contribution, as the one that "eclipsed Butow's book." In my view Butow's elegantly written masterpiece will never be eclipsed by any work, and I believe that my book only supplants it with new evidence that has become available since the publication of his book half a century ago and with a broader international framework than Butow's. Nonetheless, I appreciate Frank's generous appraisal.

But he fundamentally disagrees with the following three key arguments that I make in the book: (1) the decision made by Truman and Byrnes to insist on unconditional surrender by refusing to include the guarantee for a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty, as Stimson and others advocated, was closely connected with the use of the atomic bomb; (2) their decision to use the atomic bomb was closely connected with the Soviet factor-in fact, there was an intense race between Truman and Stalin as to whether Truman could end the war before the Soviets entered the war by dropping the atomic bombs on Japan or Stalin could succeed in entering the war before Japan surrendered; (3) the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the most decisive factor that led Japan to surrender; the Soviet entry into the war was more decisive than the atomic bombs.

What Frank does in his critique is to single out the validity of specific pieces of evidence to support my theses. His method is to chip the selective stones to crack the edifice of my theses. If I have enough space in this forum, I would gladly respond to each and every point that Frank makes in his essay, and such debate may be enlightening for historians and graduate students, illuminating how two different historians reach different conclusions, using the same sources and interpreting them completely differently. But if I take this option, my rebuttal will be as long as Frank's essay. I fear that I do not have the luxury of taxing the patience of the readers. In order to limit my reply to a manageable length, I will construct my rebuttal around Frank's criticisms on these three fundamental points, deferring the debate on other points for later or through personal correspondence.

1. Truman, Byrnes, and Unconditional Surrender

Frank rejects the connection between the atomic bomb and Truman/Byrnes' insistence on unconditional surrender. He defends their decision to excise the passage that promises the Japanese to maintain "a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty" from Stimson's draft of the Potsdam Proclamation. Their judgment was based on the fear, he argues, that any revision of unconditional surrender would be taken by the Japanese government as a sign of American weakness and that such revision was bound to embolden the hardliners in the government that insisted on the continuation of the war. Reports coming from intelligence sources that they received from Magic and Ultra intercepts indicated that the Japanese government was not close to accepting surrender, and this assessment accurately reflected Japan's reality. Thus, any president in this situation had no alternative but to insist on unconditional surrender, which was the only terms acceptable to the United States, and thus to use the atomic bomb.

(a) JCS, JSSC, OPD, and the Potsdam Proclamation

One matter on which I take pride in my book is my analysis of the internal debate within the Truman administration on unconditional surrender. I argue that the Truman administration was divided on the issue of whether or not unconditional surrender should be modified to allow the Japanese to retain the monarchical system. The pressure to revise unconditional surrender came from Grew, and then Stimson, among others, but eventually Truman and Byrnes rejected their recommendation. I argued that the decision made by Truman and Byrnes was closely connected with their intention to use the atomic bomb. A part of my argument I developed on this issue is the internal debate between the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and the Operation Division on

the wording of Paragraph 12 of Stimson's draft of the Potsdam Proclamation, and on the subsequent decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accept the JSSC recommendation and reject the OPD's recommendation (pp. 145-148).

I am happy to see Frank call attention to this issue, but he makes a frontal assault on my interpretation on the USSC-OPD debate.² The JSSC recommended that the guarantee of "constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty" in Paragraph 12 should be stricken out, because, first, this passage "may be misconstrued as a commitment to depose or execute the present Emperor and install some other member of the Imperial family," and second, "to the radical elements in Japan, this phrase may be construed as a commitment to continue the institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship." Therefore, the JSSC recommended that the passage that promised the possibility of Japan's maintaining a constitutional monarchy be crossed out, and that it be substituted with the following passage: "Subject to suitable guarantee against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government."

I argued that this was strange reasoning. A promise to preserve a constitutional monarchy could hardly be taken as the intention to depose or execute Hirohito. On the contrary, this promise would soften the concerns of those who feared that unconditional surrender meant the destruction of the emperor system. Furthermore, there were hardly any "radical elements" in Japan (perhaps with the exception of a handful of Communists in jail) strongly opposed to the preservation of the constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.

Frank, however, interprets the JSSC's view as "a reasonable and useful warning that the silence about the incumbent emperor could be interpreted as having sinister implication for Hirohito." If the fate of Hirohito was in question, the passage in question could be corrected by modifying it as the OPD suggested below. But to throw out the entire passage because of this fear was tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bathwater, since it would mean that the concerns of those who equated unconditional surrender with the destruction of the monarchical system would not be eliminated. As for the "radicals," Frank thinks that the JSSC was probably thinking about "radical rightists." This simply does not make sense, since no right-wing radicals would possibly advocate the elimination of the emperor system.

To the OPD (and to Stimson as well), this passage that the JSSC proposed to eliminate constituted the linchpin of the ultimatum, and the OPD was horrified by the JSSC's recommendation. "The purpose of issuing the ultimatum," the OPD fired back, was "to induce Japan's surrender and thus avoid the heavy casualties implied in a fight to the finish," and "the basic point on which acceptance of surrender terms will hinge lies in the question of the disposition of the Emperor and his dynasty." Thus, the OPD amended the JSSC's "amendment": the OPD substituted the JSSC's added passage with the following sentence: "The Japanese

² I set aside for the moment my response to his other points: chronology of dropping the passage of the constitutional monarch from the Potsdam Proclamation and the news of the atomic bomb text in New Mexico and the interpretation of Weckerling's analysis on Togo's July 11 Telegram to Sato. As for the former, Stimson's diary for July 16 makes it clear that Byrnes and Truman had already worked out a "timetable," implying the connection between the timing of issuance of the ultimatum and the use of the atomic bomb. For the second point, I developed my criticism of Frank's interpretation in my book (pp. 110-115), and Frank does not respond to the points of my criticism in this critique.

people will be free to choose whether they shall retain their emperor as a constitutional monarchy.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed this matter on July 17 at Potsdam. Although it had two reports in its possession, only JSSC's recommendation was presented. Leahy explained: “this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question.” On the following day, it adopted the JSSC's recommendation.

When I examined this issue, a number of questions came to my mind. Who in the JSSC proposed the amendment and why? Why did it make contradictory reasoning behind its amendment? Why did the JCS accept the JSSC's recommendation over the objections of the OPD? Why did it take two days for the JCS to reach its decision on this issue? Why did Stimson and McCloy, to whom the deleted passage constituted the linchpin of the entire document, accept defeat without any protest? Why did they keep silent on this crucial matter in their diaries?

And I speculated. Encouraged by Japan's peace overtures to Moscow, Stimson doubled his efforts to persuade the president to modify unconditional surrender. But Stimson was told by Byrnes on July 17 that the president and Byrnes had worked out a “timetable” for the end of the war. On July 16, at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, British Chief of Staff Alan Brooke commented on Paragraph 12 of the draft ultimatum, and suggested that “Allies make it clear to Japanese that the emperor might be preserved “shortly after a Russian entry into the war.” Leahy told Alan Brooke that this question had been discussed at a political level, and suggested that Churchill should put forward that view to Truman. On July 17 at the JCS meeting Leahy said that this question was considered on a political level. Stimson must have felt how strongly Truman and Byrnes were committed to unconditional surrender. Likewise, informed by Leahy that Truman and Byrnes had already made up their mind to remove the passage, the JCS had to accept that decision.

These questions do not concern Frank. What matters to him were only two pieces of documents: the JSSC's recommendation and the record of the JCS's meetings. There is not a “scintilla of evidence that Truman and Byrnes manipulated the JSSC.” The JCS “plainly based their recommendation on the report of the JSSC.” And he adds: “to suggest otherwise is pure conjecture contrary to the contemporary written record.”

Like a lawyer in the courtroom, Frank trusts nothing but the two documentary evidence, and urges us not to consider all these questions that I raised as mere “conjecture” that are not supported by the two documents. As for the third “written record” produced by the OPD, he dismisses it since the OPD lacked the competence on this matter, ignoring the fact that the OPD was the prime agent that produced Stimson's draft. In fact, if one were to question the OPD's competence on this matter, the whole draft of the Potsdam Proclamation would have been thrown out. Incidentally, I do not say in the book that “Truman and Byrnes manipulated the JSSC,” since I do not know then and even now what the JSSC was, and who composed this committee. This is the matter that must be researched further.

I would like to return here to the question I raised above about the role of speculations when one comes to assess “intentions.” I raise plausible scenarios based on circumstantial evidence and speculations based on historical reasoning. Frank can question if this reasoning is plausible. But to tell us to stick to the written documents alone and enjoin us not to engage in “conjectures” beyond that is written in these documents is to impoverish history and to reduce history to a trial court.

Let us review the series of revisions that were rendered in Stimson's original draft. (I highlight the revised parts by putting them in brackets [])

Stimson's original draft:

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. [This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.]

JSSC's revision (JCS adopted this amendment): [subject to suitable guarantee against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government.]

OPD's amendment: [The Japanese people will be free to choose whether they shall retain their Emperor as a constitutional monarchy.]

Truman's amendment-final version: [The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.]

Frank does not see that the final version was more stringent and less clear about the status of the emperor. Even the JSSC's (and JCS's) amendment directly addresses the question of “the form of government,” namely whether they choose the monarchical form of government. In Truman's final version, the question of the form of government is completely dropped, and refers vaguely “the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” and “a peacefully inclined and responsible government.” Whether or not the Japanese people could retain the monarchical system, which was the centerpiece of Stimson's draft, was watered down by the JSSC's amendment, and completely disappeared in Truman's final version.

If one examines the transformation of Stimson's draft into Truman's last version, one can clearly see that Truman and Byrnes were interested in removing any promise of a monarchy, the issue that the Japanese policy makers, regardless of the peace party or the war party, were most vitally interested in. Frank equates unconditional surrender with the “terms acceptable to the United States,” but the American policy makers were divided precisely on the terms of unconditional surrender, namely, over the question of whether it should include the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy. There was no unanimity over “the terms acceptable to the United

States.” Truman and Byrnes overruled the views advocated by Stimson, McCloy, Forrestal, and Grew. Moreover, when Truman and Byrnes decided to strike out this passage, they knew full well that this ultimatum would be rejected by the Japanese precisely because it did not contain the promise of the preservation of the monarchy.

Truman and Byrnes made the condition less acceptable to the Japanese, and they knew that the final version would be rejected by the Japanese. The question is why they chose this alternative by rejecting the alternative recommended by Stimson and the OPD? I hypothesized that their choice was connected with the use of the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war. I do not agree with his categorical statement that any president would have made the same decision. Certainly, Byrnes would have. But FDR? Hoover had sided with Stimson.

(b) Togo-Sato Exchange of Telegrams: Frank and I also differ on the interpretations of the Togo-Sato exchange of telegrams.

Frank argues that the editors of the “Magic” Diplomatic Summary made it “crystal clear to policy makers that Togo flatly rejected Sato’s proposal that acceptance of unconditional surrender should be made with one condition: preservation of the Imperial House.

This is, indeed, a very important criticism, which could potentially undermine one of the important arguments in my book that the elimination of the passage promising a constitutional monarchy was integrally connected with the decision to use the atomic bomb. In his previous telegram, No. 1416, on July 18, Sato advocated the acceptance of unconditional surrender “with the sole reservation that Japan’s ‘national structure-i.e. the Imperial House-be preserved.” If Togo’s July 21 telegram rejected Sato’s proposal, then it follows that Truman’s rejection of the guarantee for a constitutional monarchy can be perfectly justified, because the Japanese government would reject the provision that contained the passage allowing the Japanese to maintain the constitutional monarchy. This also means that Togo’s telegram punctured a big hole in the argument presented by Stimson, Forrestal, Leahy, Grew, and McCloy.

What did Togo really say in his very important July 21 telegram? This is what he said according to the July 22 Magic Diplomatic Summary:

With regard to unconditional surrender (I have been informed of your 18 July message)

We are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender.³

This passage seems to confirm the validity of Frank’s assertion that Togo rejected not only unconditional surrender in general, but also the qualified unconditional surrender demand that excluded the preservation of the kokutai, as suggested by Sato.

³ SRS 1736, 22 July 45, pp. 2-3.

But if one examines the Japanese original, the sentence in parenthesis quoted above is: “Kiden dai 1416 go ryosho zumi).”⁴ “Ryosho” means “understand and accept.” It therefore strongly implies that Togo was not only informed of Sato’s proposal, as the Magic Diplomatic Summary stated, but also he accepted it. This interpretation is consistent with the foreign ministry’s consensus that the only condition that should be attached was the preservation of the Imperial House. It was therefore unfortunate that “ryosho” was mistranslated as “informed” in the Magic.

It is quite possible to interpret the Magic’s translation, as Frank does, that Togo rejected Sato’s proposal. But it does not necessarily follow, however, that the Magic Diplomatic Summary “made it crystal clear that Togo rejected” Sato’s proposal.⁵

It is also important to pay attention to the next passage that followed the part that I quoted above and that Frank chooses to ignore completely.

It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace which is not so-called unconditional surrender through the good offices of Russia. It is necessary that we exert ourselves so that this idea will be finally driven home to the Americans and the British.

This passage makes it clear that Togo was interested in the termination of war on terms other than unconditional surrender, and that he wanted to convey this message not merely to the Soviets but also to the Americans and the British.

Frank is correct in pointing out that Togo did not specify what conditions should be sufficient to terminate the war. Togo stated that it would be “disadvantageous and impossible from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations.” The military opposition was a formidable obstacle, as Frank correctly points out. Togo was treading on a tight rope on the precarious balance between the peace party and the war party. But he believed that the only way to break this stalemate was Konoe’s direct negotiations with Moscow, the imperial sanction of the terms that Konoe would bring back from Moscow, and the imposition of these terms by the emperor on the reluctant military. And Konoe’s advisers were unanimous in their assessment that the only condition that should be attached was the preservation of the imperial house, the same position that Sato advocated in his Telegram 1416.⁶

Clearly, as Frank asserts, Byrnes and Truman interpreted Togo’s July 21 telegram as the evidence that Japan intended “to fight on rather than accept an unconditional surrender” (p. 157). But was this the only conclusion that American policy makers drew from Togo’s July 21 telegram? Forrestal wrote that the Japanese leaders’ “final judgment and decision was that the war must be fought with all the vigor and bitterness of which the nation was capable so long as the only alternative was the unconditional surrender.”⁷ From Togo’s July 21 telegram, Forrestal

⁴ *Shusen shiroku*, vol. 3, p. 180.

⁵ Sato’s Telegram 1416 is not, for some inexplicable reason, included in *Shusen shiroku*.

⁶ Frank misrepresents the tentative plan prepared by Konoe’s advisers to be brought to Moscow. It advocated the attachment of only one condition: the preservation of the Imperial House. It even included the possibility of Hirohito’s abdication.

⁷ Walter Mills, ed., *Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 76.

and Stimson concluded that Japan was close to surrender if the United States revised unconditional surrender to include the retention of a constitutional monarchy with the current dynasty (pp. 157-158). Based on this telegram, Stimson, who had previously given up the hope to restore the guarantee of the constitutional monarchy, once more tried to persuade Truman to change his mind on July 24 (pp. 156-157).

Togo's July 21 was, indeed, important, but it was not the decisive factor that triggered Truman's decision to reject the promise of the constitutional monarchy, since the decision to delete this promise had been already made long before July 21, as I argue above.

(c) Magic Far Eastern Summary and Ultra:

Frank should be credited for uncovering the existence of Magic Far Eastern Summary as well as Ultra. I must confess that I did not use these important materials. Frank states that the Magic Far East Summary, which was often delivered together with the Magic Diplomatic Summary, took the position that "so long as the Imperial Army believes it can defeat the initial invasion, there was very little prospect that Japan would surrender on terms acceptable to the U.S." And he concludes these opinions "carry more weight than those of Forrestal, Stimson or McCloy about the nearness of Japan's surrender."

The problem of this argument is the weak link that connects this analysis with the primary motivation behind Truman/Byrnes' decision. He attributes this lack of evidence to the extreme secrecy that surrounds these intelligence sources. He states: "far more often we are left to infer that the radio intelligence information shaped the decision making." In other words, we must engage in "conjecture," the very method Frank elsewhere denounces as not a legitimate historical method. Forrestal, Stimson, McCloy and Byrnes had no hesitation to reveal the supposedly classified information they obtained from the Magic Diplomatic Summary. Byrnes kept a copy of the Magic Diplomatic Summary. If the Magic Far Eastern Summary was delivered jointly with the Magic Diplomatic Summary, why didn't the Byrnes papers contain it together with the Magic Diplomatic Summary? The existence of Ultra and the Magic Far East itself is not sufficient to prove that Truman and Byrnes based their decision on the information supplied by them. When Stimson recommended the reinsertion of a constitutional monarchy in the ultimatum on his July 24 meeting with Truman, Truman did not reject Stimson's recommendation because his source indicated that this insertion would be rejected by the Japanese or that this promise would embolden the Japanese hardliners judging from the information he possessed. Instead, he merely stated that it was too late to change it, because he had already sent the draft to Chian Kai-shek. When Stimson further asked Truman to "watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point," Truman did not reject Stimson's advice, but rather he said that this was exactly what he had in mind, and that he would take care of it. In this exchange the information allegedly given by the Magic Far East and Ultra was never raised.

2. The Potsdam Proclamation, the Atomic Bomb, and Soviet Entry into the War:

Frank questions my interpretation that Truman and Byrnes deliberately excised the promise of a constitutional monarchy from the Potsdam Proclamation because it provided a justification to use

the atomic bomb. He asks: "Where is there any documentation that either Truman or Byrnes ever directly stated this reasoning?" I do not have specific documentation to prove my point as much as Frank cannot prove the Magic Far Eastern Summary and Ultra radio intelligence were the decisive factor leading Truman's and Byrnes' decision to insist on unconditional surrender and use the atomic bomb.

But I can use inferences and plausible hypotheses based on circumstantial evidence. Let us recall that as early as July 17, Byrnes told Stimson that he and Truman had worked out a "timetable." The entry for July 18 of Walter Brown's diary reads: "JFB [Byrnes] had hoped Russian declaration of war against Japan would come out [of] this conference No[w] he think[s] United States and United Kingdom will have to issue [a] joint statement giving Japs two weeks to surrender or fac[e] destruction. (Secret weapon will be ready by [t]hat time)" (pp. 142-143). Let us also recall that when Byrnes read Togo's July 21 telegram, he immediately connected his rejection of unconditional surrender with the use of the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war. Especially, after they received Groves' report, the Potsdam Proclamation and the atomic bomb became more closely connected. Byrnes asked Stimson about the timing of the S-1 program on July 23. On the same day, Stimson visited Truman. In his diary, Stimson wrote: "He [Truman] told me that he had the warning message which we prepared on his desk, and had accepted our most recent change in it, and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation. We had a brief discussion about Stalin's recent expansions and he confirmed what I have heard. But he told me that the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the information as to S-1" (p. 151). These passages clearly demonstrate the connection among the timing of issuing the Potsdam Proclamation, the timing of the atomic bomb, and the desire to prevent Soviet expansionism.

Furthermore, when he brought Harrison's telegram about the timing of the atomic bomb deployment, Stimson noted in his diary entry for July 24: "I then showed him the telegram which had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the operations. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning" (p. 153). Walter Brown wrote in his diary on July 24: JFB still hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press for claims against China." Forrestal wrote: "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur." When Forrestal told Byrnes that Truman had said "his principal objective at Potsdam would be to get Russia in the war," Byrnes responded that "it was most probable that the President's view had changed; certainly that was not now my view." Walter Brown's diary contains the following passage for July 26: "Joint message to Japan released. This was prelude to atomic bomb." Byrnes knew even before the Japanese responded to the Potsdam Proclamation that the document was prelude to the bomb (p. 158). Is it too far-fetched to connect the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation with Truman/Byrnes' timetable where the use of the atomic bomb and the date of Soviet entry into the war were carefully mapped out?

Truman and Byrnes state in their memoirs that the decision to drop the atomic bomb was the most difficult decision and this decision greatly pained them. But if so, it seems reasonable to assume that they carefully monitored Japan's reaction. As I discussed in my book (p. 182), Togo's July 30 telegram to Sato mentioned that in Tokyo's negotiations with Moscow, "there is

a disposition to make the Potsdam Three Power Proclamation the basis of our study concerning terms.” The naval intelligence analysts underlined this passage as important.⁸

Frank maintains that Togo's July 30 telegram was negated by the July 27 Magic Far East Summary that described the hopeless division within the Japanese government. Frank concludes: “the men who really controlled Japan were absolutely bent upon one final decisive battle and would not surrender on terms acceptable to the U.S.” The problem here is that if the policy makers ever discussed how the Japanese government reacted to the Potsdam Proclamation, such evidence has never been discovered.

(3) *The Soviet Factor and the Atomic Bombings in Japan's Decision to Surrender:*

Where Frank and I further disagree is the assessment of the Soviet factor in Japan's decision to surrender. Frank believes that the Japanese military had written off Manchuria, and by implication the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was not as great a shock to the Japanese as the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To support this assertion, Frank cites the Kwantung army's revision of strategy abandoning “all but a small triangular redoubt in southeastern Manchuria along the Korean border.” But the new strategy was based on the general assumption that Japan would be able to keep the Soviets neutral. This assumption led the imperial general headquarters to extract sizable divisions from Manchuria for the homeland defense. The Ketsu-go strategy was predicated by Soviet neutrality. That was why when the Soviets attacked, it was a great shock to the Japanese military, and the entire strategy collapsed like a house of cards.

Since the shock that jolted the army with the news of the Soviet invasion is discussed fully in my book as well as in my forthcoming article in *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War*, I do not need to go into details here. Suffice to mention that one day before the Soviet invasion, the Army Military Bureau considered it imperative to keep Soviet neutrality, and that even after the invasion, the Army clung to the preposterous idea that it would be possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union to restore its neutrality.

To deal with the Soviet factor, Frank's argument is two-fold: to ignore the Soviet factor entirely in Japan's decision until August 15 and to acknowledge the Soviet factor merely as the means to implement surrender of troops. And this two-tier argument is to buttress his ultimate objective that it was the atomic bombings that were most decisive in Japan's decision to surrender.

Frank does not address my major arguments challenging the decisiveness of the atomic bombings on Japan's decision to surrender. This includes:

—There is no evidence to indicate the Togo or the emperor advocated the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation even after the atomic bombing on Hiroshima before the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.

—On the contrary, the government continued to seek the termination of the war through Moscow's mediation even after the Hiroshima bomb.

⁸ SRS1747, 2 Aug 45, pp. 2-3; SRH-088, pp. 7, 16.

—On August 7 Togo sent an urgent telegram to Sato urging him to meet Molotov immediately.

—Hasunuma Shigeru, emperor's Chief Aide de Camp, who was present whenever the emperor went, testified that the atomic bomb on Hiroshima did not influence the emperor's view.

—Only after the Soviet invasion did the Japanese government begin discussing seriously the possibility of accepting the Potsdam Proclamation.

To prove that the atomic bombings were decisive factor on the emperor's decision, Frank continues to rely on Takeshita's account of the August 10 imperial conference, which is the only source that refers to the emperor's alleged reference to the atomic bomb for his decision to accept surrender. Takeshita did not attend the conference, but none of the participants (Suzuki, Togo, Toyoda, Sakomizu, Hoshina, and Ikeda) mention that the emperor referred to the atomic bomb.

Frank further proposes that the only evidence we should rely on to reach conclusions about the motivation behind Japan's decision to surrender are Hirohito's statements alone, since the emperor represented the only legitimate authority that could decide on surrender. But it is not clear to what extent Hirohito's statements at the imperial conferences and on other occasions reflected his own thinking and to what extent the ideas of other advisers (such as Kido, Shigemitsu through Kido, and Takagi's group) were filtered into the emperor's statements. The absence of record of crucial meetings between Kido and the emperor makes it impossible to detect what was really in the emperor's mind. And here Frank admits that he has to rely on speculations. Frank's methodology could make sense only if we assume that these statements accurately reflected his thinking, an assumption that can hardly be entertained.

Furthermore, Frank considers Hirohito's two imperial rescripts a reflection of his own thinking. But the imperial rescript to accept unconditional surrender was composed by Sakomizu, and it was revised at the cabinet meeting. The imperial rescript to the soldiers and officers was composed by Kihara Michio, assistant to the cabinet. They were both approved by the emperor, but it is misleading to think that they accurately reflected Hirohito's personal view. There is little to reason to distinguish the imperial rescripts from the statement issued by the cabinet and Suzuki's statement. All were written by the same writers.

As for the imperial rescript to the soldiers and officer, where there was no reference to the atomic bomb but it specifically referred to the Soviet entry into the war, Frank shifts to the second tier of argument: it was necessary to stress the Soviet entry in order to convince the Japanese troops overseas to accept surrender. But why the Soviet entry into the war, not the atomic bombings, was more persuasive for the soldiers to accept surrender is not explained. It must be remembered that this rescript was issued not only to the soldiers and officer fighting against the Soviets, but also all the soldiers overseas. If the atomic bombs rendered the defense of the homeland hopeless, as Frank argues, then why didn't the rescript say so? Isn't the importance of the Soviet entry into the war to persuade the soldiers to accept surrender telling evidence that it also provided a powerful motivation behind Japan's decision to surrender?

Finally, Frank makes an argument that the Japanese military did not take the possibility of the Soviet invasion of Japan's homeland seriously because the Soviets lacked the capability to land on Japan's homeland.

The problem for the Hokkaido defense was its size, which was as big as the entire Tohoku prefectures plus Niigata Prefecture combined. The Fifth Area Army, responsible for the defense of Hokkaido, had to disperse 114,000 troops into three possible points of attacks: one division in the Shiribetsu-Nemuro area in the east, one division in the Cape of Soya in the north, and one brigade in the Tomakomai area in the west. The fortification of the Shibetsu area was not completed, and the defense of the Nemuro area was considered hopeless because of the flat terrain. The defense of the north was concentrated on the Cape of Soya, but nothing was prepared for Rumoi, where the Soviets intended to land. The military planners had no confidence about the Army's ability to repulse the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido. In *Downfall*, this is what Frank himself wrote: "the Soviet Navy's amphibious shipping resources were limited but sufficient to transport the three assault divisions in several echelons. The Red Army intended to seize the northern half of Hokkaido. If resistance proved strong, reinforcements would be deployed to aid the capture of the rest of Hokkaido. Given the size of Hokkaido, the Japanese would have been hard pressed to move units for a concerted confrontation of the Soviet invasion. The chances of Soviet success appeared to be very good."⁹ I tend to agree with Frank's view expressed in *Downfall*.

III. Holloway's Comments

Holloway makes three valuable comments on my interpretation of Stalin's actions, one very interesting addition from Russian sources, and two criticisms.

First, he introduces the materials from the transcripts of Soviet interrogations of captured Kwantung army officers. These are comparable to "Interrogations" and "Statements" (U.S. Army, Far East Command, Military History Section), and U.S. Strategic Bombing survey's Interrogations, although the number of these transcripts published in *Velikaia otechestvennaia*, vol. 7, pt. 2, are miniscule in quantity compared with the American "interrogations" and "statements." Nevertheless, it is interesting to see what the Kwantung Army officers said about the reasons for Japan's surrender.

I would like to add a few words to Holloway's useful commentaries to these transcripts. First, although the Kwantung army officers mentioned both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the war as two crucial events, as Holloway indicates, they considered the Soviet entry a more important cause for Japan's surrender than the atomic bombings. General Uemura's interrogation, quoted by Holloway, clearly indicates this, but even General Kita Seiichi's statement reveals that he attached more importance to the Soviet entry (the Emperor decided) than the atomic bombings (the Emperor considered it hard for Japan to fight on). Second, I would add that the General Hata Hikosaburo stated in the interrogation: "We did not think that the Soviet Union would, clear out of blue [vnezapno], declare war against Japan this year. Therefore, there is no doubt that the beginning of the military actions between Japan and the

⁹ Frank, *Downfall*, p. 323.

Soviet Union had tremendous influence on the entire Japanese people.”¹⁰ Third, we must keep in mind that these transcripts, as all interrogations and statements conducted by the American side, reflected certain points of view of the interrogators. Some statements were response to interrogators' questions. For instance, General-Lieutenant Shimizu Noritsune's statement on the atomic bomb as the cruel and inhuman weapon that aimed at the total extermination of the Japanese people might reflect the point of view of the interrogator more than the general's view.¹¹

The second point Holloway makes is his criticism of my treatment of the impact that the information on the atomic bomb had on Stalin at Potsdam. Holloway believes that I exaggerated the importance of the information given by Truman to Stalin about the successful test of the atomic bomb. Holloway is the world's foremost authority on Soviet nuclear weapons. Although definitive evidence about Stalin's reaction to the news that the United States succeeded in possessing the atomic bomb is lacking, perhaps Holloway is correct in his interpretation: Stalin did not believe that the Americans would use the atomic bomb on Japan so soon.

Holloway agrees, however, with my interpretation that Stalin was anxious to enter the war, before Japan surrendered. If we discount the atomic bomb as a factor, it makes the importance of the Potsdam Proclamation without Stalin's signature a more compelling reason to hasten the date of attack on Manchuria.

The third valid, and very important point Holloway makes is the issue of the date of Soviet attack on Japan. In my book, I stated that the previously agreed date of attack was set for sometime between August 22-25, and after Stalin's request to append his signature to the Potsdam Proclamation was turned down by Truman, Stalin ordered Vasilevskii to move up the date of attack for 10 to 14 days. Holloway states that on July 16, Stalin telephoned Vasilevskii to advance the planned date of attack by ten days, to August 1, but Vasilevskii replied that the Soviet forces would not be ready by then and asked that August 11 date remain in effect. Relying on Shtemenko, Holloway asserts that “Stalin gave no new orders during the Potsdam Conference.” He continues: “On August 3 Vasilevskii recommended to Stalin that the offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria begin on August 9-10. Stalin accepted this advice and sent an order that the attack be launched on August 10 at 18.00 hours (Moscow time or 24.00 hours (Trans-Baikal time).”

Holloway's criticism made me go back to the sources. Then I realized that I did not pay sufficient attention to Shtemenko's memoirs. In his article published in *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal*, he cites what seems to me to be the same August 3 telegram published in *Velikaia otechestvennaia*, vol. 7, pt. 1, which I quoted in my book (pp. 177-178). Shtemenko states that Vasilevskii attempted to change the date of attack from August 11, as previously set, to August 9-10. According to Shtemenko, based on the information that the Japanese were reinforcing troops from 19 divisions to 23 divisions and increased the number of airplanes from 450 to 850, a postponement of the attack would not serve Soviet interests. The Stavka carefully examined

¹⁰ V. V. Vartanov et al, ed., *Velikaia otechestvennaia*, vol. 1, pt. 2, *Sovietsko-iaponskaia voika 1945 goda: istoriia voenno-politicheskogo protivobordsva dvukh derzhav v 30-40-e gody: dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow, Tera-Terra, 2000), p. 321.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

Vasilevskii's recommendations and the conditions of preparedness of deployed troops. Shtemenko writes that the Stavka agreed with "Vasilevskii's recommendations about the timing of the beginning of military actions," but did not accept his proposal to make the entire troops of the First Far Eastern Front move to offensive action, since "no matter how strong they might be, the advanced detachment alone could hardly take up the battle in 5-7 days." The Stavka favored the united military action involving the main forces of the front.¹²

Holloway's criticism prompted me to change my view: the date of attack was set for August 11 rather than August 22-25. Nevertheless, the issue of the date of attack is not as simple and straightforward as Holloway seems to indicate. Shtemenko's memoirs cited above is very ambiguous about what was decided: whether or not the Stavka accepted Vasilevskii's alternative date attack of August 9-10. On the face of it, Shtemenko seems to suggest that the Stavka accepted Vasilevskii's proposal, but his reasoning seems to repudiate Vasilevskii's strategy. Moreover, the editor of *Velikaia otechestvannia* notes in his commentary that despite Vasilevskii's recommendation, "the precise date and the time of the beginning of the military action had to be set by the Stavka. The timing was determined for all the forces of the Far East: August 10, 18.00, Moscow time." This must mean that despite Shtemenko's ambiguous statement, the Stavka must have turned down Vasilevskii's recommendation.

I do not entirely agree with Holloway's contention that Stalin did not issue any new order on the date of attack during the Potsdam Conference. Vasilevskii's August 3 telegram strongly suggests that he was responding to Stalin's previous telegram. (Otherwise, what prompted him to change his mind when he had turned down Stalin's previous request to advance the date of attack?) After suggesting that the Stavka advance date of attack to August 9-10, he requested, at the end of the telegram, that Stavka give him final instructions for the precise time that military action should begin, as well as instructions regarding questions of a "political and diplomatic nature" (p. 178). It is possible to argue, although no evidence exists, that as I argued in the book, Stalin requested from Potsdam that Vasilevskii move up the date of attack because of "political and diplomatic" reasons. Considering Stalin's shock at Truman's issuing the Potsdam Proclamation without Stalin's signature and Truman's rejection of Stalin's request to join the Potsdam Proclamation, it makes sense to assume that Stalin made the request to Vasilevskii to advance the date of attack. If this hypothesis is correct, it is likely that Stalin made this request either on July 30, when he unveiled the appointment of Vasilevskii as the commander in chief of the Soviet Army in the Far East, or on August 2 on the day when he ordered the creation of three fronts.

IV. Conclusion:

I am sure that not all the contributors agree with all my responses. I also regret that I do not have space to cover such important issues as Japan's "rejection" of the Potsdam Proclamation, the impact of the Nagasaki bomb, the factor of revenge in Truman's decision, and the connection between foreign policy and domestic policy. But this rebuttal is already too long. I hope this exchange serves as the beginning of a meaningful and productive dialogue that will elevate the scholarship on the ending of the Pacific War to a higher level.

¹² S. Shtemenko, "Iz istorii razgroma Kvantunskoi armii," *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 5, 1967, p.54.

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He is currently editing a book, *Reinterpreting the End of the Pacific War: Atomic Bombs and Soviet Entry into the War* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Commentary by Barton J. Bernstein, Stanford University

“I believe we are going to get the thing settled [ending the Japanese war] without backing up on our unconditional surrender demand.”

President Harry S. Truman to Eugene Meyer, Aug. 11, 1945

“Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them.”

“When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.”

Pres. Harry S. Truman to Samuel McCrea Cavert, Aug. 11, 1945

“The hurried dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a brilliant success, in that all the political objectives were fully achieved. American control of Japan is complete, and there is no struggle for authority there with Russia. . . . [W]e may conclude that the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the Second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress.”

P.M.S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb* (1949)

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* is a truly impressive accomplishment, meriting prizes and accolades. Able to work in the archival collections and published literature in three languages—English, Japanese, and Russian—Hasegawa has produced a major volume in international history. Before Hasegawa's study, no one scholar in any language had written in depth, and in considerable detail, on the policies of all three major nations leading to the ending of the Pacific/Asian war in 1945.

Recognizing that much of the end-of-the-war and the A-bomb literature is shaped by implicit or explicit counterfactual analysis, Hasegawa has usefully—and courageously—addressed many of these issues explicitly in his thoughtful concluding chapter, “Assessing the Roads Not Taken.” In some ways, that valuable last chapter may help compensate for the book’s strategy of providing chapters divided into multiple small segments, with a mixture usually of substantial narrative and brief analysis, where careful readers may not always be sure of Hasegawa’s interpretation of particular motives and of alternative courses of action. The main part of the book, usually closely adhering to chronology and thus necessarily often shifting from decisions by one nation to another’s, can leave the reader unsure of why some actions were taken, why some alternatives were not pursued, and what might have occurred if alternatives had instead been pursued.

It is a difficult and bold task to seek to analyze, as Hasegawa has done, the behavior of the leaders, and sometimes the underlings, of the three major nations (other than Britain and China) involved in dealing in 1945 with the Asian war—the costs, the dangers, and the opportunities. To do so with high intelligence and focused energy, as Hasegawa has done, is truly remarkable.

This review essay, conceived as part of the roundtable discussion on *Racing*, necessarily only deals with some aspects of Hasegawa’s distinguished volume: (i) briefly discussing the nature of the problems in sources, language, and earlier interpretations, and the opportunities; (ii) briefly situating *Racing* in the major scholarship; (iii) critically examining *Racing*’s treatment of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26 and the “Magic” intercepts of the period; (iv) considering troubling problems in the “*Racing*” framework and the analysis and explanation of the A-bomb “decision”; (v) looking critically at pre-Hiroshima and slightly at post-Hiroshima expectations by US policymakers in terms of *Racing*’s contentions about the bomb’s likely impact as a “decisive” weapon speedily ending the war; (vi) looking critically at related issues among A-bomb scientists and others on the Manhattan Project; (vii) analyzing some related A-bomb issues and the distinction between nuclear and atomic weapons in ethical and strategic terms; (viii) reexamining the August 9/10-14/15 period, with slight attention to Japan and emphasis on events in the US; (ix) considering briefly the end of the war and also later A-bomb revisionism by the right and the left; (x) and offering a short conclusion.

Thus, this essay, while looking briefly at Soviet and Japanese policy, focuses primarily on US policy in discussing *Racing the Enemy*, and heavily though not exclusively on A-bomb-related issues. A thorough, fully detailed analysis of *Racing* would reach far more broadly and deeply, and probably be nearly twice as long.

I-Dealing with Formidable Obstacles and Defining Opportunities

Until Hasegawa’s formidable book, no one examining in print the end of the war had a knowledge of all three languages. Nor, partly because of the uncertainties involving the Russian archival materials, did any one scholar, especially when faced with the massive American collections and the growing availability of Japanese files, seek to work in the archives of all three nations. It was a daunting task: bureaucratic impediments and arbitrary standards, mixed with peculiar personalism, in the Soviet Union; substantial materials in Tokyo at the National Defense

Institute and the Diet Library (but reportedly little at the Foreign Affairs Ministry); and, if the subject was properly pursued in necessary depth and breadth in the U.S., about six-to-nine months of archival research drawing not only on the Truman Library, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives, but on navy, air force, and army files elsewhere and on the papers in various libraries around the country of about a half-dozen key people.

The nature of such intensive and extensive archival work, as scholars fully understand, is that new interpretations and new suggestions about the meaning of particular documents and the possible importance of previously minimized events can drive scholars back to the same material a few times to examine questions and materials that previously did not seem significant. Vigorous and rigorous archival work, when conducted in the context of the prevailing scholarship, is often not a one-time visit to a collection but a series of trips over time.

That kind of intensive and sometimes iterative research may occur more frequently on subjects in decision-making and policy, such as the A-bomb “decision” and Japan’s surrender, when the history dialogue has been rather close-grained: Why was a particular option considered or not, and by whom, and why and how did the issues sometimes get transformed or reconceived by participants in the process? How did various people in the government making major decisions with impact on the future relate the present problems and likely future power constellations internationally and domestically? What were the personal and official connections—the channels of communication, and the nature of influence—among top people in the particular government, between various underlings, and between those underlings and the top people? How does one go about defining and establishing the dominant assumptions of various policymakers in 1945, and before, about weaponry and the likely course of the war? How much, and when, can memoirs be trusted, especially when checked carefully against the contemporaneous archival materials and important disjunctions emerge?

For example, in the case of President Harry S. Truman, who did not write his own memoirs, can one safely state, as Hasegawa mistakenly does, that Truman “wrote” them? Or, at best, can one usually say only that Truman’s memoirs, published nearly a decade after the key 1945 events, “contend” or “assert” that “X occurred for Y reason”? And what is the significance of the evidential gap between what Truman actually wrote, and what he approved for publication—sometimes with less than vigilant attention—in his memoirs? Heavy reliance upon the particular phrasing of such memoirs—as Hasegawa does—can be a serious error when the actual phrasing was normally “ghosted.”

Surprisingly, because the post-presidential files at the Truman Library are rather rich on the construction of Truman’s memoirs, including interviews with the retired president and drafts of segments of the volumes, no scholar has systematically worked through them on many of the 1945 issues involving the ending of the Japanese war. A few scholarly essays have briefly used some of the post-presidential interview and draft materials for estimates of US casualties in the invasion(s) that never occurred. But there is no sustained analysis of the construction of the memoirs on dealing with the atomic bomb, attitudes toward the Soviets and the Japanese, and ways of ending the war.

In the case of the Soviet materials, where the selective openings and closings of archives are distressing to scholars, there are obvious problems. Some researchers get to see materials that others can not. As troubling, the crucial presidential archives—Stalin's own files—are normally inaccessible to scholars. Sometimes, as in the case of Hasegawa, a generous Soviet scholar and friend (Boris Slavinsky) shared pages of notes from various Soviet non-presidential files that many other scholars had not seen, and that Hasegawa himself could usually not view.

The major limitation on Japanese materials is that the crucial files—those of the Imperial Household—are closed to all. It is ironic that if Emperor Hirohito had been tried as a war criminal, those materials would most likely have become available. But his exemption from such treatment, and the related favoritism bestowed on him and the Imperial Household by General Douglas MacArthur in the occupation, guaranteed that probably the most important materials would be long, if not forever, closed. Thus, part of the process of the postwar American-Japanese rapprochement involved the hiding of wartime history and of fundamental sources.

While apparently using many of the available Japanese files elsewhere, Hasegawa, perhaps out of a sense of understandable necessity, did sharply limit himself in examining the American files. He narrowed them down to what seemed a manageable size—but perhaps at some unforeseen and unrecognized interpretive cost. On the Soviet side, given the limitations on access to materials and the often-arbitrary opening and closing of Soviet files, he was severely restricted, which undoubtedly means that many conclusions about Soviet motives and purposes may have to be tentative.

Hasegawa was working in a field, or really a set of subfields, where a significant segmentation of questions and of historical inquiry had developed for reasons that are understandable to academic historians, but often surprising to outsiders, who do not understand how and why academic subfields requiring particular intellectual prowess and particular sources develop in the way that they do. Until well into the 1990s, there was normally a peculiar intellectual division of labor—rooted in the nature of the scholarly subfields, the locations and types of sources, and the problems of language facility—in dealing variously with end-of-the-war/A-bomb issues and often in treating those separate issues in different studies.

Based heavily in the U.S., historians of the A-bomb and the “decision” focused primarily on American policy, seldom did much on Japanese policy, usually did not know and could not use Japanese, and dealt with Soviet issues mostly in the framework of the origins of the Cold War and Soviet-American conflicts in Europe. In sharp contrast, historians of Japan, who had a knowledge of Japanese, usually focused on Japanese policy and decision-making, sometimes looked (usually, rather briefly) at Japanese-Soviet relations, and in a less limited way at American-Japanese relations, but normally did not work in any depth on America's A-bomb policy and on the “decision” to use the bomb.

The Soviet subfield on the ending of the Pacific war was the most underdeveloped, partly because of the shortage of available materials, resulting from Soviet/Russian government decisions. That government-imposed “shortage” deterred most scholars in the west, and elsewhere, who had the requisite language skills from delving into Soviet policy dealing with

Japan and the ending of the war. Lacking such language facility, most A-bomb historians, for that additional reason of limited sources, did comparatively little on Soviet policy and related Soviet ending-of-the-Japanese-war issues beyond trying to determine, often by inference, the nature and depth of the Soviet-American disputes over Europe.

II-Briefly Situating Hasegawa's Book in the Scholarship

Boldly and energetically aiming to bring together parts of the often separate scholarly subfields, Hasegawa's important volume seeks to explain the American use of the atomic bomb, US dealings in 1945 with the Soviet Union mostly on Asian matters, Stalin's desires in Asia and his handling of both the US and the Japanese, and Japan's struggle in 1945 in the war and moving toward surrender to deal with both the Soviet Union and the US. No one taking on such a large assignment in a single book, or probably even in a set of volumes, could please all readers. The issues are so complicated, the sources so numerous, and sometimes the passions so substantial that general agreement is probably impossible. That problem of likely non-agreement may be more severe because the issues engage the scholars resident in a number of nations, and sometimes their national loyalties may further affect judgments.

Even if various value commitments—for example, disapproving or approving of the use of the bomb, wishing or not wishing that other alternatives had instead been ardently pursued, regretting or not regretting the mass killings in the atomic bombings, and deeming or not deeming the deadly fire-bombings and the atomic bombings as morally equivalent—were not involved, it is highly likely that the nature of the evidence, the ambiguities in the records, and the difficulties of determining motives and even actions at many junctures would bar the emergence of general agreement. Indeed, as a result of the ongoing dialogue, there may well be among scholars less agreement on basic issues—why Japan surrendered? would Japan have otherwise surrendered in mid-August? why the bomb was used? whether it was necessary? how its use was connected to Soviet-American relations?—than prevailed about a half-century ago.

Ultimately, perhaps Hasegawa's book's greatest accomplishment, among its various substantial achievements, may be that it helps to define and redefine many of the issues, and to present many challenging answers, that will shape much of the subsequent scholarship in various countries on a number of key issues. Very probably, for much of the future scholarship on why and how Japan surrendered, and to a much lesser extent on the related Soviet and US policy, *Racing* will define the benchmark for the scholarly dialogue. That is a significant intellectual achievement. Rarely can a scholar, even an intelligent, honest, and energetic scholar, significantly help refocus historical inquiry on major subjects.

In view of the book's analysis of American policy—hearkening back to P.M.S. Blackett's 1948/49 interpretation that President Harry S. Truman was *Racing* to use the A-bomb to end the war to avoid Soviet gains in the Far East—Hasegawa's study should generally delight Gar Alperovitz and similar A-bomb revisionists in emphasizing anti-Soviet motives as the essential core in Truman's A-bomb decision. But whereas Alperovitz and some others emphasized American concern in using the bomb as a way primarily of gaining leverage on the Soviets in Europe, Hasegawa, like Blackett, claims that the primary US purpose in using the bomb quickly was to keep the Soviets out of the war in Asia.

Alperovitz and more moderate A-bomb revisionists (including myself) should be pleased by the contention (if correct) that Soviet entry into the war in early August, without the atomic bombing but in the context of the devastating sea-air blockade and the pummeling bombing of Japanese cities, might well have ended the war in a reasonable time and certainly before the scheduled November 1945 invasion (Olympic), thereby obviating that operation. But Hasegawa, in a conclusion that may trouble some revisionists, argues that Soviet entry (though more important than the A-bomb) had to be combined with the first A-bomb to produce Japan's surrender in mid-August. In a judgment that will trouble many anti-revisionists, he usually asserts that Soviet entry was more important than the atomic bomb in producing the surrender. Whether the issues of the comparative influences of the bomb and Soviet entry can be so neatly parsed out will remain controversial. That is partly because the sources are not crystal clear and because competing plausible narratives, using the same or similar sources, can sometimes be formulated in looking at the complicated issues of the influences on Japanese policy and decision-making in August 1945.

In studying the Japanese events, there are frequently problems of which sources to privilege, how and whether to trust post-events memories, and how to understand the desires and efforts of key people. That involves, especially, looking closely at Emperor Hirohito, General Korechika Anami (war minister), General Yosijiro Umezu (army chief of staff), Baron Admiral Kantaro Suzuki (premier), Shigenori Togo (foreign minister), Soemu Toyoda (navy chief of staff), Mitsumasa Yonai (naval minister), Koichi Kido (privy seal), and Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma (chairman of the Privy Council). These problems are compounded by Hasegawa's enterprising and sustainable conclusion that a group of second-line people in the Japanese government, including Hisatsune Sakomizu (cabinet secretary), have been unwisely minimized by most earlier interpreters and merit close consideration.

Using fewer sources than are now available, and that Hasegawa often shrewdly exploited, Robert J. C. Butow, years ago in his near-magisterial *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (1954), apparently thought that the interesting problem of the comparative weights of the atomic bombing and Soviet entry could not be fully parsed out. Butow concluded that the two events—the first atomic bombing on the 6th and Soviet entry on the 8th, coming so close to one another like trip-hammer blows—smashed through the cage of earlier Japanese indecision and errant hope in ways that even the top-level members of the government could not adequately assess the separate power of each of these two blows. Thus, Butow was suggesting that the task of weighing comparative influence was risky and perhaps not possible. He seemed, in his analysis and in his narrative, to treat the two events as roughly equal in helping to produce the mid-August 1945 surrender.

Many A-bomb revisionists—whether Alperovitz, or others—may find it unsettling that Hasegawa contends that American/Allied modification in July or in early August of the unconditional-surrender demand, by allowing a constitutional monarchy, would very probably have not produced a Japanese surrender before the date of the Hiroshima bombing. That interpretation disagrees with the speculative conclusion of Butow's *Japan's Decision to Surrender* and of some other analysts, often building on Butow's book, who long regarded the

so-called unconditional-surrender demand, without provision for allowing a ceremonial monarchy, as a mistake that may have unnecessarily prolonged the war.

While politely and respectfully differing with Butow (one of Hasegawa's mentors in graduate school years ago) on many details and often on the important content of Japanese decision-making, Hasegawa's volume may sometimes displease some important Japan scholars like Herbert Bix, who view Emperor Hirohito over time as far more active and as far more powerful than Hasegawa believes. Hasegawa's Hirohito is more like Edward Drea's Hirohito than Bix's Showa emperor. Unlike Bix's treatment in his sustained, significant biography of Hirohito, Hasegawa does not dwell in depth for much of 1945 on Hirohito, his purposes, his uses of influence, and his personality. In fact, *Racing* does not deal significantly with the personality of Hirohito. Even with Hasegawa's substantial focus on the crucial events of August 6-15, 1945, the period from the first A-bomb to Japan's surrender, the emperor remains, often, rather elusive—surprisingly so—in this intelligent, detailed study of Japanese policy.

Like many in the U.S., including both Bix and Drea, as well as some A-bomb revisionists and most anti-revisionists, Hasegawa is justifiably unforgiving of Japanese leaders (including Hirohito) for not seeking energetically, and reasonably, to end the war before August 1945. But whereas Butow rather tidily divided the Japanese leadership into the so-called militarists (the die-hards of samurai inclinations) and the so-called peace-seeking group, Hasegawa is critical of such sharp distinctions. He often finds more uncertainty among leaders, and some fluidity between these groups.

His book, like a number of studies conceived basically as diplomatic histories, does not reach out beyond the government in Japan to look at the nation's political economy in any depth or to address the interesting question, suggested by some analysts, that major Japanese industrialists and financial interests by mid-1945 were defecting from support for the war. A basic problem in diplomatic history, its critics sometimes contend, is that it can be rather narrow by not broadening the analysis to include important aspects of political economy and social history

Unlike the earlier scholarship, Hasegawa, in pursuing the use of Japanese materials in depth, offers important new information on why and how the Japanese government on August 10th, in its conditional-surrender offer, specified the requirement of Allied acceptance of maintaining the emperor's prerogatives. That demand, reaching beyond the terms of a constitutional or ceremonial monarchy, had been inserted by Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, who had a particular interpretation of kokutai (the Japanese polity). Hiranuma's addition, going beyond the loose consensus among Japanese leaders on the 10th, added a significant demand, one that the US was certainly unlikely to grant.

Unlike the United States Strategic Bombing Survey's mid-1946 reports, and contrary to one remarkably under-researched, rather peculiar study by an American political scientist (Robert Pape) who made some excessive claims for the impact of the sea-air blockade, Hasegawa seems to conclude that Japan was unlikely to surrender in summer 1945 simply because of the impact of that strangling blockade and the fire-bombing of cities. Because of Hasegawa's phrasing, it is less clear whether, under such continuing and possibly somewhat escalating conditions, he was

also barring a pre-November surrender or only contending there would not have been an August 1945 surrender.

Hasegawa is generally in line with much of the western scholarship that laments that Stalin, in dealing with Japanese “peace-bid” suggestions, cynically dragged out the negotiations, helping to prolong the war for Soviet purposes. But Hasegawa is at odds with many who contend that the Japanese military were not truly shocked by Soviet entry into the war on August 8. It is significantly because Hasegawa stresses the role of that shock that he usually contends that Soviet entry, rather than the bomb, was more substantial in producing Japan's mid-August surrender.

Racing is a book that significantly modifies and ultimately eclipses Robert Butow's very impressive, long-admired *Japan's Decision to Surrender*, which dominated the international literature into the late 1980s, and the American scholarship into the early 1990s, on the issues of Japanese policy and detailed decision-making in 1945. *Racing* also sharply challenges Richard Frank's thoughtful, pro-atomic-bombing study, *Downfall*, on Japanese policy. Whereas Frank, not knowing Japanese, relied upon translated sources and necessarily restricted his purview, Hasegawa, born and raised in Japan, can probe more deeply and range far more widely. Hasegawa also challenges Sadao Asada's important essay in the *Pacific Historical Review* (1998) on the end of the war, and indirectly rejects Yukkiko Koshiro's possibly beguiling but unpersuasive 2004 interpretation, in the *AHR*, on Japanese policy: that Japanese leaders were prolonging the war in 1945 because they wanted Soviet entry in order that the Soviet presence in postwar Asia could constitute a useful counterweight to America in Asia.

In examining the surrender of Japanese forces beyond the four main islands, Hasegawa, like most earlier interpreters, does not seek in depth to explain how and why Japanese military leaders on the Asian mainland complied with the dictates of the central government. That large question of compliance remains little understood, and requires looking in detail at the regional armies, their leaders, and possibly the military situation in particular regions.

Because the published English-language literature on Soviet policy involving Japan and the end of the war is rather skimpy, it is less the case that Hasegawa displaces the earlier established literature and, mostly, that he lays out an arresting analysis that warrants close consideration. His efforts—especially on the dating of Stalin's decision on when to start the August 1945 Soviet invasion of Manchuria—have been subjected to a counter-analysis, by my Stanford colleague, the distinguished historian/political scientist David Holloway in a still-unpublished paper and in brief summary in this roundtable discussion. More basically, Holloway's general approach implicitly raises a fundamental methodological and conceptual question—without sharply defining it in such terms—about whether Stalin's policy can be adequately understood by beginning the study of policy basically in 1945, as Hasegawa generally does, and by not integrating Stalin's concerns about Germany with his concerns about Japan, and his concerns about Europe with his concerns about Asia.

To understand Stalin by beginning mostly in 1945 (with only a brief backdrop to earlier war years), and by focusing on Japan and Asia, Hasegawa unwisely has restricted his international history in both time and region. By not emphasizing and studying more fully how and why

Japan, for Stalin, loomed large during the war as a crucial issue in geopolitical power in postwar Asia, as Germany did for the Soviet leader in Europe, is to narrow the interpretation of Stalin.

While Hasegawa wisely avoids the trap of much Cold War orthodoxy and does not view Stalin as an ideologue dominated by communist ideology, Hasegawa fails to deeply examine as early as 1941 the importance for Stalin of postwar Japan. Significant concern about postwar Japan did not require being a communist, or a capitalist, but really only a shrewd leader with a sense of history and with an understanding of the role of industrial power in the international world. Such a leader might well worry about who would control Japan and on what terms in the postwar period. The task for the historian, in reaching beyond Stalin's concern with the Kurils, southern Sakhalin, Port Arthur, and Dairen, and regaining what had been lost by Russia to Japan in 1905, is to make sense of the Soviet leader's larger world view. In turn, that requires looking closely at divisions among his advisers in their wartime thinking about postwar Japan, Stalin's possibly changing views of tactics in 1945 in handling the Japan problem, and precisely how in World War II he placed the Japan question in the context of shifting wartime and future postwar Soviet-American relations.

Reaching beyond the earlier published work of David Glantz, which mostly focused on military issues, Hasegawa carefully examines the politics and the salient military details of the Japanese-Soviet war from mid-August and into early September. Analysts often forget that the war continued in Manchuria for at least a few days, and in the Kurils for a few weeks, after the formal Japanese announcement on August 15 (August 14, in the US) of surrender.

Building somewhat on David Holloway's important earlier work, Hasegawa briefly—probably too briefly—investigates Stalin's hopes and plans of invading and occupying Hokkaido in later August and Truman's stern words that Stalin should not. What remains to be deeply explored—though Holloway has thoughtfully dealt with some of this in an unpublished essay—is what Stalin's backdown on entering Hokkaido, as well as his decision not to occupy all of Korea, which would have been militarily possible, means about Stalin's hopes in August/September 1945 of avoiding conflict with the United States. Was not Stalin, despite the shock of Hiroshima, seeking a *modus vivendi*, albeit an uneasy one, with the US? If so, should that quest be seen as limited to Asia? Or does it suggest a useful way of interpreting what may be viewed as a similar Soviet pattern of some Soviet flexibility in Europe, even extending to Soviet policy in the Hungarian and Bulgarian elections?

III-The Problems of the Potsdam Proclamation, the "Magic" Messages, and American Policy

There are various segments of *Racing*, perhaps partly because of its unduly coercive interpretive framework, where criticism seems warranted. Two important, troubling parts are (1) Hasegawa's analysis of the origins and intended function of the Potsdam Proclamation, and (2) his related analysis of the "Magic" messages of mid-1945 before the Hiroshima bombing of August 6 (Japanese time).

Consider, first, Hasegawa's unduly cynical argument about Truman's use of the Potsdam Proclamation (issued on July 26) and the removal, after its early drafts, of the possibly crucial provision allowing a Japanese constitutional monarchy. Often wishing and thus frequently

concluding that such a provision might have produced a pre-Hiroshima surrender and obviated use of the A-bomb, some earlier historians have tried to explain why this provision was deleted. The issue of why the constitutional-monarchy statement was removed has produced an interesting dialogue over time among historians, usually focusing on three different interpretations and sometimes combining two of them in a useful mix.

Hasegawa believes that the final Proclamation was ultimately devised to be unacceptable, that it was expected to be unacceptable, and that it was conceived and used by Truman primarily to justify the forthcoming use of the atomic bomb: to legitimize the atomic bombing. But if Truman, as Hasegawa argues, was ardently seeking to end the war before Soviet entry, it was unwise of the president to forego the possible opportunity—by modifying unconditional surrender, and offering the prospect of a constitutional monarchy—of trying to achieve a surrender before, and thus without, any Soviet intervention in the war.

Most analysts have focused on Secretary of State James F. Byrnes as the key person on this matter of removing the constitutional-monarchy provision. One interpretation has been that Byrnes, and thus also Truman, feared that such a concession, especially if it did not work, could be a political disaster in America, where anti-Hirohito emotions were widespread. In that interpretation, the efforts of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew lost out because of administration fears at the highest level about the likely political backlash at home. Put simply, domestic politics—the fear of a backlash—triumphed for Truman under Byrnes's tutelage.

Some (including myself) have linked that domestic-politics interpretation to the fear—suggested by some in Washington at the time—that such a concession of a constitutional monarchy might embolden the Japanese to stiffen their resolve, thus producing the hope in the Tokyo government that American concessions indicated the likelihood of greater forthcoming concessions and thereby encouraging the Japanese to fight on in the interim. Put simply, American concessions could backfire—badly.

A third interpretation—usually often focusing on Byrnes—has maintained or implied that the US did not want to risk ending the war before it could use the A-bomb, because such nuclear use had ulterior motives: intimidating the Soviet Union. That third interpretation—often associated with Alperovitz, despite his demurrer—could be loosely linked, possibly with some strains, with the domestic-politics interpretation.

Hasegawa has uneasily woven together parts of the first interpretation (domestic politics) with a heavy strand of the third (want to use the bomb), and added, without strong evidence, another: Truman insisted upon unconditional surrender because he wanted revenge for Pearl Harbor. Hasegawa is undoubtedly correct that Truman did have strong feelings on the crucial matter of terms for Japan, but Hasegawa's arguing the "revenge" motive in this context seems dubious.

Hasegawa moves boldly, but unconvincingly, to contend that the Potsdam Proclamation was conceived by Truman to justify use of the bomb. The powerful liability of that provocative argument is that it seems to depend upon strained inferences and misses some of the subtleties of bureaucratic/organizational politics in the US government—namely, that the Proclamation had

been in the works for some time—and that there was no reason for Truman to avoid issuing the Proclamation. It did stipulate generally what Truman wanted to state publicly to Japan and the world. There was a small chance that the Proclamation would succeed in ending the war, there were substantial expectations that it would not, but there was no anticipated cost to issuing the Proclamation. To repeat: It expressed the terms that Truman wanted to offer and to emphasize.

There is no evidence that Truman felt, before Hiroshima, that he had to justify the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. Nor did he feel that he had to justify the fire-bombing or the blockade.

In addition, Hasegawa's evidence on Truman's belief that the Potsdam Proclamation would definitely fail is rather flimsy. The source for Hasegawa's judgment is a single, brief comment—a sentence and a half—in Truman's Potsdam diary on July 25, the day before the Proclamation was released: “[W]e will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance.” It is possible, and not unreasonable, to view this statement substantially as an expression by Truman of regret and rue—the war will continue, Japan will not surrender.

At Potsdam, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, in his diary, indicated that he thought that the Proclamation might well produce Japan's surrender. “I would not be surprised to see their surrender very quickly,” he wrote in his diary. He added, interestingly, “Maybe the Secretary's big bomb may not be dropped—the Japs better hurry if they are to avoid it.”

Hasegawa loosely links his Potsdam Proclamation analysis in *Racing* to his lament—that many share—that Truman did not delay the use of the bomb, and that the president did not dwell on the evidence in the “Magic” intercepts of the softening of the Japanese position on surrender.

Such a lament is understandable—and I partly share it. But Hasegawa overstates the evidence for optimism in the “Magic” intercepts. It is significant that the divided Japanese government, before the Hiroshima bombing, could never give its beleaguered ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, concrete terms for surrender. There were no reasonable concrete terms. Because of the sharp divisions within the Japanese government in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo even had to be careful in his messages to Sato not to offend Japanese military leaders, lest he overreach in seeking to move toward surrender. The frequent results, in Togo's messages, were the stuff of evasion and equivocation. Reading those messages underscores the divisions in Japan's government, and that government's distance from offering reasonable terms.

This is not the place to work through all the July and early August Japanese messages in depth and in great detail. Suffice it to say that the basic problem, likely to be clear to top-level Americans who read the “Magic” materials, was that Japan did not state that it was very close to surrender on terms that approached American demands, even if the emperor issue had been waived. Stimson, Forrestal, and Grew had hopes, but they were not sure, only hopeful, that softer US terms (allowing a constitutional monarchy) might produce a surrender.

Reaching beyond Hasegawa's analysis, and delving into the background of Under Secretary of State Grew, Secretary of War Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal in particular, might help make clear why they could apparently find in the “Magic” intercepts grounds for some

guarded optimism and a willingness to gamble on offering Japan softer terms of a constitutional monarchy. As men somewhat removed from electoral politics, they were willing to have the Truman administration take a risk in the framework of a domestic American politics, where anti-Hirohito sentiment was strong.

It is significant that Grew and Forrestal, as well as Stimson—with the minor exception of Stimson's one unsuccessful run for governor nearly a third of a century earlier—had no deep experience in American electoral politics. They were, by experience and inclination, a part of what was emerging in WWII as a national-security elite, which sought to override popular concerns, avoid political partisanship, and contend that experts could discern and should act on the national interest.

By background and temperament, Byrnes, who had spent most of his public life in electoral politics, was more inclined to worry about popular sensibilities and also partisan politics. Deeply rooted in electoral-politics for more than two decades, Truman, with little earlier experience in foreign policy and national-security decisions, was also very sensitive to domestic politics and popular concerns.

As late as early August 1945, shortly before the Hiroshima bombing, the “Magic” intercepts, if read critically and not optimistically, did not provide good evidence that Japan was very close to surrender on reasonable terms. The issue blocking Japan's surrender was not simply allowing a constitutional monarchy. The problems were much greater: The “Big Six” in the Japanese government was badly divided on major issues; those leaders could not agree even among themselves on terms.

That is clear in the “Magic” and “Ultra” intercepts. On various occasions, Ambassador Sato, after trying to approach the Soviets on the possibility of some kind of negotiations involving the Soviets serving as peace intermediaries, had been directed by the Soviets to provide concrete terms before the Soviets would move toward negotiations. That was partly a way of the Soviets delaying matters, knowing, undoubtedly, that no reasonable concrete terms would soon be forthcoming from Japan. The “Magic” intercepts underscore this.

Consider the evidence from early August 1945. On August 2, Magic report #1225, for example, provided to US officials a copy of the decrypted, translated cable of that date by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Sato on the question of peace terms. Here is a key segment of Togo's words to Sato: “[I]t should not be difficult for you to realize that, although with the urgency of the war situation our time to proceed with arrangements for ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once.” After briefly mentioning that the Japanese government still hoped that Prince Fumimaro Konoe would be accepted by the Soviets as the chief Japanese negotiator, Togo went on to discuss the difficulty of defining terms and the effort in Tokyo to do so: “[W]e are exerting ourselves to collect the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms.” Togo added, in parentheses: “Under the circumstances there is a disposition to make the Potsdam three Power Proclamation the basis of our study concerning terms.”

For a few weeks, top government officials in Tokyo knew that the Soviets were demanding something concrete before they would open negotiations with Japan. Read in that context, Togo's message was a combination of obvious bureaucratic evasion, an implicit confession of near-despair, and the expression of faint glimmers that something could be worked out. He offered no schedule, no useful particulars. Mostly, he was saying: I'm trying, there are severe problems, perhaps something can be worked out, there are no useful particulars yet available, but please try again with the Soviets. That was not a message inspiring reasonable hope in Sato or in US leaders.

Only American leaders inclined to optimism, wishing not to step up the use of violence against Japan, and not wanting to use the A-bomb on Japan, would have found in this message, which was in line with earlier cables from Togo to Sato, evidence that there would soon be "concrete terms" likely to be acceptable to the US. To historians, knowing that the A-bomb attack was otherwise imminent, there is often an understandable tendency to be unduly optimistic in interpreting this Togo-Sato cable traffic.

Such optimism can be partly punctured by Sato's own message of the 3rd. Reported in "Magic" #1228, Sato's statement was a cable pleading for Tokyo's speedy action, and advising strongly against further delay. That message of the 3rd, though in content somewhat like Sato's earlier cables, was probably not available to high American leaders until the 5th, when the *Enola Gay* was already taking off or in its deadly flight to Hiroshima. Nothing in Sato's rather despairing and often hortatory cable to Togo, if examined closely and carefully by Truman or Byrnes before the *Enola Gay*'s attack, would have been likely to produce optimism and to evoke a belief that Japan was on the verge of surrendering on reasonable terms.

Even Stimson, who sometimes hoped for the best, did not explicitly seize upon the "Magic" traffic as evidence of a very likely Japanese surrender if the constitutional- emperor provision was offered to Japan. Stimson had some hopes, not expectations. Had there been better evidence available in "Magic" and "Ultra," Stimson had the highly intelligent staff, including former *Harvard Law Review* editors, to produce a near-brief that he might have employed to press Truman. But "Magic" and "Ultra" required too much optimism for the evidence in them to seem compelling.

Contrary to some interpreters, there is no evidence that Stimson was seeking to avoid the use of the A-bomb. By various means, both diplomatic and military, he was seeking to obtain Japan's surrender and to avoid the invasion. A guarantee of a constitutional monarchy was not conceived by him—had such a provision been in the Potsdam Proclamation—to obviate use of the bomb. For Stimson, softer peace terms and the atomic bombing, operating in the context of the sea-air blockade and the conventional bombing of Japanese cities, might produce a surrender before November. In prospect, for him, that was—might, not would.

Coercing the reformulation and the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation and the interpretation of the material in the "Magic" intercepts into Hasegawa's "racing" framework, as he sometimes does, leaves too many jagged pieces, too much that warrants more subtle interpretation. It's as if there was a strained effort, amid the considerable evidence not available to the marvelously intelligent and often shrewd Blackett in 1948/49, to redeem most of his interpretive framework.

Unfortunately, much of Blackett's framework—based on his naively trusting use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports of mid-1946—cannot be sustained.

IV-Hasegawa's "Racing" Framework: Starting in 1945 and the Constructing/Distorting Effects in Understanding the A-bomb "Decision"

Because most of Hasegawa's analysis really begins in 1945, there is a serious problem in his not examining in depth earlier policy, not assessing the pre-1945 decisions and implications, and not looking at events in a broader prism than the "racing" framework. In addition, his "racing" framework is designed to interpret Soviet and US policy in Asia in 1945 as in fundamental conflict in a particular way: (1) Stalin wanting to prolong the war until he can enter it, and gain the spoils promised at Yalta, and then panicking before Hiroshima to move up the schedule for Soviet entry into the war, lest Japan otherwise first surrender and the Soviets lose out on gaining what FDR at Yalta had promised Stalin as a *quid pro quo* for Soviet entry into the war. (2) Truman, by Potsdam, when he learned of the successful A-bomb test at Alamogordo, seeking energetically to end the war before Soviet entry and "racing" to do so. Thus, according to Hasegawa, the American use of the atomic bomb—somewhat as for Blackett in 1948/49—was significantly conceived to force Japan's surrender before the Japanese could enter the war.

In important ways, Hasegawa, while often not seeming to recognize the full historiographical implications of his argument, ends up in an interpretive camp very similar to Blackett. Yet, unlike Blackett, as well as Alperovitz, Hasegawa's book—without adequate explanation—does not view the American A-bomb policy as contributing to the Cold War. That is a strange—and highly questionable—conclusion. The bomb's use, and the secrecy of the US project, certainly added significantly to Soviet mistrust, further tearing at the frail bonds of the uneasy Soviet-American wartime partnership.

That Soviet-American part of the wartime Grand Alliance, like the Anglo-Soviet part, had never been comfortable. Each segment involving the Soviets was marked by significant mistrust. The Soviet-American wartime partnership was conceived in exigency—the commonalty of Germany as an enemy and threat—not in deep desire or true friendship. The issues of Eastern Europe, of the treatment of Germany, and of power relations in Europe, as well as elsewhere in the world, bedeviled the uneasy wartime alliance. The A-bomb issues, dramatized by the Hiroshima bombing, added to those substantial problems.

In general, American A-bomb policy before about April-May 1945 is unfortunately slighted in *Racing*. Hasegawa never discusses the earlier systematic American, and the systematic joint American-British efforts, to keep the Soviets from any useful knowledge of the existence of the A-bomb project and from the scientific/industrial secrets of how to make the A-bomb. That secrecy policy did not begin with Truman nor in 1945, but much earlier. Thus, from early in this top-secret weapons project, there was an assumption that the A-bomb, when developed, would offer the prospects of gaining leverage on the Soviet Union. That was a conception under FDR, and well antedated Truman's presidency. It was a conception that Truman inherited, that Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson came to nurture, that James F. Byrnes embraced, and that fit Truman's own inclinations.

That conception did not require combat use of the A-bomb on the enemy, but it certainly nicely dovetailed with combat use. Had Germany dragged out its war effort a few months longer and not surrendered in May 1945 (as occurred), or had the bomb been ready some months earlier (as it was not), it seems highly likely that the weapon would have been used on Germany. An interesting and important question, but one seldom phrased—let alone, addressed—in the literature is whether the nuclear-weapons targeting, as in the case of Japan, would have been, basically, on German cities and massively German noncombatants if Germany had been the A-bomb target.

What Hasegawa significantly misses, by basically starting his A-bomb analysis and his A-bomb archival research in spring 1945 under Truman, is that an implicit American decision—really a dominant assumption—had long existed: that the bomb would be used against a hated enemy. There is no substantial evidence, despite some spotty documents, that Roosevelt, had he lived, would have chosen to abstain from using the bomb on Germany, or on Japan. After all, the bomb project had originally been conceived under FDR in what was believed, erroneously, to be a desperate race with Germany, and therefore use against Germany under FDR was highly likely if the bomb was ready and Germany was still strongly at war. And in early March 1945, under FDR, the dramatic firebombing of Japan—with the massive killings in Tokyo—helped prepare the way for use of the A-bomb on Japan. Neither FDR before his death, nor Truman in April and beyond, or their top advisers, objected—or even raised basic questions—as the new country (Japan) was being targeted. Starting much earlier than March, and certainly visible in late 1944, the targeting had already shifted to Japan from Germany.

Such powerful assumptions about A-bomb use, and the presence of partial precedents in conventional bombing for such use, prepared the way for Truman, with the approval of his top associates—notably Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Byrnes—to employ the bomb on Japan. The reason that careful historians cannot find records of a top-level A-bomb “decision” is not because there was a fear by US policymakers and advisers of keeping records or mentioning the bomb (quite a few diaries of the time mention it, usually in now-easy-to-decipher code), but, rather, because there was no need for an actual “decision” meeting. Such a meeting would have been required if there had been a serious question about whether or not to use the bomb on Japan. No one at or near the top in the US government raised such a question; no one at the top objected before Hiroshima and Nagasaki to use of the weapon on the enemy.

The one partial exception in the US government, Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, was not really close to the top of decision-making and influence. Bard's partial dissent—which is sometimes uncritically used by historians—has to be understood as the doubts presented by a man not at or near the top. Contrary to some unsubstantiated claims, and at complete odds with Bard's own statements, he never saw or sought to see Truman on the A-bomb/Japan surrender issues. Contrary to some fanciful postwar writings by others, Bard certainly never argued in the oval office against use of the bomb on Japan.

Admirable as was their moral/political concerns, the various dissenting scientists—James Franck, Leo Szilard, Eugene Rabinowitch, and some others, mostly in Chicago—were far outside the orbit of Washington power and policy. Perhaps lamentably, they had no influence on the use of the bomb on Japan. It is highly unlikely, if their dissenting report or dissenting

petitions had reached Truman, that such pleadings by these scientists could have reversed the course of powerful assumptions: to use the bomb on Japan

Both in the Manhattan Project, and occasionally in the high-level Interim Committee, there were various official meetings on how (not whether) to use the bomb. Some of those meetings, often at levels far below Truman, focused on important matters involving in detail how to use of the bomb: the height of the detonation, the cities on the target list, the weather conditions for use, the need for a visual drop, the risk to the bomber and crew, etc.

The basic decision on using the bomb flowed from overwhelming, long-held assumptions. To Truman and others, the bomb promised to help end the war earlier than otherwise, presumably to save some American and other Allied lives, possibly to force a surrender before the dreaded November invasion, and, as a potential bonus, conceivably to intimidate the Soviets in future dealings. If one concludes, analytically, that Truman's A-bomb "decision" was basically the implementation of long-run assumptions that jibed with his own inclinations, then there is no great difficulty in explaining why he used the bomb.

To explain, of course, is not tantamount to justifying. Historians must make the effort to understand the moral-political context in 1945 for American policymakers by acknowledging their values and beliefs in 1945. But that sustained effort at interpretation does not mean approving of the use of the bomb or refusing to make moral judgments—about the atomic bombing, and about the lack of a serious quest for likely alternatives.

To Truman, in prospect, the use of the bomb on Japan promised benefits, not liabilities. Abstaining from using it on Japan would have made no moral or political sense for him. Such abstention could have been politically and personally costly: In his view, not using the bomb might well prolong the war, cost US and other Allied lives, probably fail to justify the massive secret project and its great expenditures, and undoubtedly expose him, as he could predict, to outrage at home for missing an opportunity to help end the war earlier.

In much of this, he was not unusual. What likely US president in 1945 would have chosen not to use the bomb, to struggle to find alternatives, and to worry deeply about prospective use? Not former Vice-President Henry Wallace, had he instead been president. Certainly, not James F. Byrnes, had he been president. Not the Republicans Thomas Dewey or Robert Taft, had either been president. To make this point more emphatically, and reaching selectively to some top Manhattan Project scientists, not J. Robert Oppenheimer, despite his somewhat ambiguous postwar comments from time to time about the use of the bomb and the physicists knowing sin.

How could any American president in 1945, in conducting the war against the hated Japanese, explain to the American people, the Congress, and ultimately himself, the taking of considerable risks by not using the bomb, and thus presumably caring about saving Japanese lives? To Americans—whether the president, rank-and-file citizens, soldiers and sailors, and even school children—not all lives were equal. In the United States in 1945, as for virtually all modern nations at war, the citizenry was concerned most about the welfare of their own people and seldom, if ever, about the enemy. In 1945, as earlier in the war, American lives, by near

unanimity in the United States, were most valuable. In that moral/political framework, enemy lives—soldiers and sailors, and normally enemy noncombatants—were not important.

For many rank-and-file Americans, there was actually great enthusiasm for killing the Japanese, known even in newspaper headlines, in unflinching racist parlance, as the “Japs.” Killing them was generally deemed desirable. To most rank-and-file Americans, unlike some American leaders, killing Japanese noncombatants was even attractive—an aim to be sought, not to be avoided.

After Pearl Harbor, after the various reported Japanese atrocities in the Pacific war, and after the terrible American costs in casualties at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, a presidential decision not to use the bomb on Japan would have seemed, by reasonable standards at the time, very risky, if not morally and politically bizarre. None of this should deny that Truman himself, as he indicated in some post-Hiroshima comments (see the headnote), might have further welcomed use of the bomb in order to punish the Japanese for Pearl Harbor and for various atrocities. But such sentiments of punishment and revenge were not the key motives for use. They reinforced, and thus over determined, what was already determined. Those revenge/punishment sentiments did not constitute the core of the decision, but may have helped to make the decision easier.

If the A-bomb decision is understood in this complex analytical and historical context, there is no need to seek, as does Hasegawa, the hidden ulterior motives—a *Racing* quest against Stalin—primarily to explain Truman's actions. Using the bomb as quickly as possible, in a visual drop and in decent weather, made ultimately good sense. For Truman, Byrnes, Stimson, and others, why delay?

Hasegawa's framework of “racing” as the way of understanding Truman and the use of the bomb has various analytical liabilities. That framework fundamentally misunderstands the A-bomb “decision.” The “racing” framework assumes that new reasons had to intervene to push Truman to use the bomb, fails to appreciate the power of inherited assumptions, and does not recognize that speedy use fit all the expectations. If there had not been a commitment to speedy use, there would be good reason for historians to puzzle about the reasons for a delay.

If speedy use of the bomb on Japan minimized the Soviet role in the war, that would undoubtedly have been a benefit to the administration. As Secretary Byrnes made clear to Forrestal and to Byrnes's assistant, Walter Brown, Byrnes was clearly very eager, if possible in reasonable or nearly reasonable ways, to end the war without Soviet entry into the war. For Truman, a Japanese surrender without Soviet entry would have been attractive. But there is no reason to conclude that, even after the dramatically successful Alamogordo test of July 16th, Truman based policy upon such an expectation of excluding the Soviets. That was neither expectation nor policy, because such exclusion—before the actual Japanese surrender—was too risky. The bomb was not a guaranteed substitute for Soviet entry. Both could be useful.

What if the war had continued, and the Soviets did not enter it. For the US, an important opportunity would have been lost to add significantly to the Japanese burdens, in their beleaguered empire, by forcing Japan to fight on an additional front: against the Soviet Union in Manchuria, on the mainland. The Soviet attack, and the war on the mainland in Manchuria

against the Kwantung army, would help further weaken Japan, add to the terrible burdens on that nation's forces and polity, and perhaps help produce a pre-November Japanese surrender, thereby obviating the November invasion.

Truman had not acted to block or impede Soviet entry, and there was good reason—as he lived history forward in late July and early August—for him to view that entry as militarily desirable, despite the likely political costs of expanded Soviet power in Asia. In view of Stimson's counsel, in summarizing General George C. Marshall's analysis at Potsdam, it is not even clear that Truman believed that he could do much, if anything, to stop or speed up Soviet entry into the war.

Until the Japanese actually offered on August 10th to capitulate with a single-condition surrender, there was the very real likelihood that the war might drag on for some time. In such a context, for Truman, who was eager to avoid placing American troops in significant numbers on the Asian continent to fight in the war, Soviet entry would be valuable: to deal with the massive Japanese armies in Manchuria and elsewhere on the continent. He and other American leaders at the top—contrary to the later interpretations by some historians—undoubtedly underestimated the likely “shock” value, as opposed to the military value, of such Soviet entry on the Japanese leaders.

That “shock” value was considerable. To neglect it is a mistake in analysis. Whether or not Soviet entry was greater in its effect on the Japanese government—and on whom in that government, and when—will remain vigorously disputed by historians.

V-Expectations About the Bomb: Was It Viewed by Truman and Others as Likely to End the War Speedily and Before Soviet Entry?

Unwisely, Hasegawa assumes—incorrectly, and in the face of substantial, indirect, contrary evidence—that Truman was “*Racing*” to use the bomb to end the Japanese war before the Soviets could enter it and gain spoils. That argument assumes that Truman believed the bomb would be a decisive weapon speedily ending the war, before mid-August and before Soviet entry. But there is no good evidence that Truman believed that the bomb would speedily end the war, and indirect evidence to the contrary.

Indeed, Truman's not taking certain actions involving American domestic economic policy strongly indicated that he believed that the bomb would not be speedily decisive in ending the war. Moreover, there is added evidence on this matter of expectations: The top people near him, as well as some who were more distant but who knew about the atomic bomb, did not expect that the bomb's use on Japan would quickly end the war. Rather, like him, they seemed to hope, not expect, that using the bomb might soon (that did not mean within a few days or even a week or two of use) help end the war. Put sharply, the bomb, in prospect, was not viewed as a decisive weapon, but rather as an additional, and very powerful, useful weapon.

In their conceptions, the atomic bomb would be a powerful supplement to the strangling sea-air blockade and the deadly fire-bombing of Japanese cities. The economic strangulation of Japan, the massive killing of enemy noncombatants, and the destruction of Japanese industry were all

part of the US war strategy to seek to force surrender and, ideally, to obviate the November invasion. But the American planning did not generally anticipate such a pre-November success of Japanese surrender, though Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations, and Maj. General Curtis LeMay, who commanded the B-29s in the Pacific, may each have thought that the conventional warfare—with King emphasizing the navy, and LeMay the air force—could force a pre-November surrender.

Despite the efforts by the US Strategic Bombing Survey in summer 1945 to refine the targeting for conventional bombing, to shift the air force from generally hitting cities, and to concentrate the bombing on transportation and a few key industries, much of the American war strategy in dealing with Japan in the summer was both blunt and brutal. Fitting into that framework, the A-bomb, because of its likely “shock” value, and also because of its substantial addition to the mass killing and mass destruction, would add to the significant burden on Japan. That was part of the larger American military strategy.

Discussing the relevant archival evidence on American expectations—that the A-bomb in prospect was not viewed as decisive—is important. That evidence involves looking at what Truman and those around him thought, and at what they did or did not do. Necessarily, much of the evidence, in dealing with Truman, is indirect and requires inferences, because his comments were few and because one main source (his diary, kept on scraps of paper at the time) should normally not be taken literally.

Over the years, there has sometimes been an inclination—mistaken, in my view—to take literally some of Truman's statements in his so-called Potsdam diary in mid-July about the likely impact of the bomb on Japanese surrender in August. The basic analytical and evidential problem, if one takes those optimistic diary comments literally, is that they do not jibe with what Truman actually did. Thus, there is a fundamental problem in how to interpret sources.

The best test of what Truman thought and believed, if one uses reasonable standards for analysis, is not to rely upon some scattered, rather hyperbolic words by Truman in a handwritten diary, but on what he actually did. If his actions on related matters were congruent with his diary words, then trust those words. But, if as is the case, his words ran contrary to his actual actions on important matters, then base the analysis upon his actions—not his words—as the reliable indication of Truman's actual beliefs and expectations.

There is no persuasive evidence, rooted in his actions, that he expected that the atomic bombing would end the war before mid-August 1945. That was the date that Stalin, at Potsdam had told Truman the Soviets would enter the war on the Asian mainland. Thus, by *Racing's* analysis, Truman believed that using the A-bomb would end the war before mid-August.

The evidence does not support *Racing*. Had Truman at Potsdam expected that one or even two atomic bombings would end the war speedily, and in view of the schedule of available weapons, he would have cabled from Germany his top demobilization, reconversion, and economic chiefs in Washington to get ready quickly for an imminent peace. He would have directed them to prepare promptly to formulate and promulgate the necessary regulations for demobilization and reconversion. He did not take that action—and that non-action is very meaningful.

Not to be prepared for demobilization and reconversion was to risk a terrible economic/political mess at home—strikes, unemployment, inflation, and possibly depression. The terrible fear was, by many analyses, a return to the conditions of the Great Depression. The *Magazine of Wall Street*, claiming to be optimistic, had forecast that peace would mean “only” about 9 million soon unemployed. That was over 17 percent—a horrendous number. Many analysts, stressing the importance of speedy, effective demobilization and reconversion, worried about even higher unemployment.

Truman's strength as the nation's new chief executive in 1945 was his experience in domestic policy, not in foreign policy. It did not require an unusually savvy US politician to know that federal plans had to be quickly and carefully formulated to deal at home with a speedy peace, if a speedy peace was expected. The fact that Truman never sent such a cable from Potsdam to Washington—nor is there any evidence of worries by James F. Byrnes, who was experienced in economic mobilization—clearly indicates that neither man expected the war to end quickly. It would be peculiar, if not bizarre, to contend or assume that these two men did not easily understand the relationship between a quick peace in the Asian war and the needs of demobilization and reconversion in the US.

Nor, before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, did anyone at or near the top in Washington—if we use only contemporaneous sources, not later memory or memoirs—have different expectations: that the war was quickly about to end. Take for example, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who knew about the bomb and had seen many of the “Magic” (and probably “Ultra”) intercepts indicating Japan's plight and policy. As late as August 8, three days after the Hiroshima bombing (August 5 in Washington), Forrestal, still expecting the November invasion of Japan, took the risk of offending Truman by giving him politically undesired advice: In effect, don't let General Douglas MacArthur run the invasion; instead, choose a navy man or even General Dwight D. Eisenhower or General George C. Marshall to head the final operations against Japan. Had Forrestal believed on the 8th that the war would soon end, and thus that there would definitely not be a November invasion, he would not have pleaded this touchy case and risked annoying Truman. Forrestal expended scarce political capital by presenting his unwelcome advice, because he very much thought there would be an invasion of Japan.

There is more evidence on the subject of expectations at that time about the atomic bombing's likely influence on the war. On August 2, Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who knew both about the A-bomb project and that there was a plan for imminent use of the weapon on Japan, queried one of Secretary of War Stimson's top A-bomb aides, George Harrison, about whether the War Department should therefore cut back and cancel production contracts for “the war against Japan.” In effect, Patterson, a former Court of Appeals judge who had long known Harrison, another prominent Harvard Law School graduate, was asking: Will the Japanese war quickly be ending? Is the A-bomb going to produce the desired surrender very soon? If so, shouldn't we act quickly, and prepare now? Tell me what to do.

These were two men who generally trusted one another, and they were both loyal to Stimson. They did not want to go wrong, and Patterson realized that Harrison, as one of Stimson's key A-

bomb aides, was the right man to ask about the political impact of the bomb on Japan. Unsure about the future, Patterson had turned to an expert in the War Department.

Harrison's answer and the date of his reply to Patterson are meaningful. He did not respond on the 2nd or 3rd, or the 4th, shortly before the atomic bombing, and say: The war will soon be over, and terminate the contracts. Rather, he delayed six days—until the 8th. That was three days after the Hiroshima bombing. Then, on August 8th, Harrison replied in very hedged terms. He explained that he could not give an answer on the 2nd, because “it was impossible to anticipate with definiteness what would be the extent of its [the A-bomb's] success. Accordingly, . . . I felt that developments had not then reached a stage which would warrant changes in your [the War Department's] general munitions program.”

But Harrison on the 8th was still remarkably cautious, and markedly elusive. Events were occurring, he stated in a somewhat turgid memorandum to Patterson, that still were not certain. Here is Harrison's hedged statement: When the evidence is complete, resulting from these events, there will be “warrant, at least, [for] a resurvey of your program.” To add to the bureaucratic mushiness, Patterson added another hedge, full of caution: “whether the evidence when complete will justify any change in strategy or production [,] I, of course, do not know.”

Put bluntly, for Harrison, when the Japanese war will end was still unsure on the 8th. It would be soon advisable to “resurvey” the production program. But actually cutting back production, canceling war contracts, and moving quickly toward demobilization and reconversion—all that, on the 8th—was still somewhere in the future, near or distant. It was in the vague future. Harrison would not even hazard a useful guess.

Careful readers of Stimson's diary, of the diary of his Assistant Secretary, John J. McCloy, and of Byrnes's aide, Walter Brown, for these days in very late July and early August will not find any clear indication that these men, or their superiors, expected that the atomic bombing would produce an imminent surrender—one within a few days, or even two weeks. Nor, as a result, was there any evidence in their diaries of surprise, or dismay, right after the Hiroshima bombing that the Japanese government did not speedily, within a day or two or three, change its policy and surrender.

There is more archival evidence from this August period on the matter of expectations. On the 8th, after Truman had returned from Potsdam, a White House staff member cast a directive for the War Production Board chairman, Julius Krug: Weapons production for the war against Japan will continue amid the development of a healthy economy. Truman, rather than revising this key language that assumed continuation of the Japanese war, retained it verbatim in his official paper to WPB chairman Krug on the 9th.

On the 9th, for top US leaders, even after two atomic bombings sandwiched around Soviet entry into the war, the situation was still markedly unclear on what would happen, and when. On the 9th, Under Secretary Patterson, in recommending language for Truman's forthcoming speech to the nation, suggested a phrasing that nicely encompassed the extremes: “an unconditional surrender of Japan within the immediate future or . . . a long, bitter last ditch struggle to abolish Japanese military power.” Such a statement certainly did not indicate firm expectations that the

war would speedily end. Perhaps relying on Harrison's judgment of the 8th, Patterson, somewhat like Harrison, had provided words that carefully avoided any meaningful prediction.

It was as if two physicians, when asked about a very ill patient, had answered: The patient could die very soon, or drag on for time, at great expense. Put bluntly, speedy death or prolonged, costly life. But no prediction about which course of events. Death was predicted, recovery would not occur. The schedule—the crucial issue of the likely date of death—was markedly unclear.

Hasegawa, variously disregarding or minimizing such archival evidence on expectations, is morally offended that Truman allowed the second atomic bombing to occur. How, Hasegawa in effect asks, could Truman do that? Was it not insensitive, and immoral, because, by Hasegawa's analysis, Truman should have known, and therefore did know, that the second atomic bombing was unnecessary.

Many of us who wish that Truman had been more cautious, and reluctant about using another atomic weapon on Japan, can agree with Hasegawa's moral lament. But that is not equivalent to agreeing with Hasegawa that Truman should, and did, know the war was just about over, that Japan would very soon surrender, and that the second A-bombing was therefore unnecessary. There was, unfortunately, no solid reason, in view of the available evidence in Washington, for Truman to reach that set of optimistic conclusions.

It would have been surprising, if not shocking, if the president had reached those optimistic conclusions on August 7th, 8th, or 9th. No one in Washington in the upper reaches of government—the president, Byrnes, Stimson, or Marshall—thought that Japan's surrender was imminent, and that the second A-bomb was unnecessary.

It is unlikely that Truman paid much, if any, attention to the particular timing, or to the selection of the primary and secondary cities targeted, for the second bomb. It was not, as historian Stanley Goldberg argued in an ill-conceived, wrong-headed essay in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* some years ago—in which he also cited some non-existent documents, and misdated others—that General Leslie Groves, commanding general of the A-bomb project, had cleverly kept the president ignorant and, implicitly, thus deceived Truman about the forthcoming use of the second bomb. Rather, the dating for the second bomb and the choice of the particular city to be targeted for that weapon were matters to be handled within the framework of the official order of July 25 to the air force of using A-bombs “as made ready,” until Japan surrendered.

There would have been no good reason for Truman, or Byrnes, to pay close attention to the details of use. For them, the correct assumption was that A-bombs would be used, the sea-air blockade continued, and the “conventional” fire-bombing maintained, if not escalated, until Japan surrendered. In that military context, with Soviet entry occurring on the 8th, the prospects for gaining a Japanese surrender and avoiding the November invasion were improving. But, aside from some American middle-level, military contingent planning, no one at or near the top in Washington was thinking seriously about an imminent Japanese surrender—one in the next few days.

On August 10th, the unanticipated did occur. When the Japanese offer of a conditional surrender reached Washington that day, no one at the top in Washington had expected any Japanese response—whether a conditional surrender, or an unconditional surrender—at that time. Revealingly, Stimson, presumably believing nothing was going to happen, had actually been about to leave on a vacation on the morning of the 10th when the unexpected Japanese message arrived. The various diaries—of Stimson, Forrestal, Admiral William Leahy, and Walter Brown (he was not at the oval-office session, but summarizing mostly what Byrnes told him)—dealing with the crucial White House meeting on the 10th on how to respond to Japan's offer do not indicate that top American leaders had anticipated, let alone expected, a Japanese surrender offer of any kind on that date or about then.

It is a serious analytical error to ignore, or dismiss, this collective evidence on expectations, to believe that Truman and others viewed the use of the atomic bomb, in anticipation or even immediately after Hiroshima, as decisive. After the war, however, in view of Japan's conditional offer on August 10th and the final surrender on August 14th, there would be some substantial rewriting of history. In that dubious rewriting, the bomb, in prospect, had been viewed as decisive.

For historians, and others who by profession often think critically about the nature of sources, using post-facto sources, when they are likely to be self-serving, is very risky. On A-bomb matters, because of the passions and values involved in the understanding and presentation of pre-Hiroshima and pre-Nagasaki events, there is a great danger of going wrong by uncritically using such post-event materials.

To summarize: In prospect, the bomb was not viewed as decisive. Multiple atomic bombings, US policymakers hoped, might end the war before November, thereby obviating the dreaded invasion. That was a hope, not an expectation.

Understanding that analysis, in the context of summer 1945, is crucial to analyzing why the A-bombs were used. But to repeat: Such understanding does not entail moral approval of the actions, nor should explanation bar the employment of ethical values to assess what happened, why possible alternatives were not ardently pursued, and to inquire, critically, about how the American nation state conducted war against a hated enemy.

To place such matters in a fuller historical and political-ethical context, it is worth asking: In 1945, in a war on a number of continents that probably killed over 40 million humans, would any warring nation, with a monopoly in the atomic bomb, have acted differently in conducting war?

VI-Thinking about the A-bomb

To gain added analytical leverage on the pre-Hiroshima and the pre-Nagasaki conception of the bomb, and its likely political impact on Japan, there is some value in looking at the Manhattan Project members themselves. The available evidence is rather limited, but it is also useful. There is no evidence that anyone on the project—in contemporaneous sources—expected that the atomic bombing would quickly end the war within a few days or even about a week, or so, of use of the weapon on Japan.

The dramatic Trinity test at Alamogordo of the first atomic weapon, on July 16, revealed that a plutonium bomb, if conforming to that test's results, was likely in use against Japan to produce a yield equivalent of about 21,000 to 24,000 tons of TNT. The weapon, clearly, was of a different magnitude from earlier weapons. It would obviously kill more people, and devastate a larger area, than had a single conventional bomb. Whether or not a single A-bomb would be as destructive as a batch of conventional bombs—consider the Tokyo fire-bombing of early March—was not clear.

How large an area would be destroyed in Japan, and how many people would be killed and injured, would obviously depend on more than the A-bomb itself. Planned targeting, effective delivery, and ultimately the actual targeting in dropping it would help make a crucial difference. In prospect, what the bomb's explosion over Japan, and the mass deaths, would mean to Japanese decision makers politically, and emotionally, was certainly unclear. Nobody on the Manhattan Project, among the top scientists and others in the project, believed that a single A-bomb—even in the context of the strangling sea-air blockade and the fire-bombing of cities—would make a speedy difference in producing a Japanese surrender.

Not even General Leslie Groves, commanding general of the top-secret A-bomb project, expected that one or two A-bombs would end the war speedily. Though not knowing much about the Japanese situation, and understandably impressed by the A-bomb test, he was assuming—on July 19th, three days after Alamogordo—that at least two A-bombs, probably three, and maybe four of these nuclear weapons would be necessary “to conform to planned strategic operations.” That is what he told J. Robert Oppenheimer, whose Los Alamos laboratory was producing the weapons.

By the planned production schedule at the time, as Groves and Oppenheimer knew, three A-bombs would have taken the war into at least late August. A fourth bomb, they understood, would have meant early September.

By late July 1945, Groves was reporting to General George C. Marshall, and probably to Secretary Stimson, the details of substantial future nuclear-weapons production, on the apparent assumption that many more A-bombs would probably be needed in the ongoing war before Japan's surrender was achieved: three bombs in August, three or four in September, three or four in October, at least five in November, seven in December, and an “increase decidedly in early 1946.” Whatever Groves's hopes, his expectations for a quick A-bomb-induced surrender seemed modest, if not absent.

The major A-bomb scientists at Los Alamos and those sent to Tinian (the Pacific outpost from which atomic-bomb-laden B-29s would leave for Japan), all of whom knew much about the A-bomb but little about the details of the war or the thinking in the Japanese government, were also assuming that a number of bombs would be necessary and used. Those scientists in Los Alamos, and those who went to Tinian, did not expect that only one or two A-bombs would be used on Japan.

For example, in communicating his expectations, physicist Norman Ramsey, a future Nobel laureate, wrote from Tinian a day or two after the first atomic bombing to Los Alamos director Oppenheimer. Ramsey knew that the second bomb would soon be ready, though he probably did not foresee its use as early as the 9th. In his letter (probably on the 7th), shortly after the Hiroshima bombing, Ramsey assumed that more bombs would be used after the second weapon and that the war would go on for some time. In that letter, Ramsey said that he hoped that Oppenheimer in that extended period, presumably after the second atomic bombing, would come out to Tinian. "Can you visit us sometime?" And Ramsey also said that he hoped he could get back to Los Alamos—"between units [A-bombs] sometime." All that suggested a war stretching at least into September, and perhaps beyond.

Others Manhattan Project physicists on Tinian at the time, as revealed in their correspondence then or in later recollections, had roughly similar expectations. On Tinian at the time, physicists Robert Serber, Philip Morrison, and Luis Alvarez, looking back years later, all said that they had expected that they would be there for some time, that the war would not end with one, two, or three A-bombs.

At Los Alamos, based upon contemporaneous documents and more often on later reports, a number of A-bomb physicists had similar expectations. Among them were Robert Oppenheimer, his brother, Frank, Robert Bacher, Hans Bethe, and Emilio Segre. These were not self-serving recollections, and they all pointed in the same direction: multiple atomic bombings would probably be necessary, and the war would continue for some time.

After all, Los Alamos had been rushing to get the third A-bomb materials ready for shipment. On August 10th, after the second A-bomb and after publicity about Soviet entry into the war, Los Alamos was still working hard to produce more A-bombs. That day, based on recent information from Los Alamos, Groves informed General Marshall: The third bomb, originally scheduled to be ready for use from Tinian by August 24th, would be available about a week earlier for use by about the 18th on Japan.

That memorandum was not the report of a commanding general (Groves), who, in the flow of living history forward, anticipated that the two atomic bombings would suffice. Later, in rewriting the "history" of this period, he contended otherwise. But memoirs, as historians should know but sometimes forget, can be remarkably self-serving and remarkably unreliable, except when they provide information that runs contrary to interest or independent of interest.

VII-Conceiving of the A-bomb in History

Running through Hasegawa's analysis, as with many revisionist-inclined studies looking at the A-bomb "decision" and A-bomb policy, is the assumption that the atomic bombing was morally different from the fire-bombings (including Tokyo in March), that policymakers and A-bomb scientists always felt this way, and that the conventional-bombing versus atomic-bombing distinction, in moral and strategic ways, was obvious, not surprising, and not meriting explanation.

Yet, careful historical analysis suggests the need to examine this dominant framework critically. It is a problem that I have poked at, often intermittently and not in suitable depth, over the years. Moving beyond my occasional efforts, Michael Gordin of Princeton University is pursuing this important set of issues in much greater depth, with a sharper focus, and usually with better questions.

To understand pre-Hiroshima and even pre-Nagasaki thinking about the bomb, there is need to focus on the contemporaneous evidence. It is interesting and merits close consideration. Indeed, the A-bomb in prospect was viewed sometimes as markedly different from conventional weapons; sometimes it was not. The task, in working back through the archival materials is to define, with clarity and keen analysis, how and when differences emerged, why, and whether they persisted or somewhat waxed and waned for different individuals or the same individuals.

For General Groves, for example, the atomic bomb as a weapon long seemed different in magnitude, but not morally so. For General Marshall, by late May 1945, as his meeting with McCloy and Stimson indicated, the bomb seemed rather different in moral terms, but Marshall's concern was perhaps somewhat unusual: targeting noncombatants, not the actual use of the weapon otherwise on the enemy. For him, the crucial issue was killing many noncombatants.

For Secretary Stimson, as Sean Malloy, a historian at the University of California (Merced), has shown in some provocative unpublished work, there was an emerging concern involving the A-bomb about targeting noncombatants. Can historians see this for McCloy, or Vannevar Bush and James Conant? How much of Stimson's concern about A-bomb targeting was a carryover from his unhappiness that the US air force was massively hitting cities with conventional weapons, and killing many noncombatants?

Whatever the limitations of Truman's Potsdam Diary, it does seem warranted to conclude, on the basis of that diary, that he was morally uneasy about massively targeting and killing noncombatants with the A-bomb. But there is no evidence that he ever worried in similar terms about conventional bombing. In the case of Truman, he uneasily "solved" the problem of targeting noncombatants with the A-bomb by contending, in his diary on July 25th in likely self-deception, that he and Stimson agreed that the bomb would be dropped on military targets.

When Japan's conditional surrender arrived on August 10th, Truman made a sharp distinction between the conventional bombing and atomic bombing. He told his assembled advisers that he would continue the conventional bombing, but halt the atomic bombing. Stimson and Forrestal, overruled by the president, had desired to halt both forms of warfare.

Hasegawa, dubiously, concludes that Truman still wanted "revenge" against Japan, and thus continued the conventional bombing on Japan. More likely, the president believed that such continued warfare would enhance the likelihood of Japan quickly capitulating on American terms, but the president, especially after seeing some of the reports on the Hiroshima bombing, realized painfully how many noncombatants had been killed there by the atomic bomb.

Despite the massive numbers also killed in Tokyo in early March, Truman had good reason to know that the so-called conventional bombing, for multiple reasons, normally killed many fewer

in Japan's cities in an attack than had either of the two atomic bombings. Speaking to his cabinet on the 10th on his decision to halt the use of atomic weapons, Truman said, in the summary words of cabinet member Henry Wallace, "the thought of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible." According to Wallace, "[Truman] didn't like the idea of killing, as he said, 'all those kids.'" Before Hiroshima, at Potsdam on July 25th, Truman may briefly have felt similar concerns. But he vanquished them on the 25th, and they returned forcefully, in expressed words, on the 10th. That day, because of the conditional surrender offer, he could act on that uneasiness. He was not committed to abstain from atomic warfare, but he had committed himself to try not to use more atomic bombs on Japan.

VIII-Japanese Decision-making and the American Response to Japan's Conditional-Surrender Offer

Going beyond Butow's important 1954 book, Asada's 1998 essay, and Frank's 1999 volume, Hasegawa has provided the most probing study of the impact of Soviet entry and the atomic bomb on Japanese decision-making. His narrative and analysis conclude that the Nagasaki bombing, unlike the Hiroshima bombing, played no role in Japan's conditional-surrender offer.

Hasegawa's analysis of events in Japan for August 9/10-15 is likely to be far more controversial than his study of events in America for that period. Perhaps he expended more effort on the crucial matters in Japan, because of the likelihood of sharp controversy, and that may explain his overlooking some useful materials on the US side and his questionably interpreting others for that August 10-15 period. Well before Hasegawa's book, American decisions during August 10-15 were closely examined in a journal article nearly three decades ago, but the availability of added information and new questions suggests the need for reconsideration of this period, reaching beyond Hasegawa's study.

Using a source that was available more than 30 years ago, Hasegawa contends, questionably, that a State Department Japan expert, Joseph Ballantine, had to persuade Secretary Byrnes on the 10th not to endorse accepting Japan's conditional-surrender offer, because of the condition of allowing the emperor to retain his prerogatives. Ballantine did claim this accomplishment in his oral-history memoir 15 years later in 1961, but all the archival evidence from August 10-11, 1945, moves strongly in the opposite direction. Most notably, Walter Brown, Byrnes's assistant, indicates that Byrnes opposed making any concession because it would mean, in political terms in America, the "crucifixion" of the president. Why, asked Byrnes rhetorically on the 10th, according to Brown's summary at the time, should the US modify its terms and allow soft terms when the US, before possessing the A-bomb and before Soviet entry into the war, would not do so.

What has never been adequately explored, in depth, is American attitudes during the summer, and especially in August 10-15, 1945, on allowing the emperor to remain, even under MacArthur. In providing some useful background, Hasegawa argues earlier in his book that Truman during the summer in June-July, before the conditional surrender offer of August, had more political "space" than many have recognized to modify surrender terms and allow a constitutional monarchy.

Hasegawa's evidence, focusing heavily on various US columnists, is suggestive and warrants further development. He may be right, but there is some danger, as he knows, in conflating columnist opinion with public opinion or congressional opinion. When the Japanese conditional offer was announced on August 10th, Congressional members—there is evidence on about 18 or so—split about in half, with Democrats slightly more opposed (5-4) than Republicans (4-5) to accepting terms allowing a constitutional monarchy. A few Democrats like Senator Richard Russell were obviously eager to continue the war. Some Republicans, including Robert Taft ("Mr. Republican"), favored ending the war on modified terms. How much they were responding primarily to ending the war and avoiding more American casualties, and how much to hoping to minimize Soviet influence in the Far East by obtaining a quick, though conditional, surrender, remains unclear.

What historians have not adequately appreciated is how strongly Truman himself felt on this issue of a conditional surrender allowing maintenance of some form of emperor system and conceivably retention of Hirohito on the throne. Going beyond much of the earlier scholarship, Hasegawa briefly treated this matter of Truman's desires in an earlier segment of *Racing*, but may have gone somewhat wrong on Truman's motives. Hasegawa believed that Truman wanted revenge for Pearl Harbor and thus resisted allowing an emperor system. Unfortunately, *Racing* does not in depth discuss the key relevant evidence for this conclusion about Truman's motivation.

The key available evidence—a report to a *Time* journalist by two Democratic congressman, who summarized Truman's thinking on August 10th after the president's separate meetings with them—suggests a somewhat different motive by Truman: the quest for American-defined justice, and appropriate punishment, not revenge, with a desire to root out Japanese totalitarianism, which Truman linked to Hirohito and the emperor system. As the *Time* journalist summarized what Truman had reportedly said on August 10th in a meeting with a Democratic senator: The President "thought that no special concession should be made to preserve the emperor inviolate, that he was a war criminal just as much as Hitler or Mussolini, in many respects, and was now trying to weasel his nation out of war, preserving its essentially totalitarian structure."

But Truman, according to that journalist, had in effect acknowledged the conundrum, as that *Time* journalist put the matter in his own summary words: There was no alternative group "in Japan with whom to deal, or which might set up a government, so it might be essential to retain the emperor without making special concessions. Only through him could the surrenders [by the Japanese military] in the field be arranged."

When *Washington Post* publisher Eugene Meyer, whose paper had earlier suggested moving away from unconditional surrender, wrote to Truman on the 10th, that newspaper owner urged "insisting on the strict fulfillment of our peace terms," which, in Meyer's view, seemed to allow a ceremonial monarchy, if desired in the future by "the free will of the Japanese people." Truman, not getting bogged down in the details or the substance of Meyer's letter, replied on the 11th, rather bluntly but optimistically, "I believe we are going to get the thing settled without backing up on our unconditional surrender demand."

Truman and Byrnes, as well as Stimson and presumably Forrestal and Leahy, did not realize that the Byrnes-conceived reply to Japan's conditional surrender would provoke a crisis in the Japanese government, leading to a near-triumph there for continuing the war. The US official reply on the 11th implicitly (not explicitly) rejected the Japanese condition on prerogatives was dangerously ambiguous on whether some form of emperor system might be permitted. That reply of the 11th did include a provision for the emperor continuing (time unstipulated) under MacArthur, and spoke of the "ultimate form of government of Japan [being] established by the freely expressed Japanese will of the Japanese people." To Japanese leaders, the meaning of the American reply was uncertain, and some argued for fighting on because an emperor system had not been explicitly allowed.

On August 11th, President Truman and top advisers, not foreseeing the problems in Japan, thought that the Suzuki government would quickly accept the American terms. Secretary Stimson left for a vacation, apparently sure that Japan's surrender was imminent. Assistant Secretary McCloy, believing the war was virtually over, worried about what he should do in the postwar period.]

But the expected surrender response by Japan did not quickly occur. On August 12th, in a significant report (not discussed in *Racing*), Maj. General Clayton Bissell, the assistant chief of staff in army intelligence, sent General Marshall a revealing set of conclusions. Possibly Japan would not accept the American terms, and choose instead to fight on. If so, "atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days."

On August 13th, at the behest of General Marshall, Lt. General John Hull, the head of the operations division, queried one of Groves's assistants (Col. L.E. Seeman) on the schedule of future A-bombs and the possibility of using a batch (maybe about seven or eight) as tactical weapons as part of the still-scheduled November 1945 invasion. Being contemplated by Marshall, the tentative planning, after maybe using a third bomb if Japan did not speedily surrender, was to hold the other bombs until the invasion period. In briefly treating Hull's conversation with Seeman, Hasegawa did not note that the query about the availability of bombs originated with Marshall himself and was part of a tactical nuclear-warfare conception.

On August 13th (Monday), General Groves, who had held up the shipment of the third-bomb components because of Japan's conditional-surrender offer and Truman's new order on using A-bombs, informed one of Marshall's top aides that on Wednesday, the 15th, he would again ask his superiors about sending the components to Tinian. If such a shipment was approved, the planes would depart from New Mexico on the 16th, Groves stated, and the weapon on Tinian would be ready for use on the 20th or 21st. His message, by its statement of a schedule, implied that a sudden change in policy at a higher level before the 15th could mean a somewhat earlier shipment and somewhat earlier readiness at Tinian for use of the third A-bomb on Japan.

On the evening of August 13th, as Hasegawa notes, George Harrison telephoned McCloy to suggest issuing an ultimatum to Japan asserting that America's terms must be immediately accepted or the Potsdam terms would be withdrawn and the war would go on. Whether or not Harrison was including more atomic bombings in his thinking is unclear, but it seems likely that he anticipated dropping a third bomb soon if Japan did not quickly surrender. Shortly after

Harrison's call, McCloy, who was serving as Acting Secretary of War with Stimson on vacation, telephoned Patterson about an ultimatum to Japan. Summarizing that conversation, McCloy wrote in his diary: "Patterson agreed—feels strongly it should be done."

By August 14th, for Truman and Byrnes, anxiety and frustration were greatly building up because Japan had still not surrendered. That day, apparently with the approval of Byrnes, Walter Brown was crafting a drastic public warning to Japan: Surrender, or face more destruction, including presumably atomic bombings. Byrnes's lament, according to Brown, was that the third A-bomb would not be speedily ready. Apparently Byrnes believed the likely date was August 22nd.

On August 14th, (in a source not used in *Racing*), Truman met with high-ranking British visitors. At that noon-time session, according to then-secret British report back to London, Truman, despairing of the lack of a Japanese agreement, "remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo."

Whether Truman would in fact have chosen Tokyo, and risked killing the emperor, is unclear. Whether the president's comments that day should be taken literally, or simply as an expression of his growing frustration but not as a true commitment that day to an imminent third nuclear attack, is unclear. Nor is it clear that he knew that the key components of the third A-bomb, though ready for shipment, were still in Los Alamos and thus that the bomb, if he gave the shipment order that day, could not be assembled and ready for use from Tinian until about the 18th or 19th.

Despite uncertainties in interpreting the report on Truman's conversation of August 14th, it seems safe to speculate that, had Japan not surrendered in about the next week, a third atomic bomb would very probably, soon thereafter, have been dropped on Japan. Thus, Kokura, or Niigata, or perhaps Tokyo, or possibly even Kyoto, would have joined Hiroshima and Nagasaki as painful symbols of the "new world" of nuclear weapons.

With Japan's delay in surrendering, and with the growing evidence provided in "Ultra" intelligence of a large, continuing Japanese troop buildup on southern Kyushu, the pressure for the use of a third A-bomb might well have significantly increased on Truman. That would not have been so much a case of public pressure—though there was considerable popular-level support in the US for more atomic bombings—but, rather, of Truman's own concerns about the course and cost of the war for the US.

Had there been three or four atomic bombings, and not only the two nuclear bombings that did occur, how much would the analysis by historians change on the important counterfactual issues of missed opportunities to end the war by other means, and on the related issues of the comparative impact of Soviet entry and the atomic bomb in producing Japan's surrender?

Fortunately, more atomic bombs were not used. The war did end, and Truman happily announced the surrender at 7 p.m. on the 14th.

IX. The End of the War and the Future Challenges and Dissents

Celebrating that event, McCloy wrote in his diary on August 14th: "The bells are ringing, the wars are over." He went on to say: "Nothing left but to thank God, the soldiers and sailors and the dead. . . ." Yet, as Stimson, Truman, and others would soon come uneasily to recognize, Americans and others would sometimes question how the war was ended, whether the atomic bombings were necessary, and, yes, whether Soviet entry into the war could have been avoided. Those issues, often raised in the US by conservatives in 1945 like Herbert Hoover, *Human Events* editor Felix Morley, and *United States News* (later *U.S. News & World Report*) editor David Lawrence in 1945, would take on more salience in later years.

Such early rightwing revisionism, gaining more support in the late 1940s and in the 1950s among American conservatives including *National Review* in 1958, was often rather similar to an early leftwing revisionism, partly initiated in 1946 by Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter (who became Truman's Secretary of the Air Force). In the pens in 1948/49 of journalist Helen Mears and physicist P.M.S. Blackett, soon joined by others, that leftwing revisionism, with important variations and more sustained analyses over the years, would continue into the present.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who had started his end-of-the-war research with strong doubts about, if not hostility, to A-bomb revisionism certainly did not anticipate that he would become, in a sense, an heir of Blackett. Hasegawa's probing research, his effort to make sense of the sources, and his emerging interpretation pushed him, in ways he had not initially foreseen, toward the "Racing" framework. Of course, his valuable, thoughtful book, in multiple ways, often reaches beyond that framework.

X-Brief Conclusions

The events and issues involving the use of the atomic bombs, Soviet entry into the war, the ending of the Japanese war, and Japan's surrender are sufficiently complicated, especially when embedded in the larger context of US-Soviet-Japanese relations, that it is not difficult for a critic, without being churlish, to lament omissions in *Racing* and to argue with some of the book's interpretations. Probably no scholar who has worked in depth on even part of these complicated issues will endorse all of Hasegawa's analyses in his important study.

Nevertheless, the scholarly world is considerably indebted to Tsuyoshi Hasegawa for his honest probing research, his intelligent analysis, and his challenging interpretations and reinterpretations. To disagree with him is to appreciate, not diminish, his accomplishments. He has usefully evoked a valuable dialogue, and his thoughtful book will heavily influence the content of that dialogue in future years. That is, and will be, eloquent testimony to his achievement in *Racing the Enemy*.

In private discussions with Hasegawa before and after his volume appeared, in reading various parts of it in draft, in seeking critically to assess it, and in participating in a related project with him on Japan's surrender and the ending of the war, I have received considerable intellectual benefit. He has helped establish, as have Richard Frank and Gar Alperovitz in my dialogue with him, that civility and generosity in scholarship do not require interpretive agreement on major A-bomb/Japan surrender issues.

That is especially impressive because some of the interpretive questions—in the US particularly those involving the use of the A-bombs—are often understood to be important, directly or indirectly, in defining the nature of the Truman administration, perhaps the US government, and possibly the national society in 1945. For some interpreters, disputes on those matters have bitterly spilled over in recent years to rancorous dialogue, where scholarly and journalistic standards have been severely violated, where *ad hominem* attacks have unjustly occurred, and where unsubstantiated published claims, sometimes based on apparently non-existent documents, have gained support and where neither the authors nor the editors or publishers, when challenged, have provided the requisite evidence.

Hasegawa's fair-minded book, and his generous dealings with scholars who agree substantially or disagree substantially with him, is in marked contrast to the rather different behavior, which users of the web looking at blogs, attendees at some professional meetings, and readers of scholarly journals and popular-history magazines have observed among some amateurs and professionals writing on A-bomb/Japan surrender issues.

Note:

I have purposely not sought to footnote this essay. Some segments, as readers may recognize, are based on earlier work I have published. The brief treatment of Blackett and the more extended treatments of A-bomb expectations and the August 9/10-14 period in the US, as well as the brief statements about A-bomb revisionism by the right and left and the general historiography on why and how Japan surrendered, are based partly on various work still in draft. This essay does emerge, in part, from probably a half-dozen recent conversations with Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, and perhaps more than a dozen-and-a-half with my colleague, David Holloway. Over the years, for interpretive conversations and the sharing of research materials, I am indebted to many scholars, including, among others, Gar Alperovitz, Sadao Asada, Kai Bird, Conrad Crane, Edward Drea, Richard Frank, Gian Gentile, Michael Gordin, Sean Malloy, Robert Newman, Martin J. Sherwin, and J. Samuel Walker. Both Hasegawa and Holloway, as well as Thomas Maddux and other contributors to the roundtable, have been generous and patient in tolerating my tardiness in submitting my essay for this extended dialogue.

Because I am a poor typist, and undoubtedly did not catch all of my typographical errors, I apologize to readers. On-line “publishing,” with little delay between completion of an essay and its issuance on the web, means for me not having that normal third and fourth opportunity, including galleys, to catch such typos. Such on-line “publishing” is a new venue for me and I have not yet learned fully to adjust to its schedules and operations.

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Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Roundtable Editor: **Thomas Maddux**, CSU Northridge

Roundtable Participants:

Michael D. Gordin, Gar Alperovitz, Richard Frank, Barton Bernstein, David Holloway

Response to Barton Bernstein: Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, UC Santa Barbara

Barton Bernstein is the world's renowned authority on the atomic bomb issue whose knowledge of every conceivable piece of literature and archival evidence is unparalleled and whose trenchant criticism of scholarship on this issue has been well known. Therefore, I consider it to be a great honor to receive recognition from him that my book represents a "truly impressive accomplishment."

But one cannot write a book without expecting substantial criticisms from Bernstein. My book is no exception. In fact, he challenges my fundamental arguments that Truman and Stalin engaged in fierce "racing" in the endgame of the Pacific War and that Truman issued the Potsdam Proclamation, with the full expectation that this ultimatum would be rejected by the Japanese, to justify the dropping of the atomic bombs.

Bernstein disagrees with my interpretation of the Potsdam Proclamation. He argues that any reasonable reading of the Magic diplomatic intercepts in July and August would have convinced Truman and, for that matter, any other American policy makers that Japan was not near surrender, that the Japanese were hopelessly divided, and that revising the unconditional surrender demand would have emboldened the hard-liners within the Japanese government to fight the war to the end, thus prolonging the war. He further argues that even after Alamogordo Truman considered Soviet entry into the war "militarily desirable" and that Truman "had not acted to block or impede Soviet entry." He fundamentally disagrees with my interpretation on "racing" between Truman and Stalin, since my argument that "Truman believed the bomb would be a decisive weapon speedily ending the war, before mid-August and before Soviet entry" is "incorrect, contrary to evidence."

I. Truman and Magic Intercepts

Bernstein's argument about the Potsdam Proclamation has striking similarities to Richard Frank's argument. Both contend that the judgment of Truman and Byrnes to remove the passage promising the maintenance of "a constitutional monarchy under the current dynasty" from Paragraph 12 of Stimson's draft was based on their reading of the Magic diplomatic intercepts.

Strangely, Bernstein cites merely the Togo-Sato exchange after issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation to prove that Truman and other policy makers concluded that Japan was not near surrender, and therefore, that any modification of unconditional surrender might embolden the Japanese hard-liners. But the decision to remove the passage in question had been made long before the specific Togo-Sato exchange cited by Bernstein. This particular exchange, therefore, cannot be taken as decisive evidence to explain Truman's and Byrnes' motivation behind the removal of this passage. It might be possible to argue that Togo's August 2 telegram to Sato proves that even after the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation the Japanese government was hopelessly divided, and hence there was no reason for Truman to undo the decision to drop the bomb. But even this argument is undermined by Togo's specific reference to the Japanese government's "disposition" to make the Potsdam terms the "basis for negotiations." Bernstein defends Truman's decision not to explore this "disposition," presumably because Truman had no confidence in Japan's accepting these terms or because he was not interested in a negotiated settlement. This seems to indicate that unless the Japanese government offered unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam terms, Truman would have had no interest in reversing the decision to drop the bomb. In other words, Truman was not really interested in Japan's answer short of unconditional surrender once the Potsdam Proclamation was issued, as I argue in my book.

Two levels of analysis are needed to assess the meaning of the Magic intercepts. First, we must examine to what extent the picture that was depicted by the Magic intercepts corresponded to reality. Here, as I argue in my book, the world according to Magic did not necessarily correspond exactly to the more complex Japanese domestic situation. If it is inaccurate to conclude, as revisionist historians do, that the promise of the maintenance of the emperor system would have immediately led to Japan's acceptance of surrender, it is equally inaccurate to conclude, as Bernstein and Frank do, that such promise could not possibly have been rejected and that it would have emboldened the militarists and thus prolong the war. After the emperor's involvement in the decision to seek Moscow's mediation to terminate the war in July, the power balance between the war party and the peace party was subtly shifting in favor of the latter, and there was little doubt that the promise for the maintenance of "a constitutional monarchy under the current dynasty" would have emboldened the peace party. In fact, the peace party's strategy was to send Prince Konoe to Moscow without attaching any terms and to have the emperor impose the terms agreed upon in Moscow on the war party. Togo's reluctance to spell out the terms was not merely dictated by the hopeless political division, as Bernstein concludes, but also by his conscious strategy to circumvent the war party's opposition. Furthermore, Konoe's minimal condition that his advisers recommended was limited only to the preservation of the imperial house. Far from Bernstein's (and Frank's) assertion that the Japanese would most definitely have rejected the terms, even if they included that promise, one cannot easily dismiss a possibility that they might eventually have accepted surrender with the assurance of the preservation of "a constitutional monarchy under the current dynasty," although surely this formula would have encountered the war party's persistent resistance. There is little doubt, however, that this formula would have strengthened the peace party.

Of course, Japanese reality was one thing, and how the American policy makers interpreted Japanese political reality to be is another matter. It is therefore possible to argue that Truman and Byrnes had no choice but to construct their decision on the depiction of Japanese reality presented by Magic intercepts. So, the second question is: Did Truman and Byrnes decide to remove the passage promising the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy from Stimson's draft, based on their judgment that revising unconditional surrender would embolden the hard-liners in Japan? Two problems arise if one answers this question affirmatively. First, not everyone drew the conclusion that Bernstein and Frank draw from Magic. In fact, Stimson, McCloy, and Forrestal came to the opposite conclusion, primarily from Togo's July 12 dispatch to Sato, that the inclusion of this promise would encourage the peace party to seek the early termination of the war. There was no unanimity among the American policy makers as to how to read Magic.

But more importantly, there is no evidence to indicate that Truman and Byrnes made their decision on the basis of the Magic intercepts alone. If that were the case, there was absolutely nothing to prevent Truman and Byrnes from explaining the reason for their decision to Stimson. But when Stimson met Truman on July 16, Byrnes on July 17, and Truman on July 24, neither Truman nor Byrnes explained to Stimson that their reading of the Magic intercepts depicted a completely different picture from that presented by Stimson. Especially, his July 24 meeting was important in view of the intercepted Togo's July 21 dispatch to Sato, which I discussed at length in the previous post. This is what Stimson wrote in his diary:

"I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be the thing that would make or mar their acceptance. I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it." [1]

If Truman had carefully analyzed the Magic intercepts and concluded that the inclusion of this promise would embolden the military hard liners, why didn't he say so? Byrnes did refer to Togo's July 21 telegram, but as I already stated in my previous post in my response to Frank, this telegram did not play a decisive role in their decision, since the decision to remove the passage in question from Stimson's draft had been already made previous to their receiving this telegram.

II. Soviet Factor

One common approach shared by Bernstein and Frank is to put the Potsdam Proclamation merely in U.S.-Japanese relations, but to ignore the Soviet factor. If one compares Stimson's original draft with the final text of the Potsdam Proclamation, one notices two important changes. The first was the deletion of the passage that promised the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy. The second was deletion of the passages

that dealt with the Soviet Union and the deletion of the USSR from the title of the Proclamation. I argue in my book that all three factors--the Soviet entry into the war, unconditional surrender, and the atomic bomb--were closely related.

Bernstein's argument about the Soviet factor is subtle. He accepts that Byrnes was "clearly eager to end the war without Soviet entry into the war." But Bernstein makes a distinction between Byrnes and Truman. For Truman, "a Japanese surrender without Soviet entry would have been attractive," but he did not attempt to exclude the Soviet Union. "He had not acted to block or impede Soviet entry," since he knew that the Soviet entry into the war would accrue benefits to the United States.

As Bernstein himself admits, Truman had little he could do to "stop or speed up Soviet entry into the war." Truman had no control over Soviet actions with regard to its entry into the war. If so, it makes little sense to argue whether "he acted to block or impede Soviet entry." Truman's action with regard to the Soviet Union, however, was not as benign as Bernstein depicts here. If Soviet entry into the war accrued certain benefits to the United States, he certainly did not do anything to "speed up" its entry into the war. At his first Stalin-Truman meeting on July 17, Truman did not solicit Stalin's consent to enter the war. Despite Harry Hopkins' pledge that the issue of a joint ultimatum against Japan would be placed on the agenda at the Potsdam Conference, Truman consciously excluded Stalin from deliberations of the ultimatum, and deleted any reference to the Soviet Union from the final text of the Proclamation. Byrnes distributed the text of the Proclamation to the press before he sent it to the Soviet delegation, and when Stalin asked Truman to invite him to append his signature to the Potsdam Proclamation, Truman refused that request. Of course, he took no action to "block or impede Soviet entry," because he had no means to do so. But he did everything else to dissociate the United States from Soviet entry into the war.

Stimson wrote on July 23:

"[I] told him that I had sent for further more definite information as to the time of operation [of the atomic bomb] from Harrison. He told me that he had the warning message [Potsdam Proclamation] which we prepared on his desk, and had accepted our most recent change in it, and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation. We had a brief discussion about Stalin's recent expansions and he confirmed what I have heard. But he told me that the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the information as to S-1 [A-bomb project].

After lunch and a short rest I received Generals Marshall and Arnold, and had in McCloy and Bundy at the conference. The President had told me at a meeting in the morning that he was very anxious to know whether Marshall felt that we needed the Russians in the war or whether we could get along without them, and that was one of the subjects we talked over."

[2]

On the following day Stimson told Truman that he could infer from the conference with Marshall that "the Russians were not needed." Stimson then showed the president the most recent report from Harrison about "the dates of the operations." Stimson wrote:

"He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to Chiang Kai-shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the program we had received from Harrison." [3]

Stimson's diary quoted above makes it abundantly clear that in Truman's mind the issues of Soviet entry into the war, the deletion of the passage concerning a constitutional monarchy, and the atomic bomb were closely connected. When Forrestal told Byrnes that Truman had said "his principal objective at Potsdam would be to get Russia in the war," Byrnes responded that "it was most probable that the President's view had changed; certain that was not now my view." [4]

Truman's effort to exclude the Soviet Union must be understood in tandem with Stalin's anxiousness with which he wished to be invited to sign the Potsdam Proclamation. To append his signature to the Potsdam ultimatum was to justify the Soviet violation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan. Stalin had already received Hopkins' assurance that the issue of joint ultimatum would be placed on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. Stalin came to Potsdam with a Soviet version of the Potsdam Proclamation, which, like Truman's Potsdam Proclamation, included the demand for unconditional surrender. Truman's refusal to invite him to append Stalin's signature to the Potsdam Proclamation convinced Stalin that Truman was determined to force Japan's surrender before Soviet entry into the war. As I stated in the previous post in response to Holloway's comments, I believe that Stalin, prompted by Truman's refusal, attempted to move up the date of attack by one to two days.

The Soviet declaration of war that Molotov handed to Sato on August 8 (Moscow time) stated that the Soviet government decided to enter the war against Japan, since Japan had rejected the Potsdam Proclamation, which the Soviet government had joined with the invitation of the Allies, an obvious lie that Stalin concocted to justify the violation of the Neutrality Pact. When the news of the Soviet entry into the war reached Washington, Truman hastily held a news conference and read a brief statement that the Soviets entered the war. Byrnes also issued a statement in which he explained that the Soviet government had the legal right to enter the war on the basis of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the United Nations' Charter, but this statement pointedly implied that the Soviet government did not join the Potsdam Proclamation. Truman's news conference and Byrnes' statement betrayed the profound disappointment felt by the American leaders at the Soviet entry into the war.

Bernstein does not see any “racing” between Truman and Stalin. But if one carefully examines contemporary documents both from the American and the Soviet sides, one clearly see the fierce “racing” between the two leaders.

III. The Atomic Bomb as a Decisive Weapon

Bernstein criticizes my understanding of the atomic bomb as “fundamentally wrong,” since no policy makers had the expectations that one or two atomic bombs alone would be sufficient to force Japan’s surrender. Frank (in *Downfall*), Gordin (in his forthcoming book), and Holloway (in the forthcoming article) all agree with Bernstein.

In order to make this argument, Bernstein urges us not to take too literally “scattered, rather hyperbolic” words by Truman and others that state their expectations that the atomic bombs would be sufficient to force Japan’s surrender, but to rely on Truman’s actions as more reliable indicators. I find this historical method rather dubious.

As I argue in my book, I agree that both Stimson and Marshall did not believe that the atomic bombings would be sufficient to force Japan’s surrender. Incidentally, that was the fundamental reason why Marshall considered Soviet entry into the war an essential ingredient in the recipe for Japan’s surrender. I do not find Bernstein’s evidence disputing my contention convincing, however. And there is strong evidence to indicate that Truman and Byrnes actually believed that the atomic bombings would end the war quickly either before Soviet entry into the war, and if not before, shortly thereafter to minimize Soviet expansion.

To prove that Truman did not believe that the atomic bombs would be decisive in forcing Japan’s surrender, Bernstein argues that the president did not issue any order from Potsdam for demobilization and economic reconversion “to get ready quickly for an imminent peace.” But any prudent leader, in the midst of war, would not rush to the economic reconversion, until the war became finally over, since the final date of surrender was still unclear. Similarly, the Harrison-Patterson conversation and Krug’s view on weapons production are not necessarily convincing evidence to prove that Truman and all policymakers did not consider that surrender was imminent. To borrow Bernstein’s own metaphor of a doctor and a dying patient, even if one may know that death is imminent, one does not usually jump to organize the details of the funeral before the patient dies.

Forrestal’s memo to the President that suggested an alternative candidate for the position of commander for the forthcoming invasion of Japan’s homeland is likewise not necessarily a convincing piece of evidence that Forrestal believed that the war would last until November 1, the date of Operation Olympic. In my view, this letter should be understood in the context of the Navy-Army rivalry. Already at the July 23 meeting, Marshall explained to Stimson about the difficulty “to get along with MacArthur.” He explained: “Marshall has been spending most of his time in conferences in smoothing down the Navy. [5] As late as August 30, the Navy and the Army quarreled over who

was going to occupy Okinawa. This is what Admiral Cooke told General Hull on August 30:

“Well, there’s a question about transferring command of Okinawa to MacArthur for Olympic. We didn’t think it was necessary to transfer that command, but we went along with you and everybody, whether they agreed with it or not, carried it out. Now, there’s an order that they should adhere and it has been deliberately changed, and there was no reason for it. Nimitz can occupy it..And it was an agreed decision, and we just feel here that any time that MacArthur decides to change things without reference to Joint Chief of Staff and it’s upheld, we might as well turn in our suits as Joint Chief of Staff.” [6]

Looking at Forrestal’s August 8 letter to Truman in this light, it is possible to argue that what the Navy Secretary was concerned about was the position that MacArthur held as the commander of Operation Olympic. The letter does not indicate whether Forrestal really believed that the war would last as long as November 1.

Frank cites Joseph Grew’s memorandum to Byrnes on August 7 as evidence indicating that Grew saw Japan not close to peace “on terms acceptable to the U.S.” But on another memorandum sent to Byrnes on the same day (August 7), Grew stated that “the end of the Pacific War might come suddenly and unexpectedly,” and recommended the names of political advisers to be attached to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, anticipating the impending end of the war.[7]

Walter Brown, Byrnes’ trusted aide, wrote in the July 18 entry of his diary: “JFB [Byrnes] had hoped Russian declaration of war against Japan would come out [of] this conference. No[w] he thinks[s] United States and United Kingdom will have to issue [a] joint statement giving Japans two weeks to surrender or fac[e] destruction. (Secret weapon will be ready by [t]hat time).” Further he wrote on July 24: “JFB still hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in to much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press for claims against China.” [8] Forrestal wrote: “Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affairs over with before the Russians got in with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur.”[9]

One might say that those statements only refer to Byrnes, not Truman. But Byrnes was at the time the closest adviser to Truman. Furthermore, there are pieces of evidence to indicate that Truman believed in the effectiveness of the atomic bomb that might end the war before the Soviet entry into the war. Stimson’s diary I quoted above shows that on July 23 Truman instructed Stimson to have a conference with Marshall to find out whether the Russians were needed to end the war. This instruction was given to Stimson after Truman requested “more definite information as to the time of operation from Harrison.” The implication is quite clear: Truman wished to know whether Marshall considered it possible to end the war with the atomic bombs but without the Soviets. Although Marshall’s answer on the effectiveness of the atomic bomb was ambiguous, Stimson reported to Truman, inaccurately in my view, about Marshall’s “feeling that the

Russians were not needed.” [10] It seems possible to deduce from all this that Truman was hopeful, if not absolutely certain, to be able to end the war with the atomic bombs before the Soviets entered the war around August 15.

Truman received the news about the atomic bombing on Hiroshima on the USS Augusta, off the coast of Newfoundland, on the way back from Potsdam to Washington. All the eyewitnesses were unanimous about what they saw: Truman was jubilant about this news. Unable to contain his excitement, he jumped to his feet. Why was he so excited and jubilant? Unless one subscribes to the speculation that Truman was excited about the news of the mass killing of the Japanese—an unlikely case, in my view-- it is reasonable to assume that he was excited about the possibility of the early termination of the war, possibly, before the Soviets joined the war, and he was above all excited about the fact that the “timetable” that he and Byrnes had mapped out worked exactly as they had planned. After Truman read the statement about the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, a young sailor sitting beside him said: “I guess I’ll get home sooner now.” [11] There is no doubt that Truman shared the same feeling. Truman did not tell this sailor: “No, son, the war will go on a little longer.”

In my view Bernstein overstates his case that all the American policymakers were unanimous in their skepticism that the atomic bombs would end the war. This is certainly true to Marshall and Stimson, but whether Grew, Forrestal, and McCloy shared that skepticism is not conclusively proven. Most importantly, there is ample contemporary evidence to show that Byrnes and Truman expected the atomic bombs to be effective in inducing Japan’s surrender before the Soviet entry into the war.

V. Conclusion

I disagree with Bernstein’s criticisms of the three fundamental issues—the relationship between the Magic intercepts and Truman/Byrnes’s decision to delete the passage promising the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy, Truman’s view on the role of Soviet entry into the war, and American policymakers’ perception of the effectiveness of the atomic bombs. Thinking about the comments made by Bernstein and Frank, who view the issue involving the Potsdam Proclamation narrowly in terms of U.S.-Japanese relations, I am more convinced of the need to broaden the scope of our inquiry by bringing the Soviet factor to center stage.

This roundtable discussion has served as a useful forum for elevating our research on the ending of the Pacific War to a higher level. The comments made by all the contributors have made me go back to the sources and reevaluate them. As a result, I have revised my interpretations on a number of issues. Bernstein’s acknowledgement of my “fair-mindedness” and “generous dealings with scholars who agree substantially or disagree substantially” is a fitting tribute to this extremely useful roundtable discussion. I am glad to be a part of this spirited, but civilized discourse on one of the most contentious and important issues in the 20th century.

Notes:

[1] Stimson Diary, July 25, 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University.

[2] Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945.

[3] Stimson Diary, July 24, 1945.

[4] Walter Mills, ed., *Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 78.

[5] Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945.

[6] Telephone conversation, General Hull and Admiral Cooke, 0855, 30 August 1945, OPD, Exec. File #17, Item #35a, Folder #1, Telephone Conversations 6 Aug-25 Aug, 45, RG 165, National Archives.

[7] Grew to Byrnes, August 7, 1945, Letters of Joseph Grew, 1945, Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

[8] Walter Brown Diary, July 18, July 24, 1945, Folder 602, Folder 54(1), James Byrnes Papers, Clemson University.

[9] Mills, ed., *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 78.

[10] Stimson Diary, July 23, July 24, 1945.

[11] "Off the Atlantic Coast, Monday, August 6," Papers of Charles G. Rose, Harry S. Truman Library

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